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ABSTRACT
Effective brand management requires a thorough understanding of the consumer. In particular,
managers need to know which associations consumers have for their brands. In this study, we
address the role of anonymity in interviews designed to elicit brand associations from consumers'
memories. First, the concept of anonymity is examined in order to arrive at a useful definition.
Based on a review ofpotential psychological motives for response distortion and a review of the
nature ofbrand associations, we derive two types of anonymity; social - and self anonymity.
Social anonymity is defined as the degree to which respondents believe that someone else can
identify him or her as a respondent. Self anonymity denotes the extent of outer-directed awareness
during an interview, or in other words, the lack of self-focus.
An experiment involving 205 undergraduate students was conducted to test the effects on elicitation
outcomes of different techniques selected to induce different types of anonymity. Specifically,
techniques offering selfanonymity (such as third-person questioning) were deemed more effective
in alleviating motives ofresponse distortion than techniques offering no anonymity or social
anonymity (such as self-administered questionnaires). Self-anonymity was expected to be more
effective because this type of anonymity guards against both socially-directed and intra-psychic
motivations for response distortion. In support of this contention, for a brand with latent symbolic
associations, self anonymity was shown to evoke different and more valid associations than a non-
anonymity condition. Moreover, self-monitoring was found to be a significant negative moderator
of the ability of associations to predict brand attitudes when no anonymity was provided, whereas
no such effect of self-monitoring was observed for associations elicited under conditions of self
anonymity. This finding supports a motivational explanation of the effects of self anonymity
observed in this study.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
In this introductory chapter the focus of the present research is clarified in terms oftwo major
research questions. The first one focuses on the concept of anonymity: how should we define
it? The other question concerns possible effects of anonymity in elicitation interviews with the
purpose of eliciting brand associations from consumer memory: what are the effects of inducing
anonymity in such interviews? The opening section provides a background for the problems
addressed. The chapter concludes with a brief overview of the structure of subsequent chapters.
1
1.1. Background and positioning
During the last decades, brand management has become a dominant issue within marketing
research and practice (Shocker et al. 1993). In the words of Kapferer (1997, p.1S), "The 1980s
marked a turning point in the conception ofbrands. Management came to realise that the
principal asset ofa company was in fact its brand names". Moreover, managers recognized that
the value ofbrands was not rooted in the brand names as such, but in the positive and unique
meaning attached to brand names in customers' memories (Keller 1993). Thus, the focus on
brands and brand management lead to a stronger emphasis on customer perception and on
customer memory than ever before. As a result ofthis focus,brand associations (tentatively
defined here as information about a brand held by customers in their memories: see chapter 2 for
a discussion of the concept) became a fundamental concept in theoretical research on brand
management as well as in practical planning and implementation ofbrand strategies (e.g., Aaker
1996; Kapferer 1997; Keller 1993; 1997). In fact, the essence ofbrand management can be
described as the act of strategically selecting, and subsequently communicating, persistently
over time, the same set of favourable associations so that the brand becomes uniquely related to
these particular associations in the minds of customers (e.g., Keller 1993). Stated differently, a
main objective ofbrand management is to link a target set ofassociations more strongly to one's
own brand than to competitors' and thus create a favourably unique brand image.
When the overall purpose ofbrand management is to create a certain position for the brand in
the minds of customers, measuring and monitoring customers' brand associations becomes
imperative; brand associations can not be effectively managed ifthey are not appropriately
measured. However, because brand associations are not directly observable, managers have to
rely on indirect measures of customer' s memories -- typically in the form of introspective
reports, interviews, focus groups, and questionnaires. Such methodologies have many
weaknesses potentially resulting in various kinds ofbiases (to be explicated below) and
researchers are advised to exercise caution in the use ofresults from this kind ofresearch (e.g.,
LeDoux 1996; Nisbett and Wilson 1977; Russo, Johnson, and Stephens 1989; Weiser 1993).
The strategic importance ofbrand associations on the one hand and the inherent difficulties
associated with measurement of memories in general, raise some intruiging questions for brand
managers: Can our measurements ofbrand associations be trusted? How valid is elicited
information about the status of a brand in the mind of customers? Are we missing some
important aspects of consumers' brand perceptions?
The significance of these questions to brand managers implies that response validity should be a
central issue in research on brand associations. Different problems are subsumed under the label
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ofresponse validity. Here, we make a basic distinction between two general types ofresponse
problems in measurement ofbrand associations. First, there is a problem of accessibility (e.g.
Wilson and Nisbett 1977). As pointed out by Zaltman (1997) and others, associations are often
stored in terms of visual images which are not easily verbalized. In fact, it has been argued that
most mentallife is unconscious (Plutchik 1993). This raises the question ofwhether
conventional methods based on consumers' verbal self-reports are only capable of scratching
the surface of what we are really trying to measure.
Second, for verbally accessible associations, we have the problem of response bias, that is,
different kinds of response artifacts blurring or even altering ''true'' responses and thus
threatening the validity ofresearch results. In this dissertation, we focus on response bias in the
measurement ofbrand associations. Certainly, the problem of accessibility is an important one,
however, new basic theortical insight is needed on how to access non-verbal associations, and
specialised disciplines within psychology, such as psycholinguistics are more capable of
meeting this kind of research challenge than marketers. Response bias, on the other hand, is an
area of specific problems which can be more easily understood by means of established theories
from psychology such as theories of framing, impression management, and cognitive
dissonance (e.g., Schwarz, Strack, Hippler, and Bishop 1991; Jobe and Mingay 1991). Thus,
it seems like a tenable division oflabour to let relevant specialised subdisciplines ofpsychology
search for new insights on the problem of accessibility and for market researchers to exploit the
full potential of existing theories and empirical findings to understand different forms of
response bias in the measurement ofbrand associations.
The measurement ofbrand associations can be divided into two phases: (1) elicitation ofbrand
associations, and (2) measurement of different dimensions of elicited associations, e.g.
strength, favourability, uniqueness, etc. The purpose of the former is qualitative: to gain insight
into the nature of a brand' s association set, whereas the purpose of the latter is more
quantitative: to assess key dimensions producing differential consumer responses (Keller 1993).
Inqualitative elicitations of associations, numerous factors may influence respondents to report
other associations than those actually activated. For example, respondents could choose to
withold sensitive associations because such associations are not consistent with the kinds of
images respondents would like to display (Schlenker 1985;1986). When using rating scales in
quantitative measurements of various dimensions of elicited associations (e.g., favourability),
the kind of scale used, the wording of scale anchors, and the order in which associations are
rated -- as well as the broader context in which associations are measured -- may influence the
results of analyses (see Biemer, Groves, Lyberg, Mathiowetz, and Sudman 1991). Thus,
response bias probably is a highly relevant problem both inqualitative elicitation ofbrand
associations and in quantitative measurement of different dimensions of associations. However,
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the existing body of research on response bias has largely been concerned with quantitative
measurement, typically focusing on survey measurement techniques (e.g., Bradburn and
Sudman 1983; Schwarz et al. 1991). Moreover, rather few theoretical contributions are found
explaining relevant concepts and mechanisms underlying empirical fmdings (Jobe and Mingay
1991). For qualitative elicitation ofassociations, the literature on response bias is very meager
both on the empirical and the theoretical side (see our review ofanonymity in Chapter 4).
Because little is known about the nature of response bias in this context, very few guidelines
exists to help managers and researchers avoid response bias in elicitation ofbrand associations.
Thus, as illustrated in Figure 1, there is a void in the literature on theoretical development as
well as empirical investigation of response bias in elicitation ofbrand associations. The overall
purpose of this dissertation is to contribute to filling this gap in the literature.
Figure 1
STATE OF KNOWLEDGE ABOUT RESPONSE BIAS IN
MEASUREMENT OF BRAND ASSOCIATIONS
Quantitative Qualitative
Limited
Very limitedEmpirical Extensive
Theoretical Very limited
1.2. Socially desirable responding and anonymity
Response bias in elicitation interviews is a complicated and multifacted issue. Many different
kinds ofbiases could be addressed and it not possible to investigate them all within the context
of a single dissertation. Hence, we have chosen to focus on one particular kind ofbias. In this
dissertation we concentrate on an important class of motivationally conditioned response bias
often subsumed under the label of socially desirable responding. This type ofbias is caused by
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a general need of respondents to make a good impression and develop their self-concepts and,
hence, to adjust responses accordingly (Bradburn and Sudman 1983; Schlenker 1985). As for
most kinds of response biases, socially desirable responding has been largely investigated
within the context of quantitative survey measurements. For instance, people have been found
to overreport socially desirable behaviors such as library card ownership (Parry and Crossley
1950), voting at elections (National Opinion Research Center 1972; cited in Bradburn et al.
1979), and charitable giving (Parry and Crossley 1950). The majority of studies, though, have
focused on undesirable behaviors and revealed substantial underreporting ofbehaviors such as
traffic violations, consumption of alcohol (see Sudman and Bradburn 1983), use of drugs
(Aquillino 1990; 1994), and large numbers of sex partners (Tourangeau and Smith 1996).
Correspondingly, for attitudes, individuals have been found to systematically underreport
socially undesirable attitudes, e.g., sexist attitudes (Faranda, Kaminski, and Giza 1979) and
discriminatory beliefs about immigrant job applicants (Supphellen, Kvitastein, and Tvedt-
Johansen 1997).
The traditional way to mitigate such biases is to use some kind of procedure for inducing
anonymity amongst respondents (e.g., Bradburn and Sudman 1983). It is believed that under
conditions of anonymity, respondents are less concerned with the impressions they display and
thus engage in less strategic management of responses.
Whereas the survey literature is rich in empirical investigations on this topic, little is known
about social desirability biases in qualitative interviews and the potentially alleviating effect of
anonymity. Specifically, no study have been found on the issue of social desirability bias and
the role ofanonymity in elicitation ofbrand associations.
1.3. Research questions
In order to explore the impact of anonymity in elicitation interviews, a concise understanding
and definition of anonymity is imperative. Inspection of the literature on anonymity-inducing
techniques (see chapter 3 for a review) and the broader literature on anonymity reveals that
development and clarification of the concept ofanonymity is needed. In many studies
anonymity is manipulated, but not measured (i.e., there is no manipulation check). Thus, we
are led to believe that anonymity is equal to the manipulation as such. Other researchers,
however, explicitly treat anonymity as a psychological variable, usually referring to whether
respondents feel that their identity is revealed to others or not. Projective techniques, in tum,
seem to imply the existence of another kind of intrapsychic anonymity (Fisher 1993). Prior to
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any empirical comparison of anonymity manipulations, it is therefore deemed important to
clarify the conceptual properties of anonymity and develop a defmition which is useful in the
context of elicitation. Conceptual clarifications imply that the denotations and connotations of
the concept are thoroughly defined (Zaltman et al. 1973).
RQ 1: How should anonymity be defined in the context of elicitation of
brand associations?
When the concept has been clarified, empirical effects of anonymity manipulations can be
explored. As previously noted, the role of anonymity in elicitation of consumer memory is
largely unexplored. In particular, no studies have been found comparing the relative effects of
different anonymity approaches on elicitation outcomes. We address this issue by focusing on
effects of different anonymity techniques in elicitating brand associations. Anonymity
manipulations are potentially believed to affect outputs in two ways. First, anonymity may
effect the kind of associations reported. For instance, instead of reporting sensitive associations
such as ... .1 like the way the jeans make me look to the opposite sex, subjects may report less
relevant and less sensitive associations (e.g., the jeans are durable). Second, inducing
anonymity may effect the order in which associations are reported (response latencies).
Specifically, subjects may postpone reporting of sensitive associations until a favourable
impression has been displayed. Consequently, anonymity could result in sensitive associations
being reported earlier than in non-anonymity-conditions. These two effects may in turn affect
the ability of associations to predict brand attitudes and purchase intentions.
RQ 2: Will manipulations of anonymity affect elicitation results?
How will results be affected?
1.4. Significance of the topic
Anonymity is a central concept in marketing and empirical social science research in general. In
spite of fifty years of research on the effects of anonymity on socially desriable responding in
market research, little -- if anything -- is known about anonymity effects in elicitation of
consumer memory. To a large extent the scientific development within research on anonymity
has been hampered by underconceptualization of central concepts such as anonymity and
socially desirable responding (DeMaio 1984). Clarification of the concept ofanonymity may
lead to a more unified semantic understanding and usage of the concept, which in turn, will
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likely facilitate the comparison oftheories and techniques (Zaltman et al. 1973). Also,
conceptual clarifications provide a basis for more valid operationalizations, which is a necessary
precondition for controlling potential confounds in empirical examinations of effects of
anonymity. Thus, conceptual clarification may accelerate the scientific progress within this field
of research.
On the practical side, knowledge of the effects of various anonymity manipulations may
ultimately result in more effective brand management. Invalid data provide vague or -- at worst -
- misleading information about the brand, which in turn may result in poor marketing decisions
and nonoptimal or even harmful marketing activities. If, for instance, important associations are
not reported, brand managers may fail to detect strengths or weaknesses, which could be
instrumental in determining the success or failure of the brand. Moreover, if sensitive
associations are reported but latency scores distorted, managers may wrongly assume that such
associations are not salient in the mind of consumers, and therefore omit these associations from
further analysis and from strategic or tactical considerations. Thus, the validity of elicited brand
associations (and corresponding latency scores) can be conceived ofas highly relevant and
important competitive factors. Brand managers possessing thorough and valid information
about their brands have a competitive advantage over managers holding vague, incomplete, or
misleading information.
1.5. Structure of the dissertation
The pupose of Chapters 2 and 3 is to form a basis for answering the research questions. In
order to decide on a relevant and fruitful conceptual definition of anonymity (RQ1), and to judge
the effects of anonymity in an elicitation interview (RQ2), it is necessary first to understand the
psychological mechanisms that anonymity is supposed to guard against, and to understand the
nature ofwhat we are trying to measure: brand associations. Consequently, Chapter 2 presents
a review of the psychology ofresponse distortion, and Chapter 3 provide a review of the
concept and elicitation ofbrand associations. Subsequently, anonymity is defined in Chapter 4.
On the basis of the conceptual reviews, hypotheses are developed in Chapter 5 regarding the
nature of anonymity and it's effects on elicitation outcomes. Since manipulations of anonymity
often have not been subjected to manipulation checks, or -- when checks have been performed -
- only have been checked for one type of anonymity, the first hypotheses concerns the abilities
of different methodological approaches for inducing the two major kinds of anonymity defined
in Chapter 4. The following hypotheses regards the effects of the anonymity manipulation on
the types and latencies of associations reported and expected effects of the manipulation on the
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ability of associations to predict brand attitudes and intentions. Also, hypotheses are developed
for interactions between self-monitoring and the anonymity-manipulation. InChapter 6, the
methodology used to test hypotheses are presented and discussed. Chapter 7 contains
descriptive statistics and tests oftwo potential confounds, and Chapter 8 presents the results of
hypothesis-testing. Finally, the results are summarized and discussed, and directions for future
research delineated in Chapter 9.
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CHAPTER 2
SOCIALLY DESIRABLE RESPONDING:
REVIEW AND SYNTHESIS
Our first research question asked for a definition of anonymity. When defining concepts, it is
seldom friutful to speak of right and wrong. Rather, definitions should be evaluated in terms of
their usefulness (Zaltman, Pinson, and Angelmar 1973). The concept of anonymity serves a very
specific purpose in the consumer research literature: it is considered as the major means of reducing
social desirable responding in empirical investigations. On that account, it seems pertinent to
review the concept of socially desirable responding first in order to define relevant dimensions of
anonymity. Moreover, such a review is needed in order to understand potential effects (and non-
effects) ofanonymity-inducing techniques on elicitation outcomes (research question 2).
In this chapter we first present a briefreview of socially desirable responding (section 2.1.). Next,
we introduce some psychological mechanisms that might lead to response distortion, but which are
not commonly included in the concept of socially desirable responding (section 2.2). These
mechanisms are synthesised into a more generic concept of motivational response distortion, for
which socially desirable responding is regarded as a subdimension (2.3.). Subsequently, the
nature of response distortion in elicitation interviews is addressed in section 2.4. The final section
(2.5.) focus on the question ofhow social desirable responding can be detected.
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2.1. Socially desirable responding (SDR)
A thorough discussion of socially desirable responding (SDR) would be a dissertation in itself. We
can only afford a briefreview ofmajor dimensions. In this section, we focus on the covert
psychological processes leading to biased responding. The kinds of overt behavioral responses
resulting from these processes are highly dependent on the specific kind of research conducted.
Potential behavioral biases in the elicitation ofbrand associations are discussed in section 2.4.
DeMaio (1984) reviewed the concept and measurement ofSDR in surveys and concluded that:
The literature reviewed here shows that conceptual ambiguities plague the notion of social
desirability. Simply conceived, social desirability is a tendency on parts of respondents to
give favourable impressions of themselves. The source of a respondent Os notion of what
arefavourable expectations is ambiguous (DeMaio 1984, p.276)
In other words, the major conceptual problem ofSDR is the definition of desirability. In her
review, DeMaio gave examples of different translations of the term found in previous research.
One source of conceptual confusion has been the distinction between social desirability as a
personality trait and as a response set. In this dissertation we concentrate on response sets. Still
after this limitation, no clear-cut and consistent definition is available. Instead, several different
measurement procedures can be found reflecting different (implicit) conceptual models. For
instance, Sudman and Bradburn (1974) measured SDR by letting a staffofresearchers code the
social desirability ofanswers given. The underlying notion ofwhat was socially desirable was
adapted from the concept of need for social approval. According to the degree to which answers
were consistent with such a need, they were coded on a three-point scale: no possibility, some
possibility, or a strong possibility of socially desirable answering. Others added the notion of
threat in their definition ofSDR (Cannel et al. 1977), including events that are perceived as
embarrassing or sensitive in nature. In later work by Bradburn and colleagues (1979) the terms
"acceptable" and socially desirable were used interchangeably, thereby indicating yet another
notion of SDR.
This conceptual confusion over SDR in survey research could, to a large extent, be due to a
seemingly disproportionate focus on behavioral responses at the expense ofpreceding
psychological mechanisms. Thus, we tum to the psychologicalliterature in order to identify major
psychological dimensions of SDR. Since SDR is viewed as "the tendency on parts of respondents
to give favourable impressions ofthemselves", the literature on impression management appeared
especially pertinent for this purpose.
JO SOCIALLY DESIRABLE RESPONDING: REVIEW AND SYNTHESIS
Consonant with the notion of SDR, impression management pertains to conscious motivations to
display a favourable impression to other people (Leary and Kowalski 1990). In the context of
elicitation, impression management then refers to respondents' cognitions aimed at creating a
favourable impression with the interviewer or imagined others. Hence, the focus of attention is
mainly outwardly directed towards the reactions of the interviewer or imagined others. The
underlying motivational mechanisms might be either defensive or assertive. Specifically, three
kinds of motivations may be operating (Leary and Kowalski 1990).
First, the objective of impression management might be to maximize the reward-cost ratio
(Schlenker 1980). The right impression is more likely to result in desired outcomes or the
avoidance of undesired outcomes. In the context of elicitation, desired outcomes could be social
approval or a sense of acceptance or companionship, or anexpected monetary reward or gift for
participating in the research.
A second motivating factor is the maintenance or enhancement of respondents' self-esteem. For
instance, the interviewer's reactions to the responses given (e.g., nodding or verbal comments)
might raise or deflate the subject' s self-esteem. Likewise, some associations might be more or less
compatible with a feeling of self-confidence. The respondent is likely to make impressions that will
elicit esteem-enhancing reactions. Notably, this kind of distortion can happen even in the absence
of overt feedback from an interviewer, based on the imagined reactions of others (Darley and
Goethals 1980).
Third, impression management can serve the function of identity development (e.g., Gollwitzer
1986). Respondents may display certain thoughts or opinions in order to indicate the possession of
certain identity-relevant characteristics. For example, a young promising business woman can
solidify or develop her identity as a successful business woman by reporting identity-consistent
associations when interviewed about some clothing brand. The three motives usually overlap. For
example, the business woman's successful display of an identity-consistent impression would
likely also raise her self-esteem.
From this brief review of motivations underlying impression management we assume that SDR
results from three motivational objectives: (1) maximizing of reward-cost ratios, (2) maintainance
or enhancement of self-esteem, and (3) identity development The two latter objectives expand the
traditional notion of SDR as an expression of needs for social approval. Moreover, when self-
esteem rnaintainence and identity development are acknowledged as sources of motivational
response bias, other motivational processes than impression management -- which might lead to
distortion of responses -- become relevant. Such processes or mechanisms are addressed next.
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2.2. Private self management and situational self-deception
Several researchers have reported findings indicating that individuals are concerned with the
presentation ofselfunder private conditions, i.e., when no other persons are present. For instance,
Schlenker, Hallam, and McCown (1983) reported that self-enhancement occurred about equally
under private and public conditions when their subjects made attributions for the positive act of
helping another person. Similar findings are reported by Arkin et al. (1980), Burger (1980), Frey
(1978), and Greenwald and Breckler (1985). Thus, it seems pertinent to speak of the private
dimension of impression management, tentatively termed private self-management. Whereas
impression management refers to strategic self-presentation to others, private self-management is
defined here as respondents conscious efforts to control their own impressions of themselves (the
private self). The private self is the set of salient self-associations which are activated when the
consumer is objectively self-aware. Like impression management, private self-management refers
to a strategic conscious process and is mainly based on the motivations of self-enhancement or
identity development. However, impression management is outwardly directed toward the
interviewer and thus concerned with the social self concept, while the private variant is inwardly
directed, focused on the actual or ideal private self (Sirgy 1982). The inclusion of a private side of
self-presentation is consonant with Schlenker's (1984; 1985) notion of self-identification, which is
defined as "the process, means, or result of showing oneself to be a particular type of person,
thereby specifying one's identity (Schlenker 1986, p. 23). This concept explicitly accounts for
both a private and a public side to identity development:
Fixing and expressing identity involves systematically defining and categorizing
oneself, bringing relevant evidence and experiences to bear. It is accomplished
privately, through contemplation of oneself, and publicly, through self-disclosure, self-
presentation, and other activities that serve to construct one 's identity for audiences
(Schlenker 1986, p. 23)
The distinction between social and intrapsychic concepts is much debated in the psychological
literature (for a critical review, see Tetlock and Manstead 1985). Inour conceptualization of
response distortion we maintain that impression management and private self-management are
partly overlapping but still separate concepts. In general, two concepts should be regarded as
distinct iftheir antecedents and/or consequences are different (Singh 1991). There are indications
of such differences in the literature (see Carver and Scheier 1985). For instance, in the above-cited
study by Bradley et al. (1982) subjects showed self-enhancing biases only when their attributions
were made in a private as opposed to a public setting. Thus, the private context resulted in another
psychological process than the public one. Correspondingly, and most importantly, the antecedents
(and possibly consequences) ofimpression management and private self-management are expected
to be different in elicitation interviewes. For example, the use of self-administered questionnaires
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(SAQ) is likely to result in private self-management rather than impression management. When a
SAQ is used, the subjects respond on a standard questionnaire, which is subsequently put in an
anonymous envelope. There is no interaction between the respondent and the interviewer during
the response session and the interviewer cannot couple responses and respondents under or after
the interview. In this situation, private self-management is more likely to occur than impression
management because the respondent is left alone with hislber private self. Vice versa, impression
management is probably the more dominant mechanism in more public response situations, e.g.,
when respondents report their responses directly to the interviewer verbally. These examples
illustrate that both mechanisms are relevant within the context of interviewing.
Yet another mechanism described in the psychologicalliterature seems relevant to an interview
context: self-deception. Whereas impression management is characterized as conscious self-
presentation to others and private self-management as conscious management of the private self,
self-deception is a more unconscious or pre-conscious process mainly serving the function of
protecting one's self-esteem (Greenwald 1980). Major contributors within cognitive social
psychology have described self-deception as a pre-conscious "front-end processor" which enables
people to avoid knowing negative and threatening things about themselves (Greenwald 1980;
1988). In our conceptualization of motivational response distortion in the elicitation interviews, we
adopt this perspective on self-deception. This position is consistent with the fundamental and
pervasive assumption within this stream ofresearch -- that self-deception is usually characterized
by lack of awareness (Gur and Sackeim 1979; Sackeim 1988). In the context of elicitation,
subjects report on established associations in long-term memory. Thus, self-deception is defined
here as pre-conscious avoidance of attention to threatening information in the associative network.
The respondent is obejectively self-aware, that is, his focus is inwardly directed towards hislber
own opinions and beliefs (Duval and Wicklund 1972), but s/he is not consciously aware that some
threatening information is censored. Threatening information in this context refers to brand
associations which are highly inconsistent with the real or ideal self-concept (Sirgy 1982). For
example, associating a Mercedes with a certain group ofpeople (selfish materialists) that conflicts
with one' s self-concept.
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2.3. Synthesis: Motivational response distortion
In addition to impression management, two other psychological mechanisms potentially resulting
in the motivationally conditioned distortion ofresponses have been identified. We suggest that all
three mechanisms are included in a generic concept of motivational response distortion. This
concept embraces three different established psychological mechanisms of which all may lead to
the distortion ofinterview responses. The properties of the three mechanisms are summarized in
Table 2.3.
Table 2.3.
PSYCHOLOGICAL DIMENSIONS OF MOTIVATIONAL RESPONSE DISTORTION
Mechanisms
Situational
Private self impression
management management
(PSM) (SIM)
Private Social
Mostly Mostly
conscious conscious
Defensive Defensive or
or assertive assertive
Maintain or Maintain or
enhance private enhance social
self-concept self-concept
Characteristic
Situational self-
deception
(SSD)
Psychological context Private or
social
Level of consciousness Pre-conscious
Type of psychological
mechanism Defensive
Psychological function Avoid threatening
self-knowlege
In order to distinguish between impression management as a trait and as a response set, we use the
term situational impression management (SIM). SIM is not a stable personality factor, but a
temporary reaction caused by the interaction ofa self-relevant social situation (an interview) and a
self-relevant stimulus (e.g., instructions to report brand associations). Self-deception is a pre-
conscious process initiated by the stimulus. No conscious management ofactivated thoughts are
involved, but still, different stimuli (e.g., instructions to report associations about different brands)
might evoke different levels of self-deception. Thus, self-deception is also considered as a
psychological response set and termed situational self-deception (SSD).
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Furthermore, the characteristics of the three mechanisms imply that at least two of them may occur
together in a given situation. Also a likelyorder of mechanisms can be posited. More precisely,
SSD as a pre-conscious process is likely to happen first. When long-term memory is searched for
associations which are then transferred to working memory, some associations are pre-consciously
censored -- probably the most threatening associations -- in order to protect the self. This
contention that SSD is the first mechanism to be evoked is consistent with the principle of cognitive
economy (Conrad 1972) in the sense that SSD, as the most important self-protective mechanism, is
an automated pre-conscious process. The concept of cognitive economy implies that the cognitive
system seeks to minimize it' s workload due to limited processing capacity. Thus, important
cognitive tasks which are frequently performed, may be automated because automated processing
does not occupy as much cognitive capacity as more conscious processing. Subsequently, when
SSD has been operating, SIM or PSM may occur depending on whether the context is private or
social. A process model ofmotivational response distortion is depicted in Figure 2.3.
Figure 2.3.
A PROCESS MODEL OF MOTIVATIONAL RESPONSE DISTORTION
I pre-co~sciousprocess
Conscious
process
l
YES
NO
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2.4. Behavioral consequences of motivational response distortions in
elicitation interviews
Inpersonality psychology and the survey literature in general, the major behavioral expressions of
motivational response distortion are under-reporting and over-reporting of specified behaviors or
attitudes. In the context of elicitation, the objective is different: to bring forth associations from
consumers' memory. Thus, we need to identify the behavioral expressions of motivational
response distortions in this context. Three major kinds of distortions are posited.
Non-response. The first obvious kind ofbehavioral response distortion pertains to situations
where respondents withold activated information and do not report it at all. Non-response is a
major kind of distortion within survey research (Bradburn and Sudman 1983), and is a serious
type ofbehavioral response distortion in the elicitation ofbrand associations. When important
associations are not reported, brand managers have biased guidelines for managing the brand.
Constructive reporting. Instead of refusing to respond, respondents might avvoid the sensitive
response activated from memory, and rather report something else, or report a modified version of
the activated response. For example, experiments have shown that when people are asked to
respond to sensitive issues, they tend to replace disclosure depth with disclosure breadth (Jones
and Archer 1976). Thus, respondents give the impression ofreciprocating while still maintaining
boundary controlover the private domain or, alternatively, while avoiding the display of socially
undesirable characteristics. Probably, in such a situation respondents will tend to activate
information which is perceived of as socially acceptable according to prevalent social norms.
Latency-bias. Finally, respondents might actually report the sensitive activated associations, but at
a later point of time than they were actually activated in order to first ensure that an acceptable
impression is displayed. This kind of response can be explained by theories of conversation.
Elicitation interviews may be regarded by respondents as a kind of conversation. Bringham and
More (1959) even defined the research interviewas a "conversation with a purpose". Hence,
normative principles for natural conversations might also apply to elicitation interviews. Strack and
Schwarz (1990) demonstrated that cognitive processes underlying several well-known response-
effects in survey interviews (though response distortion was not addressed) are compatible with
the principles of conversation suggested by Grice (1975). One major principle discussed by Grice
is the principle of cooperation. Cooperation means, among other things, that people want their
contribution to be "as informative as is required" (p. 117). To withold information is not consistent
with this principle and is likely to cause at least moderate levels of stress. The conflict is between
the concern of displaying a favourable impression with respect to the focal issue and the concern
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for appropriate conversational behavior. When the respondent feels that slbe has made an
acceptable impression, slhe might eventually report the sensitive associations in order to relieve the
tension. This is most likely to happen after pauses in the elicitation interview, when the subject
runs out of (alternative) less sensitive responses.
Discussion. It should be noted that all three forms ofbehavioral distortions may occur witin the
same interview. In fact, ifrespondents are engaged in constructive reporting or distortion of
response latencies, at least one other type of distortion is also present. For example, iflatencies are
distorted, this would necessarily imply prior constructive reporting, and vice versa; constructive
reporting leads to distortions oflatencies or non-response. Non-responding is the only type of
distortion that theoretically may occur alone. Still, the cost of conscious non-responding is
probably higher than the cost of constructive reporting and distortion of response latencies. Thus,
constructive reporting (and hence distortion ofresponse-Iatencies) assumably occur prior to non-
responding in many instances. Non-response resulting from preconscious motivational distortions,
i.e., situational self-deception, is however more likely to happen alone.
2.5. What is a "true" unbiased response?
In order to decide when responses are subjected to motivational distortions, we need a basis of
comparison: what is a ''true'' unbiased response? This question is as tricky as it is important.
In studies on socially desirable responding in the survey literature, the true answer is sometimes
known because the object of study is some kind ofknown behavioral frequency (e.g., speeding
fees, voting frequencies, or abortion frequencies in a specified area). Notably, however, the true
answer is seldom known on an indiciduallevel. By means of random sampling from a population
with known frequencies, distortions can usually be detected on the group level only by comparing
group and population figures (see Sudman and Bradburn 1983). Usually, the true response is not
known. Especially, for variables such as opinions, beliefs, attitudes, and intentions, which are all
mental constructs residing in people' s memories, no measure exists for deciding what is a true
response. How can we decide then, whether a given response has been distorted?
When the true answer is not known in the absoulte sense, researchers have to use a relative
approach. For example, Aquillino (1994) found that more drug use was reported when subjects
responded on self-administered questionnaires (SAQ) than when answers were given on ordinary
questionnaires with their names on them. From this finding, Aquillino inferred that less distortion
occured under the SAQ-condition because drug use is a sensitive issue which people tend to
underreport, and the SAQ-procedure provides a sense of anonymity, which make people more free
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to report their true repsonses. Relatedly, the ability ofbeliefs - measured under conditions of
varying degrees of anonymity - to predict attitudes or intentions has been used to infer distortion.
Specifically, when some beliefs are known to be sensitive, and the predictive ability is lower for
conditions with no anonymity than for conditions under which subjects are anonymous, this is
taken as an indicator of distortion in the non-anonymity condition (see Supphellen et al. 1997).
This kind of logic is fundamental in most research on social desirable responding and implies that
in order to infer the presence of distortion, researchers need to show that (a) less sensitive
responses are reported in the control group than under anonymous conditions, and (b) that people
actually feel more anonymous in the anonymity-condition than in the control group. The latter
criterion refers to the significance of effects of anonymity manipulations, which are often taken for
granted in studies of effects of anonymity on social desirable responding (no manipulation checks).
Another more serious problem with this approach is the measurement ofsensitivity (criterion a).
The task of measuring whether a given belief or attitude is sensitive (to distortion) is a difficult
task, which itselfis susceptible to social desirable responding because distortion ofresponses will
usually be regarded as inconsistent with appropriate or desirable conduct. Therefore, Sudman and
Bradburn (1983) have recommended that sensitivity is measured by means ofthird-person
questioning. Their measure of sensitivity focused on the emotional reaction of respondents when
asked specific questions: "please, tell me whether you think those questions would make most
people very uneasy, moderately uneasy, slightly uneasy, or not at all uneasy." (Bradburn et al.
1978, p.223). This measure relies on the process ofprojection: that respondents, when subjected
to the focal questions, will transfer their own uneasiness to other people. We will come back to
operationalization issues in later chapters.
Whereas the two criteria mentioned above are necessary, theyare not sufficient in order to infer
that motivational distortion of responses has occured or that some kind of anonymity manipulation
have reduced motivational distortions. There are possible rival explanations: effects of anonymity
are not necessarily moderated or mediated by motivational mechanisms. For example, anonymity
manipulations may in some instances lead respondents to believe that they are expected to report
sensitive associations (see Singer, Hippler, and Schwarz 1992). Hence, reporting of more
sensitive beliefs under conditions of anonymity may stem from selective activation of sensitive
beliefs. This and other alternative mechanisms have to be considered in the design of the empirical
study and in discussions of findings.
When discussing the truthfulness ofresponses, another aspect of the conventional approach to
investigating socially desirable responding should be mentioned: the phenomenon is studied within
a research context. Correspondingly, in elicitation ofbrand associations, the focus is on the extent
to which associations reported in an interview can be assumed to reflect the same set of
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associations which are actually activated from memory in that situation. Notably, a «true» non-
distorted response in this situation mayor may not be similar to the set of associations that would
be activated in a real purchase situation.
2.6. Summary
In this chapter, we developed a generic concept ofmotivational response distortion (MRD)
consisting ofthree types of distortion: (a) situational impression management (SIM), (b) private
selfmanagement (PSM), and (c) situational self-deception (SSD). All three mechanisms may occur
in an interview setting. Specifically, PSM and SSD may even operate when no interviewer is
present. This recognition have important bearings on the discussion ofhow to define and measure
anonymity (see Chapter 4).
Based on the discussion of antecedent psychological processes, we also addressed the behavioral
consequences in an elicitation context. Three types of distortions were identified: (l) non-response
(holding back activated associations), (2) constructive reporting, that is reporting of irrelevant,
non-sensitive associations instead of sensitive associations, and relatedly, (3) latency-bias,
instances in which associations are reported later than actually activated. More specific
consequences of distortion in elicitation ofbrand associatios are discussed in later chapters.
Finally, we addressed the question ofhow motivational distortions can be detected. At this point
we concluded that no objective standard of true responses is available, but that the relative ability of
different techniques to elicit sensitive and predictive associations can be measured. Hence, the
presence ofmotivational response distortions (and the presence ofrival mechanisms) must be
inferred from the characteristics of elicitation outcomes and the attributes of the different
conditions under which associations are elicited.
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CHAPTER 3
THE CONCEPT AND THE ELICITATION
OF BRAND ASSOCIATIONS
InChapter 2, three different types of motivational response distortions in elicitation interviews
were presented. In order to develop an understanding of more specific effects of distortion in
elicitation ofbrand associations, and to arrive at a definition of anonymity pertinent to such
distortions, we need to explore the nature ofbrand associations and the process of elicitation. What
kinds of associations will be affected? How? Though testable hypotheses are not presented until
Chapter 5, the conceptual basis for the hypotheses is developed here. Moreover, in this chapter we
seek to define the measurement task of elicitation in order to explore potential rival effects of
anonymity manipulations.
The chapter opens with a brief review of general properties of associative networks (section 3.1.).
Next, relevant dimensions ofbrand associations that may be affected by motivational distortions
are discussed in section 3.2. Characteristics of elicitation interviews is the focal matter of section
3.3.
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3.1. Properties of associative networks
Brand associations are organised in cognitive networks in consumers' memories (Keller 1993;
1997). In this respect, brand associations are not any different from any other kind of association.
In this section, major properties of associative networks and memory representations are briefly
reviewed. The literature on this topic is extensive (see Collins and Loftus 1975; Raaijmakers and
Shiffrin 1981; and Anderson 1983 for more elaborate presentations). Again, we can only afford a
brieflook at major properties. First we discuss how brand associations might be represented in the
associative network, that is, the relevant kinds ofmemory codes. Second, we address the major
structural properties of associative networks, and finally, processing properties are reviewed, that
is properties describing how the network of associations works when it is subjected to some kind
of internal or external stimulus and cognitive processing takes place. Finally, implications for
motivational response distortion in elicitation interviews are discussed.
3.1.1. The representation of brand associations.
Contempomry conceptualizations ofbrand memory define brand associations as nodes in semantic
networks (Keller 1993; Aaker 1991). As a consequence, brand associations are most often viewed
as propositional representations ofbrand-related knowledge. Propositions are sentence-like
representations consisting of a set of nodes and links in which each node is a noun, verb or
adjective and each link is the relation between ideas (Anderson 1983), e.g., «Mercedes is a high-
quality automobile». However, restricting the mode of representation ofbrand associations to the
propositional mode reflects an outdated view ofassociative memory. In fact, in other areas of the
marketing literature the dual-coding theory ofPaivio (1971) and related theories has since long
been adopted. Paivio contended that pictoral and sometimes also verbal stimuli result in the
formation ofboth verbal (propositional) and visual/spatial memory codes. The relevance of
imagery representations to marketing problems is well documented in the literature (e.g., Lutz and
Lutz 1978; Houston et al. 1987; Unnava and Burnkrant 1991; Rossiter 1980). For instance, it has
been shown that high imagery words (words that evoke visual images, e.g.; Ford Mustang) are
remembered better than low imagery words (Ford Mondeo). This effect is attributed to the
assumption that high imagery words are represented in two codes which in turn enhances
retrievability. Moreover, a third kind ofmemory code has gained widespread acceptance in the
cognitive literature; the mode ofrepresentation termed temporal strings (Anderson 1983). This
kind of representation preserve the sequential structure of information and seems particularly
pertinent to memory ofbehavior (Fiske and Taylor 1995). In other words, some of the knowledge
derived from the observation of behavioral actions involving the brand probably is stored in the
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form oftemporal strings (such as a series of actions for how to operate a Xerox machine). For
example, current conceptions oflong-term memory imply that information can be represented in
the form of (at least) three kinds of memory codes: propositions, imagery or temporal strings.
Moreover, Anderson (1983) has argued that all three memory codes are compatible with an
associative network model oflong-term memory. Finally, a triparite-view of the representation of
brand associations is consistent with the current view ofhow product knowledge is represented in
long-term memory (Brucks 1986; Johnson 1989).
3.1.2. Structural properties of the associative network model.
Several variants of the associative network model are found in the cognitive literature. In this brief
review we mainly borrow perspectives from Anderson' s (1983) conceptualization. According to
Anderson, knowledge (e.g. brand associations) is stored in memory in terms of cognitive units
(or associations). Each cognitive unit can appear as an element in other units. For instance, two
associations can be represented in different codes, e.g., one as a proposition (Mercedes signals
German quality) and the other as a visual image (Germany pictured on a map). The element
Germany links the units together even though it is represented in different memory codes in the
two units. Thus, cognitive units (or associations) are tied together in networks by joining
elements.
Following the basic principles of categorization (Rosch 1975) and cognitive economy (Conrad
1972), brand associations within the network are assumed to be organized into hierarchical
structures according to their level of similarity and abstractness. Abstraction implies a
concentration of concrete associations into more general associations. Various attributes tap into
benefits, which in turn are linked to attitudes. Correspondingly, a single category ofbrand
associations, e.g.,Junctional benefits may be found at different levels of abstraction. This
conception of hierarchical relationships is consistent with Anderson' s (1983) notion of tangled
hierarchies. One major implication ofthis hierarchical organization is that the abstractness of
product attributes applied in consumer judgements varies directly with the abstractness of the
product (Johnson and Fornell 1987).
Further, cognitive theory suggests two organizing principles, and thus two kinds of categories of
associations which may overlap or cut across the hierarchies based on abstraction: taxonomic and
goal-derived categories (Barsalou 1983; 1985). Taxonomic categories contain "dictionary-
knowledge" of natural objects, independent of contexts, e.g. associations describing what a car is.
Goal-derived categories are organized according to specific processing objectives, for instance
''things to consider when buying a car". Previous conceptualizations ofbrand image and brand
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associations have devoted little attention to the distinction between taxonomic categories and goal-
derived categories. However, this could be an important distinction for brand managers and
researchers. Brands and brand associations are probably organized in both taxonomic and goal-
derived categories, or only in one or the other. For instance, benefit associations are more likely
found in goal-derived categories than taxonomic categories whilst the opposite probably is true for
physical product attributes. Thus, an overall brand image may consist of several taxonomic and
goal-derived categories which are only partly overlapping. Some associations are only found in
specific goal-derived categories because they are only relevant to particular processing objectives
and not to a general comprehension of the brand as such. For instance, brand usage presuppose
some behavioral goal. Therefore, usage or user information is probably stored in goal-derived
categories (e.g., "people I know would be impressed seeing me drive a BMW"). Many ofthese
associations referring to specific persons are likely not to be stored in other goal-derived categories
like "driving comfortably" or in taxonomic categories like "BMW models". In short, the
organization ofbrand associations into units seems to rest on three structural principles:
abstraction, taxonomic relevance (comprehension), and goal-relevance. Hence, the structure of
brand associations could be represented in a three-dimensional space, see Figure 3.1.2.
Figure 3.1.2.
STRUCTURAL DIMENSIONS OF BRAND ASSOCIA nONS
Abstraction
Taxonomic structure
Goal-derived structure
3.1.3. Processing properties
The network approach to consumer memory reviewed here considers long term memory as a large
network ofnodes and links (Anderson 1983; Wyer and SrullI989). Nodes are stored information
(associations) connected by links that vary in strength. When the brand name -- or some other
information in the network -- is activated, a "spreading activation" process, which is largely
automated, takes place from node to node around the association first activated (Collins and Loftus
1975; Raaijmakers and Shiffrin 1981). The spread ofactivation decays gradually and the decrease
in activation is inversely related to the strength oflinks. An association is activated (that is, reaches
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a level of consciousness) if the extent of activation for that association reaches a certain threshold
value (working-memory is simply viewed as the set ofassociations activated at a given point in
time). The degree of activation for an association is the sum of activation received from all links to
that association. Thus, the probability that a given association is activated (that is it's strenght) is
dependent on the number oflinks between the starting point (e.g., the brand name) and the focal
association and the strength of links between them. If many strong links exist, the association is
very likely activated even ifthe stimulus is relatively weak. For more comprehensive reviews of
processing properties of memory associations in the psychologicalliterature, we refer to Anderson
(1983), Collins and Loftus (1975), Gillund and Shiffrin (1984), Raaijmakers and Shiffrin (1981),
Ratcliffand McKoon (1988), and Wyer and Srull (1989).
3.1.4. Implications for the study
The general properties of associative networks reviewed here, may contribute to our understanding
of distortion in elicitation ofbrand associations. First, the notion that associations are linked
together in neat networks supports our contention that sensitive associations could be replaced in
elicitation reports by associations which are less sensitive per se, but which have much the same
connotations as the sensitive associations they are replacing because they are closely linked
together in the network. For example, the associations expensive and personal success could be
closely related in a network for the car brand Mercedes. Thus, the meaning of expensive in this
context, as perceived by the consumer, implies an aspect of personal success because adjacent
associations provide meaning to each other (Anderson 1983). Ifpersonal success is perceived as a
sensitive association to disclose, the respondent may instead report expensive and still keep a
feeling of «having said the truth» since expensive in the mind of the consumer strongly implies
persoal success. One implication ofthis is that asking respondents whether they held back any
information, or whether they believe that others would do so, may not provide valid estimates.
Another property of associative networks with bearing on the present investigation, is that some
associations are organized in goal-derived categories (Barsalou 1983). Specifically, it seems
reasonable to expect that benefit associations, attitudes and intentions will tend to be stored in this
type of category, whereas physical attributes are more often stored in taxonomic categories. If our
contention is that benefit associations, attitudes and intentions are generally more sensitive than
physical attributes, then we would expect more motivational response distortion when goal-derived
categories are evoked compared to taxonomic categories. Inorder to derive a more detailed
understanding of the effects ofmotivational response distortions in elicitations ofbrand
associations, we need to address specific dimensions ofbrand associations.
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3.2. Dimensions of brand associations
In this section, central dimensions ofbrand association which might be affected by motivational
response distortions are reviewed. Dimensions constitute important connotations ofbrand
associations because they have been developed in order to investigate aspects of associations that
produce differential responses with the consumer (Keller 1993). Keller and others are mainly
concerned with four dimensions: content, favourability, strength, and uniqueness. Two other
dimensions ofbrand associations highly relevant for the present study are added here: sensitivity
and predictive ability of associations.
3.2.1. Favourability.
Favourability refers to how associations are evaluated by consumers. Clearly, this is a critical
dimension ofbrand associations as a major goal ofbrand management is to link a set of favourable
associations to the brand in the mind of consumers. The concept of favourability is related to the
concept of importance (MacKenzie 1986). Attributes or benefits considered as not very important
are neither evaluated as very good (and vice versa). Thus, importance has been been equated with
attribute polarity by Fishbein and Ajzen (1975). Though favourability is a significant dimension of
brand associations, Keller (1993) noted that some associations that are not seen as particularly
favourable or important by consumers may facilitate recognition and awareness or lead to
inferences of quality (e.g. the star logo of a Mercedes). Moeover, the faviourability of associations
may differ across situations (Miller and Ginter 1979). For example, air condition in a car
obviously is more important in some seasons and some geographical areas than others.
3.2.2. Strength.
Strength of associations refers to how closely associations are related to the brand name in the
network. Strong associations come to mind immediately after the brand name is activated. Hence,
they are often termed "top-ofmind associations". Strength ofan association is largelya function of
the quantity and quality ofprocessing it receives at encoding. Large amounts ofprocessing, such
as when an individual thinks at length/often about the information, cause the strength ofthis
information in memory to be increased. Second, when consumers actively elaborates on the
meaning or significance of some brand association, stronger associations are created in memory
than if less elaborate processing takes place (i.e., the depth-of-processing approach, Craik and
Lockhart 1972). Strength is a very important dimension to brand managers as their job is to make
the right kind of (favourable) associations come to mind first when customers encounter their
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brands. Again, the context in which a brand is considered is important. Generally strong
associations may not be very accessible or easily retrieved in specific situations (conf. Tulving and
Psotka 1971).
3.2.3. Uniqueness.
The objective ofbrand managers is not merely to create an image of strong and favourable
associations -- these associations should also be differentiated from those of competing brands
(Aaker 1982; Kapferer 1997; Keller 1997). There are two kinds ofuniqueness. First, associations
can be unique in the sense that no other brand holds the same association. This kind ofuniqueness
is rare for important associations in competitive markets. More obtainable is uniqueness in terms of
significantly higher strength of strategically important associations than competitors. For example,
Volvo tries to be uniquely associated with safety. Of course safety as an association is found in the
associative networks of other car brands too, but safety is probably more strongly linked to Volvo
than to other brands.
From a managerial perspective, favourability, strength, and uniqueness are the key dimensions of
brand associations. When recognizing that elicitations ofbrand associations may be subjected to
social desirable responding, two additional dimensions seem important.
3.2.4. Sensitivity.
It is a widely held assuption that respondents generally try to make a good impression with
interviewers (Bradburn and Sudman 1983). In chapter 3, we argue that needs to display a
favourable self-image are present in many -- if not most -- situations, also in response conditions
in which no researcher is present (conf. Schlenker 1985; 1986). Thus, motivational distortion of
responses in order to display a desired self-image probably is a serious problem in elicitation of
brand associations. A major question in this respect is whether some kinds of associations are
more sensitive to such a response bias than others. In this study, we define sensitivity as the
perceived probability of holding back associations. This is a very important dimension because if
some types of associations tend to be witheld by respondents, brand managers have incomplete or
even misleading information about the status of the brand. However, little is known about the
differential sensitivity ofvarious types ofbrand associations to social desirability effects.
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3.2.5. Predictive ability.
The issue of sensitivity points to another critical dimension ofbrand associations: predictive
ability. Managers need to know which associations are most predictive of general attitudes toward
the brand, ofpurchase intentions, and behavioral purchase decisions. Zaltman et al. (1973, p.43)
made a distinction between two types ofprediction: (a) predictions in which the criterion and the
predictor concepts are measured at the same time (termed concurrent validity), and (b) predictions
inwhich the criterion measured is separated in time from the predictor concept (predictive validity).
However, the term prediction (or predictive ability) is commonly used for both situations.
Though predictive ability has seldom been explicitly addressed as a dimension ofbrand
associations, we argue that predictive ability is an important -- if not the most important --
dimension. The rationale for this argument follows from the recognition of response bias in
measurements ofbrand associations. Ifimportant associations are witheld by respondents,
predictive ability will suffer, and measures taken to position the brand may not be optimal -- or in
the worst case even harm the brand image. For example, when responses are distorted, this may
often take the form of negative associations being witheld or strategically rated by respondents (i.e.
Haire 1950; Fisher 1993). Thus, the level offavourability of associations may often be too high
and misleading. In other instances, when social norms indicate a negative attiude towards the
brand (e.g. for erotic magazines), the level offavourability may be too low. This and other kinds
ofbias cannot be detected by investigations offavourability or other dimensions in isolation, but
can be discovered in terms oflow predicive ability scores of associations. In fact, predictive ability
can be seen as an overall indicator of the vailidty of elicited associations.
3.2.6. The content of brand associations
The content of BAs mirror the complexity ofphysical, psychological and physiological aspects of
brand-related experiences accumulated over time. Therefore, we need some extra space in order to
cover the different types ofbrand associations that can be found in consumer memories. Several
typologies of BA are found in the brand management literature (Aaker 1991; Farquhar and Herr
1993; Keller 1993). Additionally, typologies presented within two related streams ofresearch have
been been applied for classification ofbrand knowledge. First, there is a literature on different
coding schemes for cognitive response analysis (Brucks et.al. 1988; Dickson and Sauer 1987;
Sauer et.al. 1992) which also presents coding schemes for brand-related knowledge (Dickson and
Sauer 1987). Second, means-end theory provide different typologies, or means-end chains, which
have been applied for descriptions of consumers' brand memory (e.g. Gutman and Reynolds
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1982; Howard 1977; Reynolds et.al. 1995). However, the most comprehensive typology of BAs
developed from a brand management perspective is Keller's (1993).
Keller suggests that the content ofbrand associations can be devided into three major categories,
based on their increasing levelog abstraction: (1) product attributes, (2) brand benefits, and (3)
brand attitudes. Attributes and benefits are subdivided into five subcategories of attributes and
three subcategories ofbenefits according to the content of the associations. Here, we briefly
review Keller' s scheme. Moreover, we argue for the inclusion of one more category.
3.2.6.1. Review of the Keller typology ofbrand associations
Attributes. Attributes are «those descriptive features that characterize a product or service - what a
consumer thinks the product or service is or has and what is involved with its purchase or
consumption» (Keller 1993, p.4). Five distinct subcategories are suggested. (1) Product-related
attributes (refer directly to the physical components of the product or a service's requirements) (2)
packaging or appearance information, (3) price information, (4) user imagery (type of users), and
(5) usage imagery (where and in what types of situations the product or service is used).
Compared to other typologies, there is some confusion regarding the concept of attribute. Whilst
Keller and several others (i.e. Gutman 1982) restrict the content meaning of the attribute term to
perceptions of physical characteristics, some researchers use the term as a more generic concept
including both physical descriptions and abstracted evaluations, i.e. «beneficial attributes» or
«benefits» (Lefkoff-Hagius and Mason 1993; Meyers and Shocker 1981; Finn 1985). Here,
Keller' s narrow definition of attribute is prefered as a conceptual distinction between attributes and
benefits seems tenable. Benefits stem from the experience of attributes. Attributes have direct
physical counterparts, and are thus «actionable» for the brand or product manager, whereas
benefits merely exist in the mind of the consumer. Moreover, it is a major concern for a brand or
product manager to consider the effect ofvariations in attribute levels on perceived benefits. As the
relationship between attributes and benefits are important and the terms originate from different
psychological processes, it seems warranted to make a conceptual distinction.
Another comment is warranted on the use of the category labels of user imagery and usage
imagery. «Imagery» refers to a specific type ofrepresentation or memory code in the cognitive
literature (cf. Anderson 1983). Imagery is defined as visual or spatial representations ofperceptual
impressons, e.g. the shape of a car. However, there is no evident reason why representations of
brand users or situational brand information should be represented exclusively in an imagery
mode. Especially, we would expect situational brand-usage information also to be stored in terms
of temporal strings (Anderson 1983). This type ofmemory code preserves the sequential structure
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(the order) of experiences (cf. Santa 1977). The order of events probably is an important aspect of
brand memory because benefit associations are often derived from causal inferences, which, in
tum, are dependent on the sequential structure of events. Hence, to allow for different kinds of
memory codes, we suggest that the terms «user imagery» and «usage imagery» is substituted with
user - and usage information.
Benefits. Benefits are extracted from brand usage and represent knowledge ofbrand performance.
Based on Park, Jaworsky, and MacInnis (1986), three categoies ofbenefits are suggested. (1)
Functional benefits are related to specific functional or «practical» problems, e.g. how to move as
quickly and safelyas possible from A to B. These benefits usually correspond to the product-
related attributes (e.g. the size ofa car engine). (2) Hedonic benefits (also termed experiential
benefits) stem from the emotional experiences ofusing the brand, e.g. sensory pleasure, variety
and cognitive stimulation (e.g. pleasure of driving). (3) Symbolic benefits relate to consumers
underlying needs for personal expression and outer-directed self esteem. Hence, symbolic benefits
contain consumers' evaluations of the effects on the self concept of owing and/or using the brand
(e.g. Mercedes indicates status or prestige).
Attitudes. The last category of associations in Keller' s typology is attitudes. Historically, two
different perspectives are found in the study of attitudes. The tripartite view specifies three
components ofattitudes: cognition (beliefs), affect (emotional reactions), and conation (intended
and actual behavior) (Lutz 1991). The unidimensionalist conception of attitude is often seen as an
evolution of the tripartite view (Eagly and Chaiken 1993). Under this approach, attitude is
considered as a single affective dimension. Beliefs are seen as antecedents and intentions as
consequences ofattitude (Fishbein and Ajzen 1975). Since this latter conception dominates extant
consumer research, we adhere to this perspective. Thus, brand attitudes are defined as affective
evaluations of the brand as a whole. For an extensive review of attitude research, see Eagly and
Chaiken (1993).
3.2.6.2. Additional categories of brand associations
Other typologies ofbrand associations presented in the marketing literature include several other
kinds of associations not included in Keller' s scheme. For instance, Howard (1977) in his
conceptualization of a brand's semantic structure includedvalues, and Farquhar and Herr (1993)
present a typology based on Aaker (1991) which encompasses product category associations, that
is associations refering to a specific product category. In this study, we use Keller's typology
because it seems to include the most important types ofbrand associations and because it is
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commonly used in market research. However, we suggest that one important type of association is
added.
Intentions. Behavioral intentions are, as the proximal cause ofbehavior (Fishbein and Ajzen
1975), highly relevant to brand managers. Indeed, Fishbein and Ajzen demonstrated that better
predictions ofbehavior were obtained when intentions were included in their models. The question
is whether intentions can be conceived of as stable components of associative networks. The
answer to this question is probably yes -- and no, depending on the type ofbrand in question. For
low-involvement products, intentions are often formed spontaneously few minutes ahead of
purchase -- oftenjust before or even after entering a store. For such brands, intentions are seldom
found as stable associations. For expensive luxury products, however, intentions may occupy a
central position in brand memory for long periods of time. Luxury brands such as BMW or Rolex
often are more expensive than consumers can readily afford. Hence, consumers may desire these
brands for some time -- perhaps for several years -- before they can afford to buy them. Moreover,
brands with symbolic brand concepts (Park et al., 1986) often are positioned by means of market
shielding (minimizing transaction barriers toward the target group whilst maximizing barriers
toward non-target groups). Such a strategy may include selective distribution which generally
restricts the availability of the brand. Thus, even without financial restrictions consumers may
store purchase intentions in long term memory because desired brands are not available in the
immediate environment. On this account, we suggest that purchase intentions are included as a
separate category in Keller's typology.
3.3. Summary and implications
What is the nature ofbrand associations? So far in this chapter we have attempted an answer to this
question. Major properties of associative networks and important dimensions ofbrand associations
have been reviewed. A slightly revised version of Keller' s typology ofbrand associations is
shown in Table 3.3. together with main structural, representational, and processing properties of
associations. The next question to be asked is:What dimensions and types of associations will be
affected by motivational response distortions in an elicitation interview? We have indicated that
benefit associations, attitudes, and intentions are expectedly more sensitive to distortion than
physical attributes. Moreover, symbolic benefit associations seem particularly susceptible to
distortion because this type of association is strongly related to the self-concept of respondents and
their need for outer-directed self-esteem. Also, the strength ofbrand associations in terms of
response latencies is likely affected because respondents will tend to postpone mentioning of
sensitive brand associations. The extent to which the favourability of reported associations is
affected is likely dependent on the particular brand in question and the sensitivity of holding a
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positive versus a negative attitude toward the brand. Finally, because some associations are
withheld and irrelevant non-diagnostic information reported instead, the ability of associations to
predict brand attitudes and intentions is probably affected. All these effects are more systematically
addressed in Chapter 5 in terms of testable hypotheses.
Table 3.3
CONNOTATIONS OF BRAND ASSOCIATIONS:
CONTENT, REPRESENTATION, STRUCTURE, AND PROCESS
Content properties: A (Wolof.zy ofbrand associations (Jldi!Pted from Keller 1993)
Main cate~ories Subcqte~ories
l.Attributes Product-related attributes Price info.
Non-product-related attributes ~ Package info.
~ User info.*
Usage info.*
2.Benefits Functional
Symbolic
Hedonic
3.Attitudes
4.Intentions**
Processing properties
When some association is activated, a spread of activation is takes place along all links departuring from the
initially activated association. The spread of activation decreases gradually in a manner inversely related to the
strength of links. A given association is retrieved if the level of activation reaches a threshold value. The level of
activation equals all incoming activation from all related links. Hence, the probability of activation of an
association is a product of the number of links and the strength of those links.
Re.presentatjonal prQ,llerties
Brand associations can be represented in the from ofthree different memory codes: as propositions, imagery or
temporal strings. Propositions are sentence-like representations consisting of a set of nodes and links in which
each node is a noun, verb or adjective and each link is the relation between ideas. Imagery refers to spatial
representations, whereas temporal strings are ordinal representations preserving the sequential structure of encoded
information.
Structural properties
Brand associations are organized in taxonomic and/or goal-derived categories. Additionally, associations are
organized into hierarchies according to their level of abstraction. Hierarchies might overlap or cut across
taxonomic and goal-derived categories. Separate links between associations in the network has a dual structure:
one connection going from A to B and one connection going from B to A. The strength of the two directional
connections might be asymmetric.
* New category labels
** Category added to Keller's typology
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3.4. Elicitation of brand associations
Previous sections ofthis chapter have presented relevant properties and dimensions ofbrand
associations. In this section, the focus is on the task of eliciting brand associations. In addition to
the characteristics of the focal brand, the measurement process itself may stimulate or reduce
motivational response distortions. Thus, we need to address the potential sources of motivational
distortion in elicitation interviews.
Elicitation is defined here as the process through which a researcher personally interacts with a
respondent such that brand associations are activated and identified from the individual's memory.
Several qualitative methods are suggested in the literature for use in elicitations ofbrand
associations; e.g. focus groups, free association, picture interpretation, brand personality
description, sentence completion, thought listing and direct questioning (Aaker 1991; Keller
1993). Because some kind of personal interview is most commonly applied (Keller 1998), we
concentrate on this mode of data collection. Very few attempts at comparing different methods
emprically or theoretically are found in the literature. Consequently, guidelines for selection of
methods are scarce and vague. Generally, individual interviews are recommended in favour of
group discussions if detailed information on personal and/or sensitive matters are required (Aaker
1991; Malhotra 1996; Sampson 1986). Also, triangulation is recommended across respondents
under the assumption that no single method capture the total dimensionality of a brand or product
(Sampson 1972). Beyond these very generic rules of thumb, few guidelines exist to support
marketing researchers in the selection of elicitation techniques. Specifically, no guidelines are
found for when -- or how -- to induce anonymity.
3.4.1. A process model of elicitation interviews
One major problem in discussions of elicitation methods in the marketing literature is the lack of a
precise definition of the concept of elicitation method or elicitation technique. Still, an implicit
consensus ofwhat an elicitation method is. Most researchers seem to equate the term with what we
suggest is called the stimulus task. The stimulus task is the cognitive assignment to which the
respondent is exposed in order to activate brand associations, for instance the reporting of «free
associations» when hearing a stimulus word, or answering a set of direct questions. However, we
contend that focusing exclusively on the stimulus task is too narrow a perspective. Several other
important aspects of elicitation should be broached by the concept of the elicitation method, namely
the selection of an elicitation context, the instructions made before the stimulus task exposure, the
presentation mode, and the response mode. Most importantly, these other aspects are needed in
order to complete a picture of choices made by the researcher in an elicitation interview that
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potentially influence the level of motivational response distortion. Other influential factors than
anonymity manipulations represent potential confounds to observed effects of anonymity and
should be controlled in experiements designed to measure the impact of anonymity.
In this section, we present a four-stage process model of elicitation interviews describing the
different concerns and decision problems related to different stages of an elicitation interview (see
Figure 3.4.).
Figure 3.4.
THE ELICITATION INTERVIEW PROCESS
1-----------
: The elicitation
interview
Elicitation context
- selection of interview mode
- selection of place
- selection of interviewers
---------- --------------
...
Instruction
-selection of brand context
-ambiguity reduction
-task involvement
-induce affect?
inform about resnonse mode
Stimulus exposure
-selection of stimulus task
-selection of presentation mode
Response
-selection of response mode
--------- --------------
I
I
_____ -1
(Decoding)
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As methodological decisions influencing the elicitation outcome have to be made at each stage of
the process, the whole model is included in our conceptual definition of elicitation. Elicitation
method, in tum, refers to a specific combination of choices made at each of the four stages of the
process. While addressing the choices to be made at the different stages of the model, our attention
is devoted to choices potentially affecting the level and type of anonymity and corresponding
motivational response distortions.
Elicitation context. Before deciding on what to do during the interview, several concerns regarding
the context of the interview need to be considered which may effect the level of motivational
response distortion. First, one has to decide on whether to interview individuals or groups and to
select a proper interview mode. As we have already pointed out, individual face-to-face interviews
are generally preferred when the objective is to study consumers' brand associations in detail
(Malhotra 1995; Sampson 1986). However, other interview modes such as telephone interviews
and group discussions might suffice when there is no need for details and motivational response
distortion is likely not to be a problem (e.g. simple, non-expensive, low-involvement products).
Further, the researcher should consider what place and what kind of interviewers to use. For
instance, Chaikin, Derlega and Miller (1976) found that respondents disclosed more personal
information in a cozy room with pictures on the wall, cushioned furniture, a rug and soft lighting.
Thus, the place of the interview is assumed to influence the degree to which personal brand
associations are elicited, that is hedonic and symbolic benefit associations rather than functional
benefits or physical attributes (Hirschman and Holbrook 1982). These effects are not directly
relevant to a discussion ofmotivational response distortion. Still, they are important to empirical
investigations of anonymity by implicating that the place of interviews is a potential confound and
should be controlled across experimental conditions when comparing effects of alternative
approaches to anonymity. When it comes to the effects of interviewer characteristics, there are
several interesting findings. For instance, findings from social psychology suggest that
respondents tend to engage in impression management toward people they like or admire (Leary
and Kowalski 1990). High levels ofliking, in tum, relate to the degree to which an interviewer is
perceived as similar to the respondent (Rohrberg and Sousa-Poza 1976) and to the physical
attractiveness of the interviewer (Brundage, DerIega, and Cash 1977).
Instruction. The instruction is often neglected in discussions ofhow to elicit brand associations.
However, the initial instructions made to prepare respondents for the stimulus task are highly
important, especially when focusing on anonymity and motivational response distortion. Four
major concerns demand attention. First, the researcher must decide on the proper brand context:
Should the respondent be put in the context ofbrand choice, evaluation, or usage or should s/he be
presented to any specific context at all? If, for instance a choice context is chosen, a smaller set of
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associations high in discriminative ability is typically elicited, whereas no specification of the
context will result in a larger and more diverse set of associations being elicited. Moreover, a focus
on choice is likely to increase motivational response distortions because choices are more personal
than an unrestricted listing ofthoughts. Second, the researcher should be concerned with how to
reduce respondents' perception of ambiguity during the elicitation interview. In clinical
psychology, it is deemed important that clients are fully aware oftheir role responsibilities in
treatment. For instance, in support ofthis contention, Skinner and Anderson (1959) found that
«therapy readiness» was related to the realism and accuracy with which clients perceived the
therapy process. Correspondingly, respondents' level of accuracy, and hence the validity of
elicited associations, probably are dependent on a precise and instructive explanation ofwhat s/he
is supposed to do during the elicitation session. In fact, non-responses or irrelevant responses
typically assumed to stem from social-desirability-mechanisms, might in stead be due to high
levels ofperceived task ambiguity. Techniques for ambiguity reduction include detailed task----descriptions, warm-up-tasks and observational rnod~!i!!g (e.g., observing an «exemplary»
respondent) (see Cheh~;;;;t al. 1979). Third, task involvement is a prerequisite for obtaining deep
and rich information. Fourth, some findings within advertising research on the effects of inducing
positive affect might have some bearing on elicitation. For example, Isen et al. (1985) found that
the positive valence ofa stimulus word as well as the affective state of the subject, led to more
diverse and more unusual first associations to common words. This stream of research indicates
that researchers, by inducing positive affect in the introduction of the elicitation process, probably
can influence the way associations are activated and the kind ofassociations elicited from memory.
Furthermore, by altering the emotional state of subjects, inducing affect might influence the kind of
motivational distortion operating under an interview. Finally, and most importantly, careful
instructions before the stimulus task about anonymous response modes are imperative for any
effects of such response modes to occur. Respondents have to keep the anonymous characteristics
of the response mode in mind when responding to the stimulus task in order to feel anonymous.
Stimulus exposure. In this phase, the researcher must select the appropriate stimulus task and
mode ofpresentation. Stimulus tasks vary on several dimensions. For instance, some are highly
structured and dominated by the researcher, e.g., Q-sorting and repertory grid techniques
(Sampson 1986), whilst other tasks are less structured and to a large extent dominated by the
respondent, such as free one-word associations (Friedman 1986) and picture association. Others,
in turn, fall between these extremes and are characterized by a concurrent dialogue between the
researcher and respondents, e.g., in-depth interviewing and The Critical Incident Technique
(Flanagan 1954). Recently, Zaltman and associates (Zaltman and H. Coulter 1995) have developed
an interesting technique (ZMET: Zaltman Metaphor Elicitation Technique), which is a combination
of several complementary stimulus tasks. For the purpose of inducing anonymity, we have
discussed two classes of stimulus-tasks: subject-projective questioning and stimulus-projective
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questioning. Though the need is indeed recognized, a general review of different stimulus tasks is
beyond the scope ofthis study.
The role ofpresentation mode in elicitations has so far been largely ignored in the market research
literature. Theoretically, stimulus tasks can be presented in a number ofways corresponding to all
of the human senses. The effect ofpresentation mode on motivational response distortion is
uncertain.
Response. A fmal issue in the elicitation ofbrand associations is the choice ofresponse mode.
Again, the marketing literature is very scant with respect to empirical and theoretical investigations
of the elicitation ofbrand associations. However, as previously noted, important findings within
the survey literature suggest possible techniques for inducing anonymity which might apply at this
stage of the elicitation process (e.g. self-administered questionnaires, see Chapter 4). Several
researchers have demonstrated that anonymous response modes may affect responses (e.g.
Aquillino 1992; 1994; Tourangeau and Smith 1996). The question ofwhether such response mode
effects can be found in the elicitation ofbrand associations is so far unanswered.
Finally, responses have to be decoded. In the context of the elicitation ofbrand associations, the
different typologies (Table 3.3 ) can be used as coding schemes. Alternatively, traditional content
analysis can be applied in order to discover new categories or relationships between associations.
However, because no methodological decisions regarding the outcome of the elicitation interview
are advocated at this stage, decoding is not included in our definition of the concept of elicitation.
3.4.2. Summary
The four-stage process model of elicitation presented here provides an overview of major concerns
and corresponding decisions that researchers should address in planning an elicitation interview.
The majority of decisions may actually influence the level of motivational response distortion
during an interview. Several ofthese decisions do not regard the level ofanonymity induced in the
interview, but are rather assumed to have a direct impact on motivations to distort responses, e.g.,
selection ofinterviewers and selection ofbrand context. Further, all decisions at every stage of the
elicitation process may potentially affect elicitation outcomes. On that account, they have to be
considered when designing experiments on effects of different approaches to anonymity in
elicitation interviews. Inorder to isolate effects of anonymity, controlling for all other factors that
can potentially influence the dependent variables is necessary. In fact, the present process model
may function as a checklist for such experiments: every concern in the model should be controlled
for in order to secure high internal validity of reported effects of anonymity manipulations.
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CHAPTER 4
DEFINING AND MANIPULATING
ANONYMITY
In preceding chapters, psychological and behavioral processes which anonymity is supposed to
cope with have been examined and the special nature of brand associations and of elicitation
interviews have been explored. On this basis, we are now in a position to make a choice of
definition for the concept of anonymity and thus answer the first research question.
In the first section of this chapter (4.1), we ask the question of what should be the denotation of
anonymity, that is, the class of objects or events embodying the concept (Zaltman et al. 1973).
Section 4.2. defines the central dimensions and connotation of anonymity. Here we argue for the
existence of two distinct constructs of anonymity. In section 4.3. various techniques for
manipulating anonymity are reviewed.
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4.1. The Denotation of Anonymity
Who or what possesses anonymity? Two different answers to this question are found in the
literature. First, many researchers, especially within survey research, treat anonymity as an
objective characteristic of a response condition. For example, if respondents are instructed not to
identify themselves by writing their names in a questionnaire, responses are classified as
anonymous (e.g., Aquillino 1994; Downs and Kerr 1986; Fuller 1974; Futrell and Swan 1917).
Within this perspective there is no need for manipulation checks. If respondents names are not on
the questionnaire, responses are anonymous, per se.
The second denotation suggested in the literature is rooted in a psychological approach to
anonymity. Here, anonymity is defined as the psychological perception that other persons cannot
identify the subject as respondent (e.g. Schwarz et al. 1991; Fisher 1993). Thus, the denotation of
anonymity is within the respondent -- not the response. At first glance, the difference may seem
trivial, but further elaboration of the consequences of accepting the response or the respondent
shows that this is a very important conceptual distinction.
When anonymity is considered as a psychological state -- and not as an objective characteristic of a
response condition -- manipulations intended to induce anonymity may not necessarily lead to
perceived anonymity. Correspondingly, conditions defined as no-anonymity conditions may in fact
induce significant levels of perceived anonymity. Indeed, several studies comparing assumed
anonymous and non-anonymous conditions reveal that respondents perceive significant levels of
anonymity also under non-anonymous conditions. For example, manipulation checks reported by
Fisher (1993) show a significant difference between the anonymous and non-anonymous
conditions (means = 17.17 vs 10.96, respectively, measured on a summated four-item scale
including items such as «my responses on this survey can be traced back to me»), but the absolute
level of anonymity reported in the no-anonymity condition revealed that respondents also felt
substantial degrees of anonymity under this condition. Why? We contend that perceptions of
anonymity can be directed toward different parties. Some respondents in the no-anonymity
condition may have focused -- not on the researchers, but -- on the concern for whether some third
party (the general public, other participants in the study, etc) would likely see their responses and
reveal their identity. A general trust in the integrity ofresearchers may have led to significant levels
of felt anonymity. This scenario illustrates an important aspect of the psychological approach to
anonymity: when perceived as a psychological state, anonymity becomes a complex and potentially
multifaceted concept embracing different psychological mechanisms. Most importantly, we
recognize that it is not manipulations as such, but the psychological reactions that determine the
effects of manipulations. Therefore, in order to be useful it is imperative to select the respondent --
and not the response condition -- as denotation for the concept of anonymity.
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4.2. Defining Anonymity
Based on the reviews of antecedent psychological process of motivational response distortions and
the reviews ofbrand associations and the process of elicitation, we are now in a position to discuss
what should be the properties or dimensions ofanonymity. First we suggest a general definition:
Anonymity is the degree -- perceived by the respondent-- to which responses can be
coupled with the respondent 's identity by some person or group of persons -- including
the respondent himself.
This definition contains an important directional aspect. More precisely, three different dimensions
of anonymity can be derived from the different directions of the anonymity concem. The relevant
directions are illustrated in Figure 4.2 and follow from the psychological mechanisms of situational
impression management (SIM), private self-management (PSM), and situational self-deception
(SSD).
Figure 4.2.
DIRECTIONS OF ANONYMITY
1 = Social anonymity
la = Public anonymity
lb = Interviewer anonymity
2 = Self anonymity
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4.2.1. Social anonymity
First, anonymity may be externally directed toward some other party than the respondent. This is
the classic view of anonymity. Two subdimensions of social anonymity are postulated.
Interviewer-anonymity. This kind of anonymity is the classic type of anonymity targeted at the
interviewer or researcher. Under full interviewer-anonymity respondents feel that the interviewer
cannot link their responses and their identities. Interview-anonymity as defined here is consistent
with Aquilino' s (1994) definition of perceived anonymity in an interview setting:
Anonymity of responses refers to whether or not responses become known to the
interviewer during the interview (p. 212)
In relation to Figure 4, interviewer-anonymity corresponds to arrow Ib. When there is full
interviewer-anonymity, the respondent feels that s/he is the only individual who knows what
associations s/he has reported.
Interviewer-anonymity should have substantial impact on situational impression management
(SIM). When the respondent feels that the interviewer cannot link his responses to his identity, he
is unlikely to try to make a good impression with the interviewer because he will not receive self-
enhancing or self-deflating feedback from this person.
Public anonymity. This dimension refers to the concern for avoiding leakage of disclosed
information to uninvited third parties. Thus, public anonymity is the felt degree to which third
parties will be able to link responses and respondents. This kind of anonymity has often been
termed confidentiality and is usually provided by verbal assurances of confidentiality in personal
interviews. Under conditions of public anonymity, information may be revealed directly and
openly to the interviewer, but the respondent is confident that the information is not passed on to
other people. In Figure 4, public anonymity is illustrated by arrow la.
A concern for this kind of anonymity does not necessarily imply that the respondent would not
disclose information to any third party. The essence of the concern is the sense of controlover
what information about the self is displayed to whom. The respondent may well disclose to other
persons than the interviewer if a context of trust is provided.
Public anonymity is included in the concept ofinterviewer-anonymity. If a respondent is confident
that an interviewer cannot link his responses and his identity, he is also confident that no third
party will be able to do that. Thus, public anonymity could be considered as a weaker kind of
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social anonymity than interviewer-anonymity and should have a weaker effect on situational
impression management (SIM).
4.2.2. Self anonymity
Notably, social anonymity -- by focusing on the relationship between respondents and other
persons -- only is expected to influence one out ofthree kinds ofmotivational response distortions.
Another type of anonymity is needed in order to mitigate distortions stemming from situational
self-deception (SSD) and private self-management (PSM). Therefore, we introduce a new kind or
a new dimension of anonymity: self-anonymity. Self-anonymity has not been explicitly integrated
in previous conceptualizations of anonymity. However, this dimension is logically developed from
the literature on subject-projective questioning. Self-anonymity is defmed here as the degree to
which respondents are subjectively self-aware during the interview. Subjective self-awareness is in
turn defined by Duval and Wicklund (1972, p 2):
Subjective self awareness is a state of consciousness in which attention isfocused on
events external to the individual's consciousness, personal history, or body, whereas
objective self awareness is exactly the opposite conscious state.
Third-person questioning (e.g. Fisher 1993) is a typical example of a method aimed at providing
this kind of anonymity. By moving the focus of attention from the subject to a comparable third
party (e.g.: «what do most teenagers associate with the magazine Playboy?»), the respondent may
project self-threatening information onto others (e.g., Holmes 1968; 1978). A psychological
separation is created between the respondent and his/her own associations as s/he focuses on a
third party and reports associations on behalf of this other (similar) person. In this respect, the
respondent is anonymous vis-a-vis his own self. In Figure 4, self-anonymity is illustrated by
arrow 2.
However, extreme levels of subjective self awareness are not tenable nor realistically obtainable
within the context of interviews. The logic of self-anonymity is that removing the focus from the
respondent to another person will reduce motivations to distort responses whilst remaining within
the contexts of a similar in-group individual made for projections of respondents' own thoughts
and opinions (Holmes 1978; Lewis, Bates, and Lawrence 1994). If the target of the projections is
not perceived to be similar to the respondent, he willlikely not project his own thoughts, but rather
activate information from long-term memory about the target (Lewis et al. 1994). Hence, in order
to elict valid information in a context of self-anonymity, we are dependent on projection to work.
When the focus of attention is on a similar in-group person, the sense of similarity is likely to
backfire in terms of spontaneous activations of the self of the respondent (i.e. Duval and Wicklund
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1972). This position also is reminiscent of the notion of collective selves or we-facets of the self
(Greenwaldand Breclder 1985). A focus on similar in-group persons may evoke the we-facet of
the self, which are the internalized goals of groups with which the respondent is identified. Thus,
self-anonymity can be seen as providing a refocus from the private self to another more collective
(and thus less sensitive) aspect of self. However, since the different selves are connected and
elicitation interviews usually last for several minutes, full self-anonymity in the sense of no
activation of the private selfis improbable.
Self-anonymity has the virtue of potentially affecting all three kinds of motivational response
distortions. When the focus is not on the respondent himself, he is probably not very concerned
with making a good impression with the interviewer (situational impression management).
Furthermore, to the extent that subjective self-awareness is stimulated, respondents' concern for
identity development and private self-enhancement (PSM) is releaved, and automatic self-protective
mechanisms such as situational self-deception (SSD) should be alleviated.
4.2.3. Discussion
The three-dimensional framework of anonymity presented here has several strengths compared to
previous conceptualizations. First, it is explicitly grounded in relevant psychological theories of
self-presentation and self deception. Specifically, inspection of possible psychological antecedents
of motivationally conditioned response distortions showed that previous conceptualizations have
failed to take potentially important intrapsychic mechanisms into account. Second, our
conceptualization intergrates several different perspectives on anonymity and response distortion.
Third, the present conceptualization provides a framework for evaluating and classifying
anonymity manipulations with respect to their potential for mitigating different types of
motivational response distortion. Fourth, the recognition of different motivational mechanisms
operating under different conditions inherent in the framework shed new light on previous findings
on anonymity reported in the literature. In particular, the long record of equivocal findings on the
effects of "traditional anonymity", that is, what we have termed social anonymity (e.g., self-
administered questionnaires (SAQ», could be due to an unidimensional understanding and
conceptualization of anonymity whereas multidimensional mechanisms of distortion could have
been operating. For example, when no effects of using a self-administered questionnaire were
found (see Bradburn and Sudman 1981), the reason might have been that sensitive issues were
equally important to the private and social selves. Hence, even though respondents were
anonymous to the interviewer in the SAQ condition, they were still motivated to distort responses
in order to develop their own private identity (Greenwald and Breckler 1985).
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It should be noted that different dimensions of anonymity can be combined within the same study.
Fisher (1993) combined the use of social anonymity (SAQ) and third-person questioning (self
anonymity). To our knowledge, this is the only study investigating the effect of such a
combination. The effect of combining social- and self anonymity is uncertain. On the one hand, the
result could be very strong and complete. One the other hand, instructions highlighting the (social)
anonymity provided by the SAQ procedure may seem redundant or irrelevant whithin a context of
self anonymity. At worst, such additional instructions may backfire and make respondents
suspicious. Findings reported by Fisher (1993) are more in favour of the latter than the former
explanation since less social desirable responding was found in the group subjected to third-person
questioning than in the group where third-person questioning and SAQ were combined.
4.3. Manipulation of anonymity: A review
The preceding discussion and development of the concept of anonymity provide a basis for
comparing different approaches and techniques for the manipulation of anonymity. In this section,
major approaches and techniques previously used in the literature to reduce motivational response
distortion are reviewed. Six different approaches are identified. For each approach different
techniques are listed. The list is not exhaustive, but the techniques most frequently reported in the
literature are included, see Table 4.3.
4.3.1. Review of techniques
(1) Direct manipulation of accountability
First, some researchers have studied the effects of anonymity -- or rather its opposite -- by
informing respondents that they will be asked to discuss their responses with a researcher after an
interview. Sometimes this manipulation is used in combination with instructions to state or write
down subjects' names in order to maximize effects of manipulations (e.g., Fisher 1993). Direct
manipulation of accountability is a viable technique for studying theoretical psychological
mechanisms related to anonymity, or lack thereof, but is less pertinent to applied market research.
When considering this kind of manipulation in view of the present conceptual framework of
anonymity and motivational response distortion, it is assumed to affect the level of social
anonymity and, hence, the degree of situational impression management (SIM).
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(2) Assurance of confidentiality
Assurance of confidentiality is a very popular approach. According to our conceptualization of
anonymity, this technique may induce public anonymity, a weaker kind of social anonymity, and
may thus have a moderate effect on SIM. A review of the effects of this technique suggests that
inducing a sense of public anonymity only affects responses to (very) sensitive questions, such as
questions about drug use or sexual behavior. Moreover, such effects are usually reported as
relatively small (Singer et al. 1995). For insensitive questions, it has been indicated that assurances
of confidentiality might even arouse respondent' s suspicions rather than alleviating them (Singer et
al. 1992). Still, confidentiality assurances are very common in all kinds ofinterviews.
(3) Selection of interview mode
Selection of interview mode also has been much debated and empirically investigated for its
potential effect on socially desirable responding (see Sudman and Bradburn 1983). Traditionally,
the anonymity-inducing ability of three different modes of administration are discussed in the
literature: mailed questionnaires, telephone interviews, and personal interviews. The pool of
findings is rather equivocal, but the tendency is in favour of mailed questionnaires as the most
anonymous and face-to-face interviews as the least anonymous interview mode (Sudman and
Bradburn 1983; Schwarz et al. 1993). However, a meta-analysis of 31 mode comparison studies
suggested that administration mode differences have declined over time (de Leeuw and van der
Zouwen 1988). This finding may indicate that progress have been made with personal interviews
and telephone interviews in alleviating respondents anonymity concerns. When speaking of
anonymity, we are again referring to social anonymity and corresponding effects on SIM.
(4) Response modes
Anonymous response modes represent by far the most extensively investigated approach to
manipulating anonymity. Again, the kind of anonymity affected is social anonymity and SIM is
probably the only type of motivational response distortion alleviated. Many different techniques
have been used to provide a sense of response anonymity. The most common mode for directly
inducing response anonymity is simply instructing respondents not to identfy themselves when
responding to a questionnaire (Downs and Kerr 1986). Other more elaborated techniques directly
influence the structure of responding. When using self-administered questionnaires (SAQ),
respondents write down responses on a standard sheet of paper, which is subsequently put in a
standard envelope and posted by the respondent. No names are disclosed. With one variant of this
technique questions are asked by means of a walkman (audio-SAQ). The randomized response
technique (RRT) is another frequently investigated technique within survey research. With this
method respondents are asked two behavioral questions, one threatening and the other completely
innocuous (Warner 1965; Sudman and Bradburn 1983). Both questions have the same possible
answers, "yes" or "no". The distribution of answers to the innocuous question is known (for
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example, such a question could be about gender: "are you female?"). Which question is answered
by the respondents is decided by a probability mechanism and the researcher is not aware of which
question is answered. Because the distribution of the innocuous question is known, the response
on the sensitive question can be estimated. Hence, RRT allows for estimations of sensitive
behaviors at the group level under conditions of very high social anonymity. However, this
method is not applicable for elicitation purposes. Another group of survey techniques makes use of
the computer in order to provide a sense of anonymity. Computer-assisted personal interviewing
(CAPI) is now one of the most commonly used face-to-face data collection methods in the U.S.
(Tourangeau and Smith 1996, p. 276). With this method subjects respond to oral questions from a
researcher on the computer. CAPI has been found to be more effective than ordinary personal
interviews in making subjects report sensitive behaviors (e.g. Bradburn et al. 1991). Even better
results have been obtained by computer-assisted self-administered interviewing (CASI) where the
questions appear on the computer instead of being asked by a researcher (Locke et al. 1992;
Erdman et al. 1983).
Moreover, there are some results indicating that audio computer-assisted self-administered
interviewing (ACASI) may even perform better than CASI on very sensitive questions. ACASI is
similar to CASI except for the mode of asking questions; ACASI features auditory presentation of
questions (e.g. Tourangeau and Smith 1996). Despite the great creativity observed within survey
research in designing a variety of anonymous response modes, they are all assumed to affect only
one kind of anonymity: social anonymity, and are thus not deemed effective in alleviating biases
stemming from private self management (PSM) or situational self-deception (SSD). One final
response technique developed by Jones and Sigall (1971) should be mentioned: the bogus pipeline
technique. This method, which is a kind of fictitious lie detector, has been developed and tested
within the context of experimental psychological research. For instance, Tedeschi and Rosenfeld
(1981) used this technique to test hypotheses derived from impession management theory. The
bogus pipeline technique makes use oflie detector-like equipment (e.g. detectors linked to the skin
ofrespondents). Respondents are instructed that the lie detector is real and that the apparatus can
measure the truthfulness of responses from implicit muscle responses. Unlike the other response
mode techniques reviewed in this section, the bogus pipeline may affect the level of PSM in
addition to SSM since respondents are manipulated to believe that any deviation from the truth will
be detected.
When considering the fifth and sixth approaches to manipulating anonymity, which are both based
on the mechanism of projection, a very important change is noted in the potential effects of
manipulations. Projective techniques may provide a different type of anonymity from the foregoing
techniques; self anonymity, which may affect all three kinds of motivational response distortions:
SIM, PSM, and SSD.
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Table 4.3.
TECHNIQUES FOR MANIPULATING ANONYMITY IN CONSUMER RESEARCH
Approaches to
manipulation of
anonymity
Techniques
studied
Selected
references
Type of
anonymity
Type of
motivational
distortion affected
l.Direct manipu-
lation of
accountability
2.Confidentiality
assurances
3.Selection of
anonymous
interview modes
4.Selection of
anonymous
response modes
5.Use of person-
projective
techniques
6.Use of object-
projective
techniques
Telling/not telling
subjects that they
will be asked to
discuss their responses
Verbal assurance
of confidentiality
prior to interview
Face-to-face interw.,
Telephone interw.,
Questionnaires
Name disclosed/no
name disclosed,
SAQ
audio-SAQ
CAPI
CASI
ACASI
RRT
Bogus pipeline
Third-person
questioning,
Shopping-list
techniques
Modified TAT,
Projective quest-
ioning referring to
cars, animals, etc.
Fisher 1993
Tetlock 1983
Reamer 1979
Singer et al. 1992
Singer et al. 1995
Colombotos 1965
Groovesand
Kahn 1979
de Leeuw and van de
Zouwen 1988
Short et al. 1976
Andreasen 1970
Aquilino 1994
Aquilino and
LoScuito 1990
Bradburn et al. 1978
Bradburn et al. 1981
Fuller 1974
Jones and SigalI, 1971
Tourangeau and
Smith 1996
Warner 1965
Alpert 1971
Anderson 1978
Beardenand
Etzel1982
Fisher 1993
Haire 1950
Rogers and
Beall958
Zober 1956
Levy 1985
Social
Social ano.
(public)
Social ano.
Social ano.
(public and
interviewer)
Selfano.
Selfano.
Situational
impression
management
Situational
impression
management
Situational
impression
management
Situational
impression
management
(Private self
management)
Situational
impression
management,
Private self
management,
Situational
self-deception
Situational
impression
management,
Private self
management,
Situational
self-deception
NOTE: SAQ=self-administered questionnaire, audio-SAQ=walkman-administered questionnaire, RR T=randomized
response technique, CAPI=computer-assisted personal interviewing, CASI=computer-assisted self-
administered interviewing, ACASI=audio computer-assisted self-administered interviewing, TAT=thematic
apperception technique.
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(5) Person-projective techniques
Person-projective techniques instruct respondents to answer questions or respond to some stimulus
task from the perspective of another ambiguous person; for instance third-person questions like
"what do you think most consumers associate with Mercedes?" By focusing on another person,
respondents become less objectively self-aware (that is, more subjectively self-aware), which is the
demarcating characteristic of self-anonymity. It is believed that allowing respondents to focus on
another person creates a facade of impersonality. Behind this facade respondents are thought to
speak more freely in terms ofprojecting their own attitudes and beliefs onto a smilar but
ambiguous other person (Lawrence et al. 1994).
Person-projective techniques have been used in several surveys reported in the literature (e.g.,
Alpert 1971; Brinberg and Plimton 1986; Fisher 1993; Park and Lessig 1977). In these studies,
respondents were instructed to answer questions about predefmed beliefs or attitudes from the
perspective of another ambiguous person. However, the effects of using this kind of anonymity-
inducing questioning are not known in many of the studies because no control groups were
included, and hence no comparisons were made. For qualitative interviews, the majority of
attention has been devoted to one single variant of person-projective techniques: the shopping list
technique introduced by Haire (1950). Haire asked respondents to describe the character and
personality of the author's of two shopping lists. The lists were identical except from one item:
coffee. One of the lists contained Maxwell House Coffee (ground), and the other Nescafe instant
coffee. In this classic study several negative and socially undesirable characteristics of women
buying instant coffee were elicited which may not have been reported if respondents were asked
directly. While the shopping-list study and its many replications (see Fram and Cibotti 1991 for a
review) have certainly been useful to the discipline, the strong -- and largely warranted -- criticism
directed toward this stream ofresearch (e.g., Hill 1968; Anderson 1978) seem to have hindered
further explorations and comparative investigations of other and potentially more useful person-
projective techniques (e.g. projective word association tests). Thus, research on the shopping-list
technique is extensive, but published qualitative research using person-projective techniques in
general is rather limited.
(6) Object-projective techniques
Object-projective techniques ask questions directly in the first person, but use another stimulus
than the one ofinterest. Instead ofasking about the focal brand as such (e.g. Ranx Xerox), object-
projective techniques may ask respondents to describe the brand as an animal, as a car, etc. (Levy
1985). In addition to potentially evoking unconscious material (Levy 1985), such techniques may
provide a sense of self-anonymity because the focus of attention is moved from the relationship
between the respondent and the brand to the relation between the brand and some well-known
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object. However, the self-anonymity-inducing effect of object-projective techniques seems more
uncertain than the effect of person-projective techniques. The thematic apperception test (TAn is
another well-known object-projective technique. Itwas originally developed by Murray (1938) for
use in clinical psychology. The original test consists of 30 ambiguous pictures selected from
paintings and drawings. Respondents are asked to tell stories about the pictures. It is assumed that
individuals will organize their responses around their personal experiences, hopes, needs, and
aspirations, and that the stories may reflect unconscious conflicts and attitudes (Kassarjian 1974).
In the context of market research, pictures of the original TAT are changed to fit the particular
marketing problem under study (for some examples, see Kassarjian 1974). Both objects and
persons can be included in a TAT (thus, TAT can be bothperson-projective and object-projective).
4.3.2. Manipulation checks
An important, but often neglected issue in studies of anonymity is the question of whether
manipulations had a significant psychological effect compared to a control condition. For example,
the psychological effects of confidentiality assurances are typically not checked (e.g., Reamer
1979; Singer et al. 1992). In fact, no studies on the effects of confidentiality assurances have been
found in which manipulation checks were carried out. Also, in previous studies of anonymity (that
is, interviewer anonymity) manipulation checks are sometimes not performed, in particular within
survey research (e.g., Wildman 1977; Aquilino 1994; Aquilino and LoScuito 1990). However,
within other disciplines or streams of research such as social psychology, decision behavior, and
management research, manipulations of (interviewer-) anonymity are typically checked by means
of simple rating scales. For instance, subjects are instructed to rate the extent to which they believe
that responses can be traced back to the respondents (e.g., Connolly, Jessup, and Vlacich 1990;
Cotton and Baron 1980; Jessup and Tansik 1991; Weldon and Mustari 1988). This type of
measurement corresponds to our conception ofinterviewer anonymity.
Self anonymity is a new concept introduced in this study and no measure is readily available for
manipulation checks. Still, several studies have used techniques which are deemed adequate for
inducing this type of anonymity. For example, Fisher (1993) used third-person questioning in a
study of consumer beliefs about new products. However, no manipulation check was performed.
Similarly, other studies on the effects of projective techniques (e.g., Anderson 1978; Haire 1950;
Supphellen et al. 1997) have not directly measured the psychological effect of the manipulation as
such -- but only inferred from the results that manipulations caused respondents to project their
own beliefs or attitudes. The concept of self anonymity focuses on a precondition for projection:
that respondents during an interview focus their attention on a similar in-group person. To perform
manipulation checks for selfanonymity, we develop a new measure for this concept in section 6.6.
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4.3.3. Potential moderators
Manipulations of anonymity are expected to affect the outcome of elicitation interviews. Several
personality traits may moderate such effects. In particular, self-monitoring (Snyder 1974; Lennox
and Wolfe 1984) seems to be a relevant variable in this respect. Self-monitoring is an individual
personality measure for the tendency of people to monitor and adapt their behavior in social
situations. Thus, high self-monitors are more concerned with projecting social images that allow
them to meet the requirements of different social situations. Moreover, high self-monitors have
been found to be more concerned with the self-presentational significance of products (i.e.
symbolic benefits) than low self-monitors (Snyder and DeBono 1985). Because of this, high self-
monitors may hold more sensitive associations in their memories than low self-monitors and may
be more concerned with displaying a favourable image during interviews. On that account, we
expect that high self-monitors engage in more motivational response distortions and therefore are
more susceptible to manipulations of anonymity.
4.3.4. Summaryand implications
Previous research on manipulations of anonymity have largely focused on alternative response
modes and assurances of confidentiality in surveys. No studies have been found on effects of
anonymity-manipulations in qualitative interviews. Most importantly, the emphasis on anonymous
response modes apparently has lead to a narrow focus on only one type of anonymity: social
anonymity. In order to investigate the relative efficacy of social and self-anonymity, projective
techniques need to be included in experimental designs.
The conceptual development of anonymity in this chapter suggest that the two kinds of anonymity -
- social anonymity and self anonymity -- may affect different types of distortions and thus lead to
different outputs of elicitation interviews. Furthermore, the review of techniques for the
manipulation of anonymity suggests that different techniques are adequate for inducing different
types of anonymity. In the following chapter specific hypotheses are developed for the effects of
different anonymity-inducing techniques on elicitation outcome variables.
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CHAPTER 5
MODEL AND RESEARCH HYPOTHESES
In the introductory chapter, two main research questions were posed. The first question called for
the clarification and development of the concept ofanonymity. In Chapter 4 we attempted an
answer to this query and concluded that a distinction can be made between two types of anonymity
and that one ofthem can be further devided into two sub-constructs. In this chapter, we go on to
investigate which techniques are adequate for manipulating different types of anonymity. The
second research question focused on possible effects of anonymity manipulations on outcomes of
an elicitation interview. To answer this question, empirical experimentation is necessary.
In section 5.1. ofthis chapter, we develop a modelofthe empirical relationships investigated in the
study. This model provides a framework for subsequent development ofhypotheses in section
5.2.
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5.1. Conceptual model of anonymity effects
In the preceding chapter, two different kinds of anonymity were defined; social - and self
anonymity. We have further advanced the conjecture that the two types of anonymity are adequate
for alleviating different kinds of motivations to distort responses. Specifically, social anonymity
was only deemed relevant for reducing social motivations directed toward the interviewer or some
other person. Self anonymity, on the other hand, should affect all kinds of motivations for
distortion -- also intrapsychic motivations -- because this type of anonymity creates a psychological
distance between the self of the respondent and his or her responses. Due to the inherent
differences between self- and social anonymity, the two are expected to have different effects on
outcomes of elicitation interviews for a brand with sensitive associations. In particular, self-
anonymity is expected to elicit other and more valid associations than non-anonymity conditions
due to its greater potential for alleviating different types of distortion. A model of hypothesized
effects of anonymity is described in Figure 5.1. The variables in the model are further described
below.
Figure 5.1
MAIN RELATIONSHIPS EXAMINED IN THE EMPIRICAL STUDY
Treatment variable Elicitation outcomes
Latencies of sensitive
brand associations
Manipulation of
anonymity Sensitivity of
brand associations
- Social anonymity
- Self anonymity
- No anonymity Favourability of
brand associations
Predictive ability
of brand associations
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Manipulation of anonymity. Different techniques were selected to provide the different types of
anonymity. Testable hypotheses are developed for this manipulation. Two techniques were
selected for the purpose of inducing social anonymity and one for manipulation of self-anonymity.
Additionally, one condition was included in which both social- and self anonymity were induced
simultaneously. Finally, a control group with no manipulation of anonymity was included for the
purpose of comparison. The specific techniques used for the different conditions are presented in
section 5.2.1 below.
Dependent variables. The dependent variables follow from our discussions of response distortion
in elicitation interviews (Chapter 2) and discussions of dimensions ofbrand associations (Chapter
3). First, we have suggested that one type ofmotivational distortion in elicitation interviews could
be that sensitive associations are withheld until a favourable impression has been made and thus
reported later than actually activated. The result of this kind of distortion would be that sensitive
associations obtain too low latency scores when motivations for response distortions are not
effectively alleviated. Non-response is the other major type of distortion in elicitation interviews.
This kind of distortion willlikely lead to differences between experimental conditions in the
amount of different types of associations, in the sensitivity of associations, and the favourability of
associations reported. Finally, some respondents are likely to distort their responses in terms of
constructive responding, that is, reporting of irrelevant non-sensitive associations in stead of more
relevant sensitive associations. This kind of distortion in combination with non-responding is
likely to affect the predictive ability ofbrand associations reported. Predictive ability is defined here
as the correlations between evaluations ofbrand associations and self-reported attitudes and
intentions for the same brand (see section 6.6. for a discussion ofmeasurement issues).
Moderator. One moderator was selected for the purpose of investigating possible interactions with
anonymity manipulations. Self-monitoring is a well-known and extensively examined trait concept
(Briggs and Cheek 1988; Lennox and Wolfe 1984; Snyder 1974; 1987) which seems particularly
relevant to our investigation because it represents the tendency of individuals to observe and adjust
their conduct according to situational cues to social appropriateness (Snyder 1974). This kind of
tendency will probably interact with variations in anonymity conditions.
To provide a basis for testing the effects depicted in Figure 5.1, we first test specific expectations
regarding two related issues: (a) which techniques that are adequate for manipulating the two kinds
of anonymity, and (b) the relative sensitivity of different types ofbrand associations.
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5.2. Hypotheses
In the following sections, hypotheses are developed regarding the manipulation oftwo forms of
anonymity, the level of sensitivity of different types of associations, and the differential effects of
anonymity manipulations on elicitation outcome variables.
Many different types of associations are discussed in the literature (see the summary in Table 3.3.,
Chapter 3). In the empirical study we have chosen to focus on the three types ofbenefit
associations: functional -, hedonic-, and symbolic benefit associations -- and on attitudes, and
intentions. These kinds of associations are deemed most relevant in consumer evaluation and
purchase ofbrands and are therefore particularly important to brand managers (Park et al. 1986;
Keller 1993; Keller 1998).
One assumption should be mentioned here. Different types ofbrands may be characterized by
different kinds ofbrand associations. For example, Shavitt and Nelson (1997) found that the
extent of symbolic associations -- or associations about the users of a product -- was moderated by
the functions served by the product attitude. For example, products that primarily engaged attitudes
serving a utilitarian function (e.g., aspirin and air conditioner) were shown to elicit less
associations about users than products primarily serving a social identity function (e.g., team
banner and class ring). A similar relationship is likely to be present at the brand level. In
developing hypotheses in this section, we assume a brand with a rich associative network of
different kinds ofbrand associations. In particular, we assume that symbolic associations are
salient. Our choice ofbrand for the empirical study was guided by these considerations (see section
6.3.1., Chapter 6).
5.2.1. Manipulation of social- and self-anonymity
Conceptual development of anonymity has been a central concern in this dissertation, i.e, research
question 1 (chapter 1). The results of the theoretical review and synthesis of the concept in Chapter
4 resulted in the selection of anonymity techniques that are expected to induce principally different
kinds of anonymity. Because no previous studies have addressed the comparative ability of
techniques to induce different kinds ofanonymity, development and testing ofhypotheses on this
issue is warranted.
In Chapter 4, two main kinds of anonymity were developed: Social anonymity and Self
anonymity. Self-anonymity is conceptualized as the degree to which a respondent' s attention is
directed away from the self during an interview. Though researchers have not previously
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conceptualized anonymity in this way, theoretical arguments for the mechanism of projection
(Holmes 1968; 1978; Lawrence et al. 1994) and ofsubjective self-awareness (Duval and Wicklund
1972) is consistent with our notion of self-anonymity. Correspondingly, by inducing subjective
self-awareness in an elicitation interview, respondents' reporting ofassociations is kept away from
their egos. Projective techniques, in particular person-subjective techniques, are likely to induce
this kind ofanonymity.
One well-known technique presumably adequate for moving the focus away from the subject to a
similar other person and thus inducing self-anonymity, is the person-projective technique of third-
person questioning (3P). Person-projective methods are specifically designed to reduce distortion
by asking respondents to report on the nature of the external world (a similar, but ambiguous
person or group) rather than about themselves (Westfall et al. 1957, p. 138) and thereby facilitating
projection of sensitive cognitions and motives. Thus, subjective self-awareness (= self-anonymity)
is instrumental in obtaining projection, and an important product of person-projective techniques.
Correspondingly, Freud in his first clinical description of projection as a method concluded that:
"something was gained by this (the projective task) ....the judgement, the reproach, was kept away
from her ego" (Freud 1895/1966, p. 208, paranthesis added). Moreover, in specifically addressing
third-person questioning, Simon and Simon (1975, p. 586) argue that this technique allows
respondents to "describe their own feelings behind a facade of impersonality". In support of these
theoretical arguments, empirical studies show that different and more sensitive reports are obtained
for respondents subjected to third-person questioning than for respondents subjected to self-
administered questionnaires (Fisher 1993; Supphellen et al. 1997) or no-anonymity conditions
(Haire 1950), respectively. Hence, there seems to be another psychological process going on
under conditions of third-person questioning that is different from processes operating under
conditions of self-administered questionnaires and conditions of no anonymity. In fact, the nature
ofthese effects are consistent with the notion ofprojection (Fisher 1993; Supphellen et al. 1997).
As previously noted, though, full self-anonymity in the sense ofno activation of the private self is
not very likely since the target of subject-projective techniques needs to be a similar ingroup
person. Ifthe target is not perceived to be similar to the respondents, s/he will likely not project his
own thoughts, but rather activate information from long-term memory about the target (Lewis,
Bates, and Lawrence 1994). The flip side of this is that self-anonymity can only be obtained within
certain boundaries. Still, significantly higher levels of self-anonymity should be observed in the
groups subjected to third-person questioning (the 3P and SAQ3P groups) than in the other
experimental groups.
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HI a Respondents subjected to third-person questioning (the 3P and SAQ3P
groups) will experience higher levels of self anonymity than respondents
in the control group.
Social anonymity was devided into the sub-concepts of Interviewer anonymity and Public
anonymity. Interviewer anonymity refers to the feeling of respondents that no person other than
himself can link his responses to his identity, whereas Public anonymity refers to the feeling that
nobody but the researcherswill know the respondent's identity. The highest levels of Interviewer
anonymity are expected for the groups responding by means of self-administered questionnaires
(the SAQ and SAQ3P groups). When responses are made on standardized questionnaires, which
are put in neutral envelopes and then posted by respondents, higher levels offelt anonymity toward
other people are likely to result than when assurances of confidentiality are made but no measures
are taken to hide the identity of respondents (CONF). In tum, confidentiality assurances should
produce higher levels of Public anonymity than conditions in which no steps are taken to alleviate
concerns for anonymity (the 3P and CTRL groups). Several findings within survey research
suggest that the use of SAQ results in the reporting of more sensitive behaviors than ordinary
paper-and-pencil response modes (e.g. Aquilino and LoScuito 1990; London and Williams; Turner
et al. 1992). Also, some studies support the effect of confidentiality assurances (Singer et al.
1996); however, in line with our contentions, findings are more mixed than for SAQ, thus
indicating that confidentiality assurances provide a weaker (and possibly different) form of social
anonymity than SAQ. According to our conceptual framework of anonymity, the characteristics of
the methods involved, and previous findings, the following hypotheses should hold:
HIb Respondents subjected to self-administered questionnaires (the SAQ and
SAQ3P groups) will experience higher levels of Interviewer anonymity
than respondents in the control group.
HI c Respondents subjected to confidentiality assurances (the CONF group)
will experience higher levels of Public anonymity than respondents in the
control group.
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5.2.2. Premises for anonymity-effects: Sensitivity of brand associations
A fundamental assumption underlying the present research is that brand associations are -- to some
degree -- perceived as sensitive by respondents. Moreover, we contend that different kinds of
associations are differentially sensitive. The consequence of this premise, if confirmed, is that
anonymity manipulations may not only affect the amount of sensitive associations elicited, but also
the relative amount of different types of associations reported.
Sensitivity in this study is defined as the perceived probability -- from the perspective of
respondents -- that some brand association would be withheld in an elicitation interview (for a
discussion of the concept and its operationalization, see Chapter 6). Thus, such a concept leave the
antecedent motivational mechanism(s) -- which are hardly accessible for measurement -- open and
focuses on the behavioral side of sensitivity in terms of perceived probabilities of withholding
specific information in an interview. Before discussing the different degrees of sensitivity of
various types of associations, a more fundamental question is posed: Is there any reason to believe
that brand associations are perceived as sensitive at all?
Pragmatic analysis ofbeliefs (Schlenker 1980; 1982; 1985) and empirical findings from market
research (e.g., Haire 1950) strongly support a positive answer to this fundamental question.
According to Schlenker, there are two main reasons why people hold particular beliefs/
associations: (a) believability, and (b) personal beneficiality, or the extent to which the beliefs serve
the holder' s goals and values. Applied to the case of self-identification, "the analysis suggests that
within the range ofpotentially believable self-identifications, people endorse those that best serve
their goals and values" (Schlenker, 1986, p. 25.). Similarly, people develop networks ofbrand
associations in accordance with goals and values related to the kind ofproduct or brand in
question. This contention is reminiscent of'Barsalou's (1983;1985) work on goal-derived cognitive
categories. Barsalou found that some categories of cognitions were organized according to specific
processing objectives such as "arguments defending the purchase of a Mercedes" (myexample).
Thus, some brand associations -- in particular those stored in goal-derived categories -- are likely
to reflect the personal goals and values of consumers. These personal goals and values of an
individual are, in turn, closely related to his/her self concept (e.g., Belk 1988; McClelland 1951;
Sirgy 1982), and generalizations about the self are intimate topics that subjects hesitate to disclose
(Jourard 1971). Moreover, several empirical studies indicate that information held in memory is
sometimes withheld by respondents (e.g., Haire 1950; Stouffer 1950; Zober 1956). Thus, there
are good reasons to believe that some associations are perceived as sensitive. However, it is also
evident that some are not. For example, the second category of cognitive categories in Barsalou' s
framework, taxonomic categories, contain more "neutral" "dictionary-knowledge" concepts of
objects (e.g., brands), independent of contexts. Associations belonging to such categories are
likely to be very low in sensitivity.
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The next question then is: which kinds of associations are sensitive? In attempting an answer to
this question, we turn to the typology ofbrand associations developed in Chapter 3 (see Table
3.3). As previously noted, we focus on benefit associations, attitudes and intentions.
Benefits. Significant differences in sensitivity are expected between different types ofbenefits. It is
not only the degree of closeness to the self concept that determine the sensitivity of associations,
but also the function of the relationship.
Symbolic brand benefits are expected to be more sensitive than other types. Symbolic associations
are strongly self-relevant and central types ofbrand associations (Belk 1988; Keller 1993;
Solomon 1983). Indeed, from a symbolic interactionist perspective (see Solomon 1983 for a
review), brands may primarily serve a symbolic function. For example, the use of a Rolex may
signal personal success and wealth. Consumers rely on the social meanings inherent in brands as a
guide to the performance of social roles and the development of identity (e.g., Belk, Bahn, and
Mayer 1982; Haire 1950). Through interactions with others we learn how others see us -- and how
we should be seen. Thus, according to this perspective, the self is to a large extent a result of
other' s appraisals, whether imagined or actual. On this account, it seems tenable to assume that an
important aspect of consumers' self-related brand associations consist of perceptions of how others
see -- or would see -- them when using or owning the brand. This need for social recognition,
social approval, and role definition is accentuated when people are uncertain of other' s beliefs and
lack experience in satisfying role expectations. For example, Wicklund et al. (1981) reported a
study in which male MBA students with a lower chance of career success (as assessed by grade
points, number of job offers, etc.) were more prone to display symbols ofbelonging to the group
of successful businessmen, e.g. luxury watches and specific shoe brands. This urge for social
approval through consumption is undesirable in the Western culture. For example, Americans have
been shown to consistently assign a low rank to social recognition and a high rank to independence
as cultural values (Rokeach 1979, p. 133; Rokeach and Ball-Rokeach 1989, p. 778). Functional
(and to some extent hedonic) benefits are more socially acceptable reasons for liking or preferring a
brand. Correspondingly, previous research has found that consumers tend to downplay symbolic
aspects in their reports and instead focus on the functional attributes of products such as roominess
or horse power (e.g. Haire 1950; Fisher 1993).
H2a Symbolic brand associations will be perceived as more sensitive to
distortion than functional and hedonic associations.
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Attitudes and intentions. Intentions are expectedly more sensitive to distortion than attitudes. The
main rationale for this contention is that intentions are more closely linked to behavior (Fishbein
and Ajzen 1975). More precisiely, behavior in terms ofbrand choice more explicitly signifies
actual personal preferences than do attitudes and benefits. Consequently, intentions to select one
brand over another more directly displays "the true self' of an individual than do stated attitudes
which are more open to the concerns ofwhat is appropriate and socially acceptable and thus may
hide consumers' true feelings for a brand. Breckler's (1985; 1986) notion ofbelievability is
compatible with this position. We contend that his position that people come to hold beliefs that are
believable (and personally beneficial) also applies to the question ofwhich associations are
reported in an interview because the same fundamental needs for self-identification are likely
present in both instances. For attitudes, there is no other salient evidence for evaluations of
believability than, perhaps, consumers' previous statements. However, in interviews, researchers
normally lack such information. Thus, consumer reports on attitudes are easily subjected to
situational impression management (and possibly private selfmanagement) since the researcher (or
an imagined audience) cannot control the believability ofresponses. For behavioral intentions,
however, there is less room for strategic management of responses since stated intentions can be
checked against overt behavior. On that account, respondents concern for believability is probably
more dominating for intentions than for attitudes. When stating intentions, respondents may
therefore feelless free to mask their real intentions and are thus more prone to withhold intentions
than attitudes.
Yet another psychological concept is consonant with this reasoning: the concept ofpsychological
reactance (Brehm 1966). According to Brehm, people are very alert to reductions in their
behavioral freedom. If their freedom to act out of free will is threatened, a state of psychological
reactance will result, followed by actions to re-establish their freedom or hinder any further loss of
freedom. Applied to an elicitation interview, reporting ofintentions and attitudes could result in
psychological reactance since stated intentions and attitudes are perceived to pose restrictions on
future behavior. Indeed, Brehm argued that; «..reactance can be aroused in regard to opinions and
attitudes» (Brehm 1966, Chapter 6). We have argued that this is probably more the case with
intentions than attitudes due to intention's proximity to actual behavior.
Reactance is stronger for more important behaviors (Brehm 1966, pp 4-5). Hence, we might
expect that the level of reactance aroused by activating -- and thus challenging respondents to report
-- intentions or attitudes is proportional to the importance of the productJbrand in question.
However, a given increase in product importance willlikely cause more arousal ofreactance for
intentions than for attitudes since there is more room for strategic management of stated attitudes.
On that account, differences in sensitivity between intentions and attitudes are probably accentuated
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at higher levels of product involvement. Based on these lines of argument, we propose the
following hypothesis:
H2b: Intentions will be perceived as more sensitive to distortion than
attitudes
5.2.3. Anonymity-effects on response latencies
Three kinds ofbehavioral response distortion in elicitation interviews were suggested in Chapter 2:
(1) non-responding, that is withholding particular associations, (2) constructive reporting of non-
sensitive and irrelevant associations in order to display a positive or neutral image, and (3) latency
bias referring to distortion of the order at which associations are reported. We argue here that the
latter type of distortion probably is the most common in the elicitation ofbrand associations.
Conscious distortion has a psychological price. According to Grice (1975), asking and answering
qustions is a form of social discourse, govemed by some fundamental principles of conversation.
One central maxim set forth by Grice is : «make your contribution as informative as is required».
Applied to an elicitation context this principle could, perhaps, be translated as: «report all
associations you can think of». Furthermore, this principle is explicitly emphasised in most
elicitation interviews by the researcher with verbal or written instructions to report everything that
comes to mind. When the respondent is culturally «programmed- -- and, additionally, explicitly
instructed -- to report all associations that come to mind, s/he willlikely experience at least
moderate levels of stress when associations are consciously not reported. One solution to this
problem may be to report other related but less sensitive associations first (constructive reporting),
and subsequently, when a satisfactory impression has been displayed (towards oneself or others),
report sensitive associations. In this case, the result is latency bias: sensitive associations are
reported later than actually activated from long term memory. We believe that latency bias is a
dominant kind ofmotivational distortion in the elicitation ofbrand associations. Conscious non-
responding is more likely to occur for very sensitive associations, and though we have argued that
brand associations can be sensitive, they are seldom extremely sensitive when compared to topics
typically studied in the survey literature, such as racial discrimination, abortion, and sexual
behavior (e.g., Aquilino 1994; Tourangeau and Smith 1996). Instead, symbolic brand associations
and intentions are probably -- at most -- sensitive at moderate levels. Furthermore, in traditional
studies of anonymity effects, the researcher focuses explicitly on specific sensitive behaviors or
attitudes. In the context of the elicitation ofbrand associations, relatively general cues are used
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(e.g., a brand name in a word-association task) and there is no evidently «true» or «correct»
answer either in the view of respondents or interviewers. Hence, there is considerable room for
private self mangement or situational impression management. Since sensitive associations that are
consciously activated are merely moderately sensitive, theyare likely reported, but due to ample
opportunities for active management ofresponses, sensitive associations are probably reported
later than actually activated. At the beginning of interviews, associations consistent with a desired
selfimage are reported. Later in the interview, moderate tensions resulting from temporarily
withholding sensitive information might be relieved by reporting those sensitive associations.
Again, this reasoning is in line with Schlenker's (1986, p. 25) position that «within the range of
potentially believable self-identifications, ..., people endorse those that best serve their goals and
values». When not addressing specific sensitive issues directly but allowing respondents to report
«everything that comes to mind», a large set ofpotential responses is seen as believable. Thus, the
other concern of respondents, namely the personal beneficiality of associations in terms of
developing or maintaining their identities, will dominate, resulting in management of responses.
However, since conscious censoring of sensitive associations causes some stress, sensitive
associations withheld by respondents because they are not perceived as consistent with desired
identities, may be eventually reported. Provision of some kind of anonymity willlikely reduce the
concern of respondents for displaying an optimal image and, thus, affect distortions of latency
scores.
Specifically, only one kind of anonymity is expected to have any effect on latency bias: self-
anonymity. This is because self anonymity is the only type of anonymity adequate for alleviating
processes of private self management and situational impression management.
One important outcome of our conceptual review of antecedent processes for response distortion
was that the management of responses for the purpose of self-esteem enhancement or identity
development -- and, thus, subsequent behavioral distortions -- may occur in private as well as
public situations (e.g. Schlenker 1985; 1986). Traditional manipulations of anonymity, such as
allowing respondents not to identify themselves or use of SAQ-procedures, are only adequate for
alleviating biases stemming from socially-directed motivations to distort responses (hence, our
notion of social anonymity). Private self management may still occur because the same basic needs
for esteem-enhancement and identity-development are present under private conditions. However,
one potentially important aspect differentiating private and social settings regards the believability
ofresponses (Schlenker 1986). In a social setting, the definition ofwhich responses are believable
are seen largely from the perspective of some audience (e.g., the researcher), whereas in private
settings the respondent himself defines the range ofbelievable responses. We believe that this
distinction explains much of the positive effects of SAQ and other techniques inducing social
anonymity reported in previous studies. When people are asked sensitive behavioral questions, for
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instance about consumption of alcohol or drugs ( e.g. Aquilino 1990), reporting a falsely low
figure is perceived as more believable when taking the perspective of the researcher than when
respondents are "left alone with their private selves". Under private conditions, respondents are
stuck with the (perceived) truth, and non-responding or reporting of false figures willlikely cause
higher levels of stress than under social conditions. Thus, social anonymity does not reduce
motivations to distort, but rather restricts the perceived range ofbelievable responses so that they
more closely resemble the (perceived) truth. Ina context of elicitation, however, this restriction of
believability under private conditions is probably not taking place. As previously noted, elicitation
stimuli do not focus on specific behaviors or attitudes but ask for relatively free listings of
cognitions, thus leaving the question ofwhat constitutes a "true" answer more open. On this
account, manipulations providing a sense of social anonymity in elicitation interviews may not
have any substantial effect over no-anonymity conditions on the level of response distortion.
On the other hand, self-anonymity willlikely affect the level ofresponse distortion in elicitation
interviews. By moving the focus ofattention from the subject to another party, the concern for
esteem-enhancement and identity development could be alleviated. Consequently, distortions
resulting from situational impression management (SIM) or private self management (PSM) -- such
as latency distortions -- should be less serious under conditions of self-anonymity.
H 3 Sensitive associations will be reported earlier under conditions of self-
anonymity than under non-anonymity conditions.
5.2.4. Anonymity-effects on the level of sensitivity and the number of sensitive
types of associations reported
Will manipulations of anonymity affect the amount of different associations reported? From the
discussion of sensitivity of associations, it would seem reasonable to assume that a greater number
of symbolic associations and intentions would be reported under more (self-) anonymous
conditions.
Variations in the number of sensitive associations across experimental conditions would indicate
the presence of non-responding. We have argued that conscious non-responding is probably not a
pervasive phenomenon in the elicitation ofbrand associations due to moderate levels of sensitivity
ofbrand associations and flexibilty ofresponding. Still, in Chapter 2 we discussed another
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motivational mechanism resulting inpre-consciousnon-responding: Situational self-deception
(SSD). Self deception is a pre-conscious process protecting the conscious selffrom threatening
self-knowledge (Greenwald 1980; 1988). Such processes are more pertinent for the most sensitive
types ofassociations, for example symbolic brand associations and intentions (see H2a and b).
Due to the cultural unfavourability of symbolic reasons for liking or preferring a product,
consumers that like or prefer a symbolic brand because of its symbolic benefits are likely to
experience an intrapsychic conflict: on the one hand they like the brand, but, on the other, the
reasons why they do so might be partly in conflict with their values. The result could be self-
deception.
Self-anonymity is the only kind of anonymity deemed effective in reducing self deception. Only by
taking the perspective of another person will the tension caused by threatening self-knowledge be
relieved when respondents are allowed to project sensitive associations onto similar others. Thus, a
greater number of sensitive associations such as intentions and symbolic associations should be
reported under conditions of self anonymity.
H4a A greater number of sensitive types of associatlons will be reported under
conditions of self anonymity than under non-anonymity conditions.
In addition to non-responding, constuctive reporting of irrelevant non-sensitive associations will
probably occur in the non-anonymity condition. Self-anonymity should alleviate this problem and
result in higher levels of sensitivity of associations reported.
H4b Higher levels of sensltivity of reported associations will be observed under
self-anonymity conditions than under non-anonymity conditions.
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5.2.5. Anonymity-effects on the favourability of associations reported
The effect of the anonymity manipulation on the overall favourability of associations reported is
not clear. Some favourable associations may be sensitive (e.g., "this car make me feel I'm
something"), whereas other favourable associations are not (e.g., "this is a nice car'').
Correspondingly, some negative associations are common and thus not very sensitive (e.g., "ifs
too expensive"), whereas other associations may be regarded as sensitive to disclose (e.g., "that' s
a car for people who need to compensate for poor self-confidence"). Though it is difficult to
evaluate the effect of our manipulation on the overall level offavourability, we expect an effect on
the level of favourability for one specific type of associtation.
Positive symbolic associations are probably more sensitive than negative or less positive symbolic
associations because they signal a culturally unfavourable desire of social approval (Rokeach
1979). Hence, favourable symbolic associations are expectedly more prone to be withheld than
less favourable symbolic associations. The flip side of this is that effective use of self-anonymity
may result in more favourable symbolic associations being reported. Interestingly, in his study of
third-person questioning, a technique inducing self-anonymity (see HIa), Fisher (1993) found that
normative beliefs such as "students I know would have a favourable reaction if! bought one of
these new products" were evaluated as more important when respeondents responded in the third
person (the typical college student will ...), than when answers were given more directly (I will
...). In a similar vain, we believe that respondents will feel more free to report favourable symbolic
associations when subjected to self-anonymity in an elicitation interview.
H 5 The level of favourability of symbolic associations reported will be higher
under conditions of self-anonymity than under non-anonymity conditions.
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5.2.6. Anonymity-effects on the predictive ability of associations
Predictive ability in this study is defmed as the correlation between strength ratings of a set of
brand associations and self-reported ratings of attitudes or intentions toward the brand (see
Measurement section in Chapter 6). The question is: will different manipulations of anonymity
produce association sets with different abilities to predict attitudes and intentions? When sensitive
but relevant associations are withheld, the predictive ability of reported associations may suffer.
Also, constructive reporting, that is reporting of less relevant associations to compensate for those
sensitive associations that are withheld, may lower predictive ability.
Sensitive associations (e.g., symbolic associations and intentions) are probably very salient
because they are highly self-relevant and diagnostic of overall preferences for the brand (i.e.,
Solomon 1983). When they are salient, they are also more likely to be activated in evaluations and
choice (Fishbein and Ajzen 1975). Because different manipulations ofanonymity are expected to
produce different levels of sensitive associations (H4b), the predictive ability of associations are
likely to vary across manipulations. Moreover, even when sensitive associations are not withheld
but respondents engage in constructive reporting of irrelevant associations, different levels of
predictive ability are probably observed across conditions because irrelevant non-diagnostic
information tends to weaken the impact of diagnostic information (Nisbet and Zukier 1981). This
negative impact of non-diagnostic information on predictive ability is expected to be differentially
alleviated across manipulations because different levels of constructive reporting are expected
across conditions. Again, self-anonymity is expected to be most effective in reducing distortions
and, hence, improving the predictive ability of associations because this method has an impact on
all three types of antecendent psychological mechanisms leading to overt distortions.
H6a Associations elicited under conditions of self-anonymity will be more
predictive of self-reported attitudes than associations elicited under non-
anonymity conditions.
H6b Associations elicited under conditions of self-anonymity will be more
predictive of self-reported intentions than associations elicited under non-
anonymity conditions.
We have argued that the distortion of response latencies probably is the most common type of
motivational distortion in elicitations ofbrand associations. If sensitive associations are reported
later than they are actually activated and these associations are important to predict attitudes and
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intentions, the mitigating effect of anonymity manipulations are expected to be more significant for
the first associations reported than for whole sets of associations reported. When the whole set is
used, sensitive associations important to prediction -- which are reported at the end of thought
listings -- should be included in predictions, and the effect of anonymity manipulations are less
significant.
H6c The difference in predictive ability between associations elicited under
self-anonymity conditions and associations elicited under non-anonymity
conditions will be larger for the most latent associations than for all
associations reported.
5.2.7. Interactions with self-monitoring
Brands for some products (e.g. cars) may serve many kinds ofneeds or functions, allowing
consumers to focus on different functional goals (Shavitt 1989; 1990), for example the social
identity function ofhow the car makes them look to others or the utilitarian function of its safety.
Thus, individual differences in consumer goals willlikely emerge for such brands. Indeed,
previous research indicates that personality may influence the focus of consumers on certain kinds
ofbenefits or attributes. In particular, the concept of self-monitoring has been addressed in this
respect (e.g., Snyder and Debono 1985; Shavitt, Lowrey, and Han 1992). Selfmonitoring refers
to the degree to which individuals are concerned with projecting favourable social images in social
situations (Snyder 1974). High self-monitors are most attuned to the shifting requirements of
different social situations and tend to adjust their behavior accordingly. Low self-monitors, on the
other hand, are less concerned with social appropriateness and more concerned with being
consistent with their internal feelings and preferences. These individual differences have an impact
on peoples relationship with products. For example, research by Snyder and DeBono (1985)
suggested that low self-monitors tend to be concerned with attributes or benefits related to product
quality, such as taste of coffee, whereas high self-monitors tended to focus more on symbolic
aspects such as the image associated with serving a particular type of coffee. Correspondingly, low
self-monitors are probably more convinced by advertising appeals focusing on functional and
hedonic aspects whereas high self-monitors are more influenced by symbolic appeals (i.e., Shavitt
1990). Most important to the present study, the kinds of associations deemed more relevant to high
self-monitors, symbolic associations, should be more sensitive than associations most pertinent to
low self-monitors (utilitarian associations). Consequently, high self-monitors should hold more
sensitive associations in memory than low self-monitors. Moreover, during an elicitation interview
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high self-monitors are likely to be more concerned with displaying a favourable image than would
low self-monitors. On this account, the postulated effects of anonymity manipulations are probably
greater for high self-monitors than for consumers low in self-monitoring.
H7a Any observed effects of anonymity manipulations on number-, latencies-,
favourabillty-, or sensitivity of associations will be more accentuated for
high self-monitors than for low self-monitors.
For predictive ability, we suggest a different type of interaction. If our contention is correct that
respondents will engage in distortions ofresponses when no anonymity is provided (the control
group), we expect self-monitoring to be a negative moderator of the predictive ability of
associations in this group. This is because high self-monitors will tend to distort their responses,
and thus lower the predictive ability ofreported associations, to a larger degree than low self-
monitors. Respondents subjected to self-anonymity, on the other hand, should not be motivated to
distort their responses since this type of anonymity alleviates all three psychological mechanisms
leading to distortions (situational impression management, private selfmanagement, and situational
self-deception, see Chapter 2). Consequently, self-monitoring should not have any moderating
effect on the predictive ability of associations reported under this condition.
H7b Self-monitoring will be a negative moderator for the predictive ability of
associations elicited under non-anonymity conditions, but not for
associations elicited under conditions of self anonymity.
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5.2.8. Summary
In the opening section ofthis chapter we presented a set ofhypotheses on which techniques that
would be appropriate for inducing social- and self-anonymity, respectively. To form a basis for
discussing effects of the anonymity manipulation, we also developed hypotheses on the relative
levels of sensitivity of different types of associations. The basic logic of postulated effects of the
anonymity manipulation rested to a large extent on the premise that self-anonymity provides a
fundamentally different kind of anonymity which is expected to alleviate all three forms of
motivations for distortion. Self-anonymity was hypothesised to significantly reduce behavioral
distortions such as suspending reporting of sensitive associations (thus distorting latency scores)
and the holding back of some sensitive kinds of associations. On this account, we have also argued
that associations elicited under conditions of self-anonymity should be more predictive ofbrand
attitudes and purchase intentions than associations elicited under non-anonymity conditions.
Finally, interactive effects of self-monitoring and the manipulation of anonymity were suggested.
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CHAPTER 6
METHODOLOGY
The first research question posed in the introductory chapter asked for a clarification of the concept
of anonymity in market research. Based on previous studies on anonymity and borrowing
theoretical perspectives from psychology, we anwered this query in Chapter 4. In this chapter we
go on to operationalize our three-dimensional framework of anonymity. The second research
question focused on possible effects of anonymity manipulations in elicitation interviews on the
type, latencies, and predictive ability ofbrand associations reported. Here we present a
methodology amenable to answer this second question and to test the specific hypotheses
developed in Chapter 5.
In the first section, the choice of an experimental design is explained and discussed (6.1.) followed
by a briefoverview of the experimental manipulation (6.2.). Subsequent sections describe and
explain the selection of stimulus brand and elicitation technique (6.3.), sample for the study (6.4.),
details of the experimental procedure (6.5.), and the measurement of study variables (6.6.).
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6.1. Research design for the empirical study
As pointed out in the review of studies on anonymity and anonymity-effects in Chapter 4, little
research exists on the effects of anonymity in elicitation interviews. Thus, our study is exploratory
in the sense that we are looking for potential effects of anonymity manipulations for this kind of
measurement task with limited prior knowledge about what effects to expect. However, we Still,
our major concern is with the manipulations of anonymity as such and the causal effect of
manipulations of anonymity on elicitations outcomes. Furthermore, in order to develop specific
causal hypotheses, some descriptive hypotheses were also presented regarding differences in levels
of sensitivity between various kinds ofbrand associations. On that account, we chose an
experimental design though the overall character of the study is exploratory. Still, our choice is
consistent with the reasoning ofZaltman et al. (1982) and Troye (1985) that experiments may well
be used in exploratory research when researchers have hunches that specific effects or relationships
exist. Specifically, a laboratory experimental design was chosen for three main reasons.
First, descriptive problems are more easily investigated within the context of an experiment than
causal problems in a non-experimental design (Nachmias and Nachmias 1992). The level of
sensitivity on different types ofbrand associations (H2a and b) can be studied in an experiment
designed to investigate the effects of anonymity manipulations on elicited associations provided
that the product or brand chosen is fairly rich in different types of associations. However,
investigation of causal effects of anonymity manipulations on elicitation outcomes is problematic
within a non-experimental design because such designs are not adequate for isolating effects of
independent variables (Cook and Campbell 1979).
Second, to isolate the effects of anonymity manipulations is a major objective in this study.
Because little is known about the effects of anonymity in elicitation interviews, we first need to
verify whether there are any effects at all, and then we wish to explore the nature and boundaries of
effects. We believe, based on a literature review and theoretical developments, that there are good
reasons to expect effects of anonymity manipulations in elicitation interviews. Hence, our focus is
on theory application as opposed to effects application (Calder, Phillips, and Tybout 1981), and
for applications oftheories, Calder et al. argue that researchers should prioritize internal validity.
Internal validity is maximized in laboratory experiments in which conditions for controlling
confounding variables -- and thus isolating the effects of independent variables -- are better than for
any other design (Cook and Campbell l 979).
Third, the variables included in our model and the hypotheses proposed are of such a kind that
experimental investigation is possible. It is possible to control the experimental situation (elicitation
interviews) and extraneous variables threatening the internal validity of fmdings, such as task
METHODOLOGY 69
ambiguity and task involvement which can be measured and controlled for. Furthermore,
anonymity can be manipulated by means of different well-known techniques, which in turn can be
compared for their differential effect on dependent variables (i.e., Cook and Campbell 1979).
Finally, experiments have been used in previous research on anonymity effects -- though a
majority of experiments have been conducted within surveys (e.g., Aquilino 1990; 1994; Fisher
1993). Thus, the use of an experimental design facilitates comparison with previous studies on
effects of anonymity.
6.2. Overview of the experiment
Five experimental conditions were developed in which response and question modes were varied.
In group l, the control group (CTRL), subjects were not provided with any kind ofmeasure to
create anonymity. Respondents names were written on the response sheets and subjects responded
to direct questions about their associations to a brand name. Thus, group 1 functioned as a
benchmark in testing the effects ofanonymity manipulations. In group 2, subjects responded to a
self-administered questionnaire (SAQ). The same direct question was asked, but respondents were
instructed not to write down their names. They were given a standard sheet ofpaper and an
envelope prior to the interview with instructions to put their response in that envelope and post it in
a given mailbox used for the purpose of the study. Hence, group 2 was designed to obtain social
anonymity (interviewer-anonymity). In group 3, subjects wrote down their names like those in the
control group, but here questions were asked in the third person ("what do you believe most
students would associate with ...") (3P). The type of anonymity induced here was self-anonymity.
Group 4 was subjected to the combination ofthird-person questioning and self-administered
questionnaires (SAQ3P). Thus, both social- and self-anonymity were induced in this condition. So
far, the experiment could be described as a 2(SAQ vs. no SAQ) x 2 (third-person- vs. direct
questioning) factorial design. However, a fifth condition was added. Group 5 was similar to the
control group except from the difference that respondents in group 5 were subjected to assurances
of confidentiality at the introductory stage of the interview. This condition was included for two
reasons. First, it provides another "milder" subtype of social anonymity than SAQ, namely public
anonymity. Second, confidentiality assurances probably represent the most common technique for
mitigating response distortions in market research. The characteristics of the five experimental
conditions are summarized in Table 6.2.
Anonymity techniques were varied between subjects. Because we wanted to measure felt (social
and self) anonymities and several other variables pertaining to feelings and focus of attention
during the stimulus task, we needed to address these feelings right after stimulus exposure when
70 METHODOLOGY
theywere still "fresh" in working memory. Repeating the stimulus task with another anonymity
manipulation would most likely result in hypothesis guessing and extensive practice effects. Thus,
our choice of design can be described as a 2(SAQ response mode vs. not SAQ response mode) x 2
(third-person- vs. direct questioning) + I (confidentiality assurance) between subjects factorial
design.
Table 6.2
OUTLINE OF EXPERIMENT AL DESIGN
Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 Group 5
(CTRL) (SAQ) (3P) (SAQ3P) (CONF)
Response mode Namestated SAQ Namestated SAQ Name stated
Questioning Direct Direct Third person Third person Direct
mode
Instruction Confiden-
tiality
Type of None Social Self Selfand Social
anonymity (interviewer) social (public)
NOTE: CTRL = control group, CONF = assurances of confidentiality, SAQ = self-administered questionnaire, 3P =
third-person questioning, SAQ3P = self-administered questionnaire and third-person questioning.
The levels of sensitivity of different kinds ofbrand associations, however (H2a and b), were
analysed within subjects. Immediately after the interview, respondents filled in a questionnaire
measuring different variables about the interview experience such as felt anonymity and task
involvement. One month later, subjects responded to another questionnaire based on the responses
from the elicitation interviews. More details about the experimental procedure and the questionnaire
are provided in sections 6.5. Expreimental procedure) and 6.6.(Measurement).
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6.3. Selection of stimulus brand and elicitation technique
Mercedes was chosen as the stimulus brand and the free association technique was used to elicit
brand associations. Background and reasons for these choices are discussed next.
6.3.1. Stimulus brand
Three criteria were used in selection of stimulus brand. First, since our hypotheses address
different kinds ofbrand associations, brand images for the chosen brand should be rich in different
kinds of associations (different benefits, attitudes, and intentions). Psychological research on
attitude functions has shown that many - if not most -- products engage many functions (Shavitt
1989). In particular, Ennis and Zanna (1991) showed that automobiles may serve three kinds of
needs: utilitarian (gain rewards and avoid punishment), social adjustment (facilitate and maintain
social relationships), and value-expressive needs (expressing personal values and other core
aspects of the self concept). Thus, images for automobile brands would likely contain many
different kinds of associations. Second, some associations for the chosen brand should be
sensitive. Specifically -- as indicated by Hlb -- brand images should contain symbolic brand
associations. Solomon (1983) has argued that automobiles often are taken as indicators of
underlying characteristics of the people driving them. From this we might expect that most car
brand images contain symbolic brand associations. However, Mercedes was selected because this
is a differentiated and luxurious brand -- and thus more likely to evoke salient symbolic
associations than other car brands (Wright et al. 1992). Moreover, Mercedes is often regarded as a
symbol of success and typically associated with business people -- an aspect highly relevant to the
(ideal) self concepts of business students participating in our study. The third criterion for
selection was that the chosen brand should be a relatively common and well-known brand. One
fundamental conjecture advanced in this thesis is that response distortion may result from very
common and fundamental psychological needs such as self-esteem enhancement and identity
development. Thus, response distortion is believed to be a pervasive phenomenon in any kind of
social interaction, including elicitations ofbrand associations. On that account, we did not opt for
marginal brand names for which people obviously hold very sensitive associations such as erotic
video brands or brands for contraceptives. If effects of anonymity manipulations were found for
these brands, findings could be attributed to the unique characteristics of the product categories. If
interesting effects of anonymity manipulations are found for a car brand, however, manyother
brands belonging to other product categories could be seen as candidates for similar effects.
Hence, if significant effects of anonymity manipulations are found for Mercedes, further
investgation of the external validity offmdings would be highly warrented.
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6.3.2. Elicitation techniques
Several techniques are suggested in the literature for the purpose of eliciting brand associations
from consumer memory. For example, Keller (1993, p.l4) proposed three groups oftechniques
for this purpose: free associations tasks, projective techniques, and depth interviews. However,
several other and more structured techniques could be used such as the repertory grid technique or
q-sort techniques. Moreover, more complex combinations of different stimulus techniques have
been developed recently for the purpose of elicitation, i.e. Zaltman' s Methaphor Elicitation
Technique (Zaltman 1997). Still, free association probably is the kind of technique most
commonly used by marketers. With this technique, consumers are given a stimulus cue, typically a
brand name, and asked to report all thoughts that come to mind when reading or hearing the cue
word. In this study, we selected this technique for the elicitation ofbrand associations. The
unstructured and simple nature of this technique was considered beneficial because it allows
respondents to report associations relatively freely, without interruptions from a researcher and
without being subjected to an artificial structure of responding. Thus, any observed effects of
anonymity manipulations for a free elicitation task would not be attributed to the peculiarities of the
elicitation technique. Most importantly, the unstructured nature ofthis technique allows
respondents to engage in any kind of distortion discussed in this study (see Chaper 2), including
self-deception, private self-management, and situational impression management -- and
corresponding behavioral distortions of non-responding, constructive reporting and distortion of
response latencies. Also, the common use ofthis technique implied that any observed effects of
anonymity manipulations would likely be of interest to a broader audience.
Interestingly, free association techniques have been described as very reliable and valid measures
of consumer memory (e.g., Freedman 1986). We agree with this contention in the sense that this
method probably is less susceptible to various kinds of response bias than other more structured
techniques. However, since motivational distortions result from very fundamental and pervasive
psychological needs (Schlenker 1980; 85), we believe that anonymity will also have an impact on
the results of free elicitation tasks.
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6.4. Sample
The sample consisted of205 undergraduate business students recruited from two Norwegian
business schools (the Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration (NHH) in
Bergen, and the Norwegian School of Management (Bl) in Oslo). Students were randomly
assigned to the five anonymity conditions.
Type of sample. A focal issue in sample selection is whether the sample should be composed of
members of a readily available homogenous group -- such as students -- or should be more
representative of some relevant population (e.g. owners of Mercedes ). The critical question here is
whether the research objective is generalization or theoretical explanation (Calder et al. 1981;
Stemthal et al. 1994). As previously noted in the discussion of the design for this study (section
6.1.), our goal is to discover and explain effects of anonymity manipulations in elicitation
interviews. With this goal, a homogenous sample is preferred (Calder et al. 1981). This is because
the chances that the experimental treatment will have the same impact on all participants (within
conditions) are greater when the subjects are similar. Thus, homogenous samples increases the
likelihood of observing causal relations when they exist.
Sample size. Conventional rules of thumb indicate that 30 subjects per cell is appropriate in order
to meet the assumptions of statistical analyses performed on experimental data such as ANOVA
and ANCOVA (Sawyer and Ball 1981). However, studies with smaller sample sizes are often
reported and even recommended. Cohen (1977) and others have demonstrated the importance of
another issue in selections of sample size for empirical studies. In addition to meeting the
assumption of analyses performed on the data, a sample size should be selected so as to provide
sufficient statistical power for the effects investigated. The smaller the expected effects of
manipulations, the more power that is needed to detect them. Power is increased by accurate
measurement and large sample sizes (Cohen 1977). Because no studies have been conducted in the
literature on the effects of anonymity in elicitation interviews, we do not know what effect sizes to
expect. However, since we have argued that elicitations ofbrand associations probably are
subjected to only moderate levels of distortion, it seems reasonable also to expect moderate effect
sizes, that is (1)2 - values of about .06 in ANOVAs, i.e., Cohen 1977). However, with a
conventional sample size of 30, the probability of detecting a moderate effect of (1)2 = .06 is less
than 50% (Sawyer and Ball 1981). Hence, we planned to recruit enough students to obtain cell
sizes of about 40. Though desirable, a larger sample was not obtainable on financial and practical
grounds. Students were recruited at the end oflectures oftwo obligatory courses (introductory
courses in marketing and organizational theory) at the two business schools. Between 300 and 400
students were typically present at these lectures. Students were requested to participate in a market
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research project for a well-known brand and they were told that all participants would take part in a
lottery for two cheques of about 400 dollars each. The final sample, distributed on the five
anonymity conditions, is presented in table 6.4.
Table 6.4
SAMPLE SIZE OBTAINED
Group 1
(CTRL)
Group 2
(SAQ)
Group 3
(3P)
Group 4
(SAQ3P)
Group 5
(CONF)
Total: n = 205
Numberof
respondents 40 43 42 37 43
NOTE: CTRL = control group, CONF = assurances of confidentiality, SAQ = self-administered questionnaire, 3P =
third-person questioning, SAQ3P = self-administered questionnaire and third-person questioning.
6.5. Experimental procedure
The experimental study consisted of two measurements at two different points in time. First,
elicitation interviews were conducted in which subjects were randomly assigned to one out of five
anonymity conditions. Immediately after the interview, subjects responded to a short questionnaire
containing variables asking about the elicitation interview experience, e.g., felt anonymity and task
involvement. Then questionnaires were developed based on the elicitation results. This was done
on an individual basis, that is, a unique questionnaire was developed for each of226 subjects (the
fmal N was 205). Rating scales for attitudes, intentions, and self-monitoring were equal across
subjects, but the brand associations that were included corresponded to the individual sets of
associations reported by each respondent in the elicitation interviews. These second questionnaires
were distributed one month after the elicitation interviews. Further details about the two stages of
the experiment are provided below.
Elicitation interviews. The interviews were conducted at the two business schools involved.
Students were welcomed by a research assistant and assigned to one out ofthree vacant offices at
one of the schools and one out oftwo small meeting rooms at the other. All rooms and offices
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Table 6.5.
TREATMENT: INSTRUCTIONS FOR MANIPULA TION OF ANONYMITY
1. CONTROL GROUP (CTRL)
"WHAT IS YOUR NAME? (WRITES IT ON TOP OF THE RESPONSE SHEET SUBSEQUENTLY HANDED
TO THE SUBJECT). In a moment you will receive a sheet of paper with an instruction asking you to write down
thoughts that come to mind for a specific brand name. Please, write down all thoughts or associations that come to
mind. Take the time you need and let me know when you run out ofthoughts."
Written stimulus: "What do you associate with Mercedes?"
2. SELF-ADMINISTERED QUESTIONNAIRE (SAQ)
"In a moment you will receive a STANDARD sheet ofpaper with an instruction asking you to write down thoughts
that come to mind for a specific brand name. Please, write down all thoughts or associations that come to mind.
Take the time you need and let me know when you run out ofthoughts.YOU ARE NOT SUPPOSED TO GIVE
ME THE RESPONSE SHEET BUT TO PUT IT IN THIS ANONYMOUS ENVELOPE (HANDING IT TO THE
RESPONDENT). AFTER THE INTERVIEW YOU MAY PUT THE ENVELOPE IN THE MAILBOX OUTSIDE
THISROOM"
Written stimulus: "What do you associate with Mercedes?"
3. THIRD-PERSON QUESTIONING (3P)
"WHAT IS YOUR NAME? (WRITES IT ON TOP OF THE RESPONSE SHEET SUBSEQUENTLY HANDED
TO THE SUBJECT). In a moment you will receive a sheet of paper with an instruction asking you to write down
thoughts that come to mind for a specific brand name. Please, write down all thoughts or associations that come to
mind. Take the time you need and let me know when you run out of thoughts."
Written stimulus: "What do you think MOST BUSINESS STUDENTS associate with Mercedes?"
4. THIRD-PERSON QUESTIONING AND SELF-ADMINISTERED QUESTIONNAIRE (SAQ3P)
"In a moment you will receive a STANDARD sheet of paper with an instruction asking you to write down
thoughts that come to mind for a specific brand name. Please, write down all thoughts or associations that come to
mind. Take the time you need and let me know when you run out ofthoughts.YOU ARE NOT SUPPOSED TO
GIVE ME THE RESPONSE SHEET BUT TO PUT IT IN THIS ANONYMOUS ENVELOPE (HANDING IT TO
THE RESPONDENT). AFTER THE INTERVIEW YOU MAY PUT THE ENVELOPE IN THE MAILBOX
OUTSIDE THIS ROOM"
Written stimulus: "What do you think MOST BUSINESS STUDENTS associate with Mercedes?"
5.. CONFIDENTIALITY ASSURANCE (CONF)
"WHAT IS YOUR NAME? (WRITES IT ON TOP OF THE RESPONSE SHEET SUBSEQUENTLY HANDED
TO THE SUBJECT). In a moment you will receive a sheet of paper with an instruction asking you to write down
thoughts that come to mind for a specific brand name. Please, write down all thoughts or associations that come to
mind. Take the time you need and let me know when you run out ofthoughts. WE CAN ASSURE THAT ALL
RESPONSES ARE CONFIDENTIAL "
Written stimulus: "What do you associate with Mercedes?"
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were sparsely furnished and any vivid pictures or other attention-catching elements were removed
prior to interviews. Upon arrival at the offices/meeting-rooms, subjects were introduced to the
interviewers. Interviewers were five carefully trained graduate students at each school, three males
and two females. Subjects were reminded that the study was about a well-known brand and that
they would be asked a general question about this brand and respond in writing. Next, students
were randomly assigned to one of the five anonymity conditions. All interviewers administered all
five manipulations in order to control for interviewer-bias. The five oral instructions corresponding
to the five experimental conditions are presented in Table 6.5. Note that the only aspects varying
between conditions were the manipulations of anonymity. All other aspects of instructions were
held constant. Also, other extraneous elements of the elicitation method (see our modelofthe
elicitation process, Figure 3.4 in Chapter 3) were controlled for or held constant: interviewer-
effects, place of interviews, presentation mode, and brand context (not specified). However, two
important extraneous variables possibly confounding the effects of anonymity manipulations were
not controlled: task involvement and task ambiguity. If different anonymity instructions induce
different levels oftask ambiguity and/or involvement, such effects represent rivalry explanations
for any observed effects of our treatment variable. Therefore, task ambiguity and task involvement
were measured in order to check for this potential confound.
When the respondent indicated that he/she had nothing more to add, the elicitation task was ended,
and the response sheets for the CTRL, 3P, and CONF group members were handed in. Next,
respondents received a short questionnaire with measures of self anonymity, social anonymity,
task involvement, task ambiguity, age, and gender. Additionally, questions about the purpose of
the interview task and whether respondents had met the interviewer before were included (recall
that the interviewers were graduate students at the same schools). None guessed the true purpose
of the elicitation task; the majority simply thought that the purpose was to get information about
consumers' associations with Mercedes. Only two respondents reported to have seen or met their
interviewers earlier; however, they were not friends -- the interviewers had been instructed not to
interview anybody they knew. Since there were only two respondents ofthis kind, and they
belonged to different experimental conditions (SAQ3P and CONF), they were not excluded from
the sample.
For the respondents subjected to the SAQ and SAQ3P conditions, the same envelope was used as
was handed out before the elicitation task, whereas the others (CTRL, CONF, and 3P) received
their envelope together with the questionnaire. When the questionnaire was filled in, the elicitation
response sheets were put in the same envelopes as the questionnaire. For respondents subjected to
the CTRL, 3P, or CONF conditions (for which the elicitation sheet had been handed in and names
were written on them), the interviewer tore off the name and handed the sheet back to the
respondent for him or her to put it in the envelope.
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Before receiving the questionnaire, subjects were informed that:
You are not supposed to hand back this questionnaire or write your name on it. When you
have finished the questionnaire, you may put it in this(the same) anonymous envelope
and drop it in the mailbox outside the room
Inother words, the questionnaire was self-administered and thus answered under conditions of
social anonymity. This response mode was chosen because the self-report measures for self
anonymity and task involvement (see section 6.6) could be subjected to response distortions. The
self-anonymity measure focuses on the extent to which respondents aim their attention at
themselves compared to other people when reporting associations. For example, ifmore sensitive
associations were reported by SAQ-respondents in the elicitation phase, and no anonymity was
provided in the questionnaire measuring self-anonymity, SAQ-respondents would tend to report
less self-focus than was actually the case because they might feel a need to distance themselves
from the sensitive associations they had reported. Correspondingly for task involvement,
respondents reporting sensitive associations might feel a need to signallow degrees of involvement
if no anonymity was provided. SAQ induces social anonymity - the most common kind of
anonymity used in previous research - and the strongest kind available for this purpose. Before the
subjects left the room, they were asked to write the first letter(s) of the first name ofa person they
knew very well and this person's day ofbirth on the front of the envelope. The researcher did not
observe what letters and figures were written down. The students were instructed to note the code
because it would be needed in order to participate in the lottery. The codes were used to match
respondents from the first stage with their individual questionnaires in the follow-up study. A total
of 226 students participated in the first part of the experiment.
Thefollow-up questionnaire. About one month after the elicitation interviews, 226 questionnaires
were distributed to the same students participating in the first phase of the study. Students were
told that only those questionnaires that were adequately filled in would participate in the lottery.
The questionnaires were distributed at the end oflectures for the same courses as for the elicitation
interviews. Questionnaires were put in envelopes and ordered alphabetically according to the codes
on a large table. Students found their questionnaires by checking the codes written on the
envelopes. However, nothing was said to reveal that each questionnaire was uniquely adopted to
the individual student. Subsequently, students found a place in the auditorium and were asked to
keep one free chair between each individual and were told not to cooperate. When they had
completed the questionnaire, they placed it back in the envelopes and dropped it in a mailbox at the
entrance. Thus, the questionnaires at this final stage were also self-administered (SAQ) --
providing social anonymity. Typical response times were about 15minutes; 205 out of226
students completed this second data collection (N=205).
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The SAQ response mode was chosen for the following reasons. Itwas deemed important to induce
some kind of anonymity also for the second questionnaire because ratings of the strength,
favourability, and sensitivity ofbrand associations would likely be distorted to some degree. For
example, findings by Fisher (1993) suggested that ratings of the favourability of normative beliefs
(e.g., «students I know would have a favourable reaction if! bought one of the new products»)
were distorted. Most importantly, ifmore sensitive associations were elicited under some of the
experimental conditions -- as was expected -- the questionnaires for these conditions would more
likely be subjected to distortions. Consequently, potential effects of our manipulation would be
"hidden" or weakened. One apparently appealing solution would be to match the kind of condition
and anonymity for the questionnaires with the conditions subjects were assigned to in the elicitation
interview. However, in order to compare the manipulations: we needed a common baseline. If
subjects assigned to the CTRL condition responded to the questionnaire under the same condition
and subjects assigned to the 3P condition answered the questionnaire also in the third person, etc.,
this would rather allow for a test of consistency within subjects rather than a test between
techniques for inducing anonymity. Inorder to compare the outcome of elicitation interviews under
different anonymity conditions, the ratings of the various characteristics of elicited associations had
to be performed under the same condition for all respondents. On these grounds, it seemed tenable
to induce the same kind of anonymity on all students. SAQ was chosen over confidentiality
assurances because SAQ induces higher levels of (social) anonymity. Third person questioning
was not considered as an alternative because the questionnaire contained a personality scale (self-
monitoring) which should not be measured by means ofthird person questioning -- and using both
third person questioning and direct questioning within the same questionnaire was not considered
tenable. Still, by using SAQ, the experimental group in which brand associations were elicited by
SAQ might have been favoured since both measurements were performed under the same
anonymity condition. However, this potential advantage would only occur if distortion
mechanisms are the same for elicitation ofassociations and ratings ofpredefined associations.
The questionnaire started with ratings of attitudes and purchase intentions for Mercedes and three
other comparable car brands (BMW, Audi, and Volvo, see appendix x). We were only interested
in evaluations of Mercedes, but included the other brands in order to provide a realistic evaluation
context. The selection of the other brands were based on a focus group interview with five
business students not participating in the study. In the next section, the strength, favourability, and
sensitivity of associations were measured on standard rating scales. The fmal section contained
measures ofproduct knowledge, product involvement and self-monitoring (for details, see section
6.6. on measurement).
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6.6. Measurement
In this section we describe operationalizations ofvariables measured in the study. The independent
treatment variable was described in Table 6.5. Here, we focus on the measurement of dependent
variables, manipulation checks, and the covariate.
6.6.1. Measures for manipulation checks
Our conceptualisation ofanonymity contains two types ofanonymity: social and selfanonymity.
Social anonymity is further divided into public and interviewer anonymity.
Because public and interviewer anonymity are related subconcepts, their dimesnionality and
internal consistency were analysed together.
6.6.1.1. Social anonymity: Interviewer anonymity and public anonymity
Interviewer anonymity. This construct refers to the extent to which respondents feel that the
interviewer can couple the respondent' s identity and his/her responses. This type of anonymity is
reminiscent of the traditional (unidimensional) conception ofanonymity (Aquilino 1990; Fisher
1993). However, in previous studies this kind of anonymity has seldom been measured -- usually
it is merely assumed to be present under specific response condition such as SAQ or under
conditions in which respondents were not allowed to identify themselves. Fisher (1993), on the
other hand, evaluated his anonymity manipulation (SAQ) via a summated five-item self-report scale
with items such as «My responses on this survey can be traced back to me». Unfortunately, only
one item was reported as an example. We first developed a five-item scale from Fisher's
manipulation check. The measure included items such as «I felt that nobody -- not even the
researcher -- could trace my responses back to me» and was measured on nine-point Likert-scales
with anchors «completely agree - completely disagree». Two items were removed as 8 out of 12
pre-test subjects (business students at a third business school) indicated that those items were
perceived as identical to one of the other items.
Public anonymity. Public anonymity refers to the degree of felt confidence that respondents'
identity will not be revealed to any third party. Stated differently, this construct focuses on the
believability of confidentiality assurances. No measure was found in the literature for this
psychological variable. A three-item measure was developed in this study with items such as «I
was confident that only the researchers would know my responses», see Table 6.6.1. below.
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Because public anonymity and interviewer anonymity are distinct subconcepts of the same
superordinate concept ofsocial anonymity, the two scales were combined and submitted to
confirmatory factor analysis via LISREL 8 (Jøreskog and Sørbom 1993) in which the three items
of the public anonymity scale formed the first factor and the three items of the interviewer-
anonymity scale the second factor. This model did not obtain an acceptable leveloffit (RMSEA =
.14). As exploratory factor analyses clearly indicated the presence oftwo factors, we examined
modification indices and factor loadings in order to improve the two-factor model. This resulted in
the removal of one of the items in the public anonymity scale (this item is shown in parenthesis in
Table 6.6.1.). Fit statistics for the improved model and indicators of internal consistency of the
two subscales are reported in Table 6.6.1.
Table 6.6.1.
DIMENSIONALITY AND INTERNAL CONSISTENCY OF
SOCIAL ANONYMITY
Variable/item Model fit
(Mean inter-item
Alpha correlation)
x = 11.38, P = .01
df=4
RMSEA =.09
GFI = .98
NNFI = .99
CFI = .99
Public anonymity
1. I felt that nobody except the researchers
would know my responses
(2. I was certain that my response was
confidential)*
3. I was confident that only the researchers
would learn what I wrote .91
Interviewer anonymity
1. This way of responding scured that nobody
but myselfwould know what I wrote
2. I felt that nobody, not even the
researcher, could trace my responses
backtome
3. I was confident that nobody would be able
to couple my name with the responses I gave .80 (.57)
*This item was removed in the fmal version based on inspection ofmodification indices and factor loadings.
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The final model depicted in Table 6.6.1. does not meet all relevant criteria for close fit: the chi-
square compared to degrees of freedom has a ratio above 2 (Bollen 1989) and the RMSEA is above
.05 (Browne and Cudeck 1993). However, these are absolute fit indices and should be
complemented with relative indices adjusting for sample size (CFn and the simplicity of models
(NNFn (Gerbing and Anderson 1993). Notably, these relative fit indices indicate a very good fit
for our model (CFI = .98, NNFI = .99). In sum, the various indices imply an acceptable level of
fit.
6.6.1.2. Self anonymity
The concept of self-anonymity was defined in this study as the degree to which respondents are
subjectively self-aware (Duval and Wicklund 1972) -- or not focusing on their own selves but one
similar ingroup figure -- when reporting associations. As noted in Chapter 4, extreme levels of
subjective self-awareness are neither desirable nor realistically obtainable in an elicitation interview.
In the course of an interview, typically lasting for several minutes, repondents will likely focus on
aspects of the external world (subjective self-awareness) as well as on their own selves (objective
self-awareness). Still, we believe that the relative degree ofnon-selffocusing versus self-focusing
can be manipulated. Indeed, a number of studies have been reported in which the level of objective
self-awareness was manipulated (for a review, see Carver and Schreier 1981).The vast majority of
studies manipulating self-awareness has focused on the objective state and used some kind of
artificial stimulus such as mirrors or cameras to increase the level of objective self-awareness (e.g.
Duval and Wicklund 1972; Geller and Shaver 1976; Wicklund and DuvaI1971). In several of
these studies researchers have tried to measure the effect of manipulations on subjects' self-
attention. Self-attention was typically measured by some kind of post-experimental response task
resting on the assumption that enhanced awareness of self will lead to increased mention of self or
self-relevant words. For example, Carver and Scheier (1978) used a measure of egocentricity
based on sentence completions. Responses to the sentences were scorable as reflecting either focus
on the self or focus on the external world. Consistent with predictions, subjects made
proportionally more self-focus responses in the presence of a mirror than when the mirror was
absent.
In trying to provide a state of self-anonymity, the purpose is not to induce objective self-awareness
but exactly the opposite: to increase the level of subjective self-awareness,- and specifically, to
direct respondents' attention toward a similar ingroup figure in order to provide a basis for
projection of sensitive information. Inour context, this is done by means of third-person
questioning. When subjects are asked to respond on behalf of «most business students», they are
likely to focus on prototypes or exemplars ofthis category -- and focus less on their own selves
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than respondents asked to report their own associations. However, subjects responding in the third
person are also believed to become objectively self-aware (self-focused) during the interview.
First, they may choose to focus on themselves as representatives of business students. Second,
when thinking of business students they are likely to think offriends who, in turn, could be
considered as extentions oftheir own selves (Belk 1988). On this account, an initial focus on a
friend may lead to the subsequent activation of respondents 'private selves. Still, the focus on a
known similar group ofpersons may facilitate projection (Holmes 1968; 1978) and thus result in
less self-focus than conventional direct questionning. However, whereas several studies have used
third-person questioning and some theorizing have been made as to what psychological
mechanisms are induced by this method (Fisher 1993; Supphellen et al. 1997), no
operationalizations of the psychological state induced by this method is known. We believe that the
concept of self anonymity is useful in this regard and suggest a three-item self-report scale to
measure this construct.
The sentence-completion measure and similar measures of self-attention used in previous research
within social psychology (e.g. Carver and Scheier 1978; Davis and Brock 1975) could perhaps be
adapted and used as measures of self anonymity. However, we decided to develop a new rating
scale for two reasons. First, we needed a measure not simply distinguishing between self focus
and focus on the environment, but a measure targeting relevant ingroup persons corresponding to
the thrid-person questioning technique. Second, as several other measures pertaining to
experiences of the elicitation task such as social anonymity, task involvement, and task ambiguity
were administered along with the self-anonymity measure, all measures should be relatively short
and concise. Hence, we were looking for a more simple and more targeted operationalization of
self anonymity than those readily available.
When developing our measure, we tried to identify the potential external foci at which our
respondents might direct their attention (in addition to their own selves). When asked to report
associations on behalf of «most business student», theories of cognitive categorization (for a
review, see Fiske and Taylor 1995) and theories ofself-attention (Carver and Scheier 1981)
suggested that students would probably switch their attention between three alternative foci: (l) an
abstracted pototype of business students stored in memory, (2) one or more exemplars of business
students, e.g. fellow students, and (3) their own selves. Self-anonymity was then defined as the
extent to which respondents focused on (l) and/or (2), and not on (3). Thus, the extent of"other-
focus" (1+2) and the absence of self-focus are the two major components of our measure of self
anonymity. Both are important because they interact and give each other meaning. Moreover, ifwe
only asked for the degree of self-focus, respondents' would lack a common frame of reference for
judging what should be considered "a large extent" or "a small extent" (scale anchors) of self-
focus. When respondents are provided with three alternative foci of attention, they can respond
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according to a crude opinion of the relative amount of attention devoted to the alternatives. Pre-
testing ofa subsample of 12 business students who were interviewed after a free elicitation task
(stimulus cue: Mercedes) confirmed that the three foci ofattention were relevant and fairly
representative of their thinking. We developed three rating scales for the three foci and asked
students to rate on seven-point Likert-scales «the degree to which you had the following persons in
mind when writing down associations»: (a) a typical business student, (b) one or several business
students you know, and (c) yourself(scale anchors: «to a small extent - to a large extent»). Self
anonymity was then computed from the following equation:
Self anonymity = (a+b) x c reversed
From the equation it is seen that high levels of self-anonymity are obtained when students focus a
lot on others and little on themselves during the interview. Why is c reversed multiplied with a +
b -- instead of simply subtracted? The reason is theoretically grounded. As previously noted,
focusing on a similar ingroup individual willlikely backfire to a certain degree in the sense that
such individuals can be related to the ''we-facet'' of respondent' s selves (Greenwald and Breckler
1985), which in tum activate the more private aspects ofself(Duval and Wicklund 1972). Thus,
we contend that it is the joint effect of -- or in other words the interaction between -- "other-focus"
and absence of self-focus that determine the level of self anonymity in an elicitation interview.
6.6.1.3. Task involvement and task ambiguity
Our measure of task involvement was adopted from Mittal' s (1995) operationalization of product
involvement. This is a unidimensional scale consisting of five differential scales developed in order
to tap the essence of product involvement. Empirical research indicates that Mittal' s
operationalization possesses sound psychometric properties (MittaI1995). To fit our purpose, the
items of the Mittal scale were rephrased so as to focus on the degree offelt involvement when
responding to the elicitation task (e.g., "It was not important to me what answers I gave" - "it was
important to me what answers I gave"). See appendix A for a full display ofitems. The alpha (.79)
and the mean inter-item correlation (.43) for this measure indicate high internal consistency.
Task ambiguity was measured in terms ofthree seven-point Likert scales focusing on the
instruction given prior to the elicitation task and the level of felt uncertainty when responding to the
task. Items included "The instruction given prior to the task was unclear", and" It was fully clear
to me what I was supposed to do in this task" (reversed). Cronbach's alpha and the mean inter-
item correlation for this measure were .68 and .44, respectively.
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6.6.2. Dependent variables
The majority of dependent variables were measured by standard rating scales used in previous
research or modifications of established operationalizations in order to facilitate comparisom and
secure valid operationalizations.
6.6.2.1. Type of associations reported
Elicited associations were coded according to the typology ofbrand associations presented in
chapter 2. Specifically, we concentrated on the five categories pertinent to our hypotheses:
functional benefits, hedonic benefits, symbolic benefits, brand attitudes, and purchase intentions.
These five categories of associations are commonly discussed and researched in the marketing
literature (e.g. Keller 1993; 1997) and represent the most important types ofbrand associations
(i.e. Park et al. 1986). Associations reported in this study were classified by three graduate
students blind to the purpose of the study. The inter-rater agreement rate was 86%. Disagreements
were solved by negotiation.
6.6.2.2. Strength of associations
The strength of associations were measured in terms of one general item: "to what extent are the
thoughts below descriptive of the four car brands?" (recall that Audi, BMW, and Volvo were
included in order to provide a realistic evaluative context). Responses were made on nine-point
Likert scales with labels: not at all descriptive (l) - not descriptive (3) - neither nor (5) - is
descriptive (7) - very descriptive (9).
6.6.2.3. Distortion-sensitivity of associations
Sensitivity was defined in this study as the perceived probability that an association would be held
back by respondents. Accordingly, we constucted a nine-point Likert scale with anchors "he/she
would defenitely hold back this thought (9) - he/she would defenitely report this thought (1)".
Another established meaure was initially evaluated as an alternative. Bradburn et al. (1978)
introduced the measure of question threat, asking subjects to indicate whether they thought ''those
questions would make most people very uneasy, moderately uneasy, slightly uneasy, or not at all
uneasy" (p. 223). Correspondingly, we could have asked the same question for each brand
association listed in the individual questionnaires. However, the question threat measure was
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developed for specific sensitive behavioral questions about issues such as drinking habits, sexual
activies, and use of drugs. In an elicitation interview, very moderate levels ofuneasiness are
probably activated. Hence, the Bradburn et al. measure would probably obtain little variance in our
context. Moreover, we preferred a measure explicitly addressing the susceptibilty of associations
being held back by respondents. Still, as recommended by Sudman and Bradburn (1983), our
measure asked subjects to respond in the third person.
6.6.2.4. Latency of associations
The latency ofbrand associations was simply measured by recording the order at which
associations were reported and assigning figures accordingly. The first association mentioned by a
subject was assigned a 1, the next a 2, the third a 3, and so forth. This is a standard procedure for
measuring latency and can be seen as an alternative measure of association strength (Fishbein and
Ajzen 1975).
6.6.2.5. Attitudes and intentions
Attitudes were measured by means offour standard items: "I like this brand", "this is a good
brand", "this brand has high quality", and "I have a good impression ofthis brand" (labels were:
strongly disagree -- disagree -- neither nor -- agree -- strongly agree). This type of'attitude measure
is very common in the marketing literature and is believed to cover the core facets of brand-related
attitudes while simultaneously possesing high levels of internal consistency. Our attitude measure
obtained an alpha of .87 and a mean inter-item correlation of .64..Purchase intention was
operationalized in terms of one general statement: "I will probably choose this brand the next time I
purchase a car" (again labels were: strongly disagree -- disagree -- neither nor -- agree -- strongly
agree).
6.6.2.6. Predictive ability of associations
Predictive ability ofbrand associations can be meaured in a number ofways and with respect to
different criterion variables. In this study, we measured predictive ability at the group level by
means of Pearson correlations between the average strength of associations reported and self-
reported brand attitudes and intentions, respectively. This type ofprediction (termed concurrent
validity by Zaltman et al. 1973 since predictor and criterion variables are measured at the same
point in time, see section 3.2.5.) was chosen because we wanted to test how well elicited
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associations reflected overall attitudes and intentions. Alternatively, favourability ratings ofbrand
associations could have been used (i.e. Nelson et al. 1995). However, findings by Fisher 1993
indicate that importance ratings of symbolic beliefs are susceptible to social desirability bias.
Furthermore, predictive ability could have been measured with respect to future behavior or
evaluations, e.g. actual selection of a car brand. Though desirable, this kind of measure was not
considered due to practical and financiallimitations. In addition to estimating correlations, we
regressed the five most latent associations in each group against the attitude and intention measures
in order to examine how much variance were explained in the different groups.
6.6.3. Moderator
Two (three) alternative measures ofself-monitoring are found in the literature: Lennox and Wolfe's
(1984) 13-item measure and Snyder's (1974) 25-item scale (Snyder's scale was later reduced to 18
items in Snyder and Gangestad 1986). Lennox and Wolfe's scale was selected here for two
reasons. First, the Snyder scale is a complex two-dimensional scale for which the first factor is
strongly correlated with a number of other personality constructs such as extraversion,
exhibitionism, and social potency, and the other factor represents a tendency of other-directedness
that correlates negatively with self-esteem and positively with shyness (Briggs and Cheek 1988).
The Lennox and Wolfe scale consists oftwo simple factors representing a measure ofprotective
self-presentation and a measure of aquisitive or assertive self-presentation (Briggs and Cheek
1988; Lennox and Wolfe 1984). These two factors were considered particularly pertinent to our
study since we have argued that the nature of subjects' motivational response distortions can be
both protective and assertive (see Table 2.3.a, Chapter 2). Second, the Lennox and Wolfe scale is
shorter than the Snyder scales.
The thirteen items of the Lennox and Wolfe scale were translated into Norwegian by the author and
back-translated into English by a bilingual Phd student. Incompatabilities with the original scale
were solved by negotiation. According to Lennox and Wolfe, the scale is two-dimensional.
Consequently, we submitted the original two-factor model to a confirmatory factor analysis via
LISREL 8. The initial model with all13 items did not fit the data well (RMSEA = .12, OF! = .84).
Since the theory -- and the results of exploratory factor analyses favoured a two-factor model -- we
examined modification indices and factor loadings in order to improve the fit of this model. By this
procedure we removed two items from the first factor (acquisitive self-presentation) and one item
from the second factor (protective self-presentation). Items, fit statistics, and indices of internal
consistency for the two factors are reported in Table 6.6.3.
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Table 6.6.3.
DIMENSIONALITY AND INTERNAL CONSISTENCY
OF THE LENNOX AND WOLFE SELF-MONITORING SCALE
Variable/item Model fit
(Mean inter-item
Alpha correlation)
x = 62.05, p = .00
df =34
RMSEA =.06
GFI = .94
NNFI = .92
CFI = .94
Acquisitive self-presentation
l. In social situations, I have the ability to alter my
behavior ifI feel that something else is called for.
(2. I have the ability to control the way I come across to
people, depending on the impression I wish to give them.)
3. When I feel that the image I am portraying isn't working,
I can readily change it to something that does.
(4. I have trouble changing my behavior to suit different
people and different situations.)*
5. I have found that I can adjust my behavior to meet the
requirements ofany situation I find myselfin.
6. Even when itmight be to my advantage, I have difficulty
putting up a good front. *
7. Once I know what the situation calls for, it's easy for me
to regulate my actions accordingly. .64 (.28)
Protective self-presentation
l. I am often able to read people' s true emotions correctly
through their eyes.
2. In conversations, I am sensitive to even the slightest change
in the facial expression of the person I'm conversing with.
3. My powers ofintuition are quite good when it comes to
understanding other's emotions and motives.
4. I can ususally tell when others consider a joke to be in bad
taste, even though they may laugh convincingly.
(5. I can ususally tell when I've said something inappropriate
by reading it in the listener's eyes.)
6. If someone is lying to me, I usually know it at once from
that person' s manner of expression .77 (.39)
NOTE: Items in parenthesis were removed from the fmal version based on inspection of modification indices and
factor loadings.
* denotes items that require reverse coding
The model depicted in Table 6.6.3. obtains reasonable levels of fit on both the absolute fit indices
(the Chi-square/d.f. ratio and RMSEA) and the relative ones (CFI and NNFI). Thus, our
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Norwegian version of the Lennox and Wolfe self-monitoring scale supports the notion oftwo
distinct and internally consistent subscales of self-monitoring: aquisitive self-presentation and
protective self-presentation. Also, more traditional indicators suggest that the self-monitoring scale
should not be analyzed as a single construct, but as consisting oftwo subscales: the mean
correlation between items from the two subscales is significantly greater than zero (r = .21), yet
less than the average within-subscale correlations (.28 and .39, respectively) (Clark and Watson
1995). On this account, the two subscales were kept apart and entered separately in subsequent
analyses.
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CHAPTER 7
DATA DESCRIPTION
AND TESTS OF CONFOUNDS
The purpose ofthis chapter is to fonn a basis for accutrate and valid testing ofhypotheses in
Chapter 8. The first section (7.1.) offers descriptions of the data, such as mean values,
correlations, and distributions of study variables. In section 7.2. we test and discuss the
assumptions of the statistical analyses. Finally, in section 7.3. the results oftests oftwo potential
confounds of our manipulation -- task involvement and task ambiguity -- are reported.
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7.1. Data description
Three kinds of description are offered in this section. First, we show mean values, standard
deviations, extreme values and distributional indices for the study variables. Next, the 15
associations most frequently mentioned are presented. The section concludes with an analyses of
correlations between the manipulated variables and between the dependent variables.
Table 7.1.1.a. summarices descriptive statistics for all study variables for the entire sample.
All means, maximum and minimum values seem to be reasonable and not affected by any mis-
calculations of indices or other errors. The high maximun value for Self anonymity is due to the
multiplication of scores in the calculations ofthis index. The standard deviations are fairly low for
attitude, the favourability of the different types ofassociations, and the covariates. Specifically,
these results indicate that our student subjects hold consistently favourable associations and
attitudes toward Mercedes and that they are comparatively similar with respect to tendencies of
aquisitive and protective self-presentation. The remaining variables have higher standard deviations
implying that these variables discriminate more between our subjects.
Another important observation from Table 7.1.l.a. is the low number of respondents for some of
the variables. For example, only 29 subjects (14.1%) mentioned attitudes and 42 mentioned
intentions (20.5%) in their elicitation reports. This affects the latency, favourability, and sensitivity
variables. N for Number of attitudes and Number of intentions is 205 because non-response was
coded as zero. Measurements oflatency, favourability, and sensitivity of attitudes and intentions,
however, were based on those subjects reporting at least one attitude or intention.
The mean total number of associations reported across categories was 8.27 (Max. 23, Min. 2,
Standard Deviation = 3.28). The values for kurtosis and skewness indicate distributional problems
for several variables. Nine out of28 variables have skewness values greater than 1, and six out of
28 variables have kurtosis values above 2. All variables with kurtosis values above 2 are also
skewed. This has to be accounted for in the analyses (see section 7.1.2).
Table 7.l.l.a. shows descriptive statistics for the study variables. This table does not give any
information about what specific associations were mentioned in the elicitation interviews. To get a
picture ofwhat associations that were typically reported, the 15most frequently mentioned are
shown in Table 7.1.1.b.
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Table 7.1.1.a
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR STUDY VARIABLES
Variable Mean St. Dev Kurtosis Skewness Max. Min. N
Mani[lY.lll.tfd vll.d.all/f!J.
Self anonymity 18.58 14.31 2.56 1.53 78.00 2.00 202
Public anonymity 11.26 3.14 .32 -1.08 14.00 2.00 205
Interviewer anonymity 13.05 5.35 -.92 -.28 21.00 3.00 203
C.QntrQl vll.rill.lll!i!.~
Task ambiguity 7.04 3.69 .16 .84 19.00 3.00 205
Task involvement 22.32 5.96 .10 -.46 35.00 5.00 204
Dep.end,ent varialllf!J.
Attitude (rating scale) 29.93 4.83 1.82 -1.16 36.00 10.00 205
Intention (rating scale) 4.08 2.36 -.89 .27 9.00 1.00 205
Number ofhedonic assoc. .82 .97 1.34 1.24 4.00 0.00 205
Number of functional assoc. 1.26 1.18 .42 .91 5.00 0.00 205
Number of symbolic assoc. 3.16 1.86 .45 .51 10.00 0.00 205
Number of attitudes .17 .43 6.71 2.67 2.00 0.00 205
Number of intentions .23 .48 3.12 1.96 2.00 0.00 205
Latency ofhedonic assoc. 4.43 2.71 .55 .85 14.00 1.00 110
Latency of functional assoc. 4.22 2.38 3.12 1.46 14.25 1.00 142
Latency of symbolic assoc. 5.47 2.56 1.28 .82 16.00 1.00 191
Latency of attitudes 4.02 3.01 10.10 2.62 16.50 1.00 29
Latency of intentions 4.70 3.14 1.27 1.30 14.00 1.00 42
Favourability ofhedonic assoc. 6.01 1.83 -.46 -.06 9.00 1.00 lIO
Favourability of functional assoc. 6.62 1.85 .35 -.43 9.00 1.00 142
Favourability of symbolic assoc. 4.65 1.40 .37 .44 9.00 1.00 191
Favourability of attitudes 6.79 1.64 -1.51 .20 9.00 4.00 29
Favourability of intentions 6.66 .86 6.99 -2.52 8.00 3.00 42
Sensitivity of hedonic assoc. 2.81 l.S l 1.78 1.12 9.00 1.00 liD
Sensitivty of functional assoc. 2.65 1.62 2.20 1.41 9.00 1.00 142
Sensitivity of symbolic assoc. 4.12 1.85 -.21 .39 9.00 1.00 191
Sensitivity of attitudes 2.59 1.37 -.43 .61 6.00 1.00 29
Sensitivity of intentions 3.43 1.73 1.44 .90 9.00 1.00 41
Moderators
Aquisitive self-presentation 16.25 3.04 .10 -.20 24.00 7.00 204
Protective self-presentation 15.26 4.01 -.02 -.20 24.00 2.00 205
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Table 7.1.1.b.
THE 15ASSOCIATIONS MOST FREQUENTLY MENTIONED (CUE: MERCEDES)
Association Frequency Percent Category
l. Expensive 154 75.1 Product-related
2. Status 142 69.3 Symbolic
3. Quality 121 59.0 Functional
4. Success/successful 111 54.1 Symbolic
5. GennanlGennany 78 38.0 Product-related
6. Rich people 47 22.9 Symbolic
7. The star symbol 43 21.0 Product attribute
8. Luxury 39 19.0 Symbolic
9. Safety 39 19.0 Functional
10. Elegant/good looking 37 18.0 Hedonic
11. Car 33 16.1 Product category
12. Good car 21 10.2 Attitude
13. Exclusive 20 9.8 Symbolic
14. Comfort 17 8.3 Hedonic
15. Yuppie 15 7.3 Symbolic
NOTE: Frequencies refer number of respondents mentioning the focal association. N - 205. The categorization refers
to the typology presented in Chapter 3.
Table 7.Ll.b. indicates that all three kinds ofbenefit associations - hedonic, functional, and
symbolic associations - are central associations in our subjects' memories. Yet, the symbolic
associations are dominating: 6 out of the 15most frequently mentioned are symbolic. Also, Table
7.1.I.a. shows a higher mean number of symbolic associations than for any other type of
association. Though some hedonic associations are mentioned, Tables 7.1.1. a. and b. indicate that
they are not very dominating in the memories of our subjects. This is not very surprising because
most hedonic associations are derived through direct experience with the brand over time, and only
a minority of our student subjects have probably owned a Mercedes or have parents who own one.
Otherwise, the associations listed in Table 7.1.I.b. seem reasonable and do not not include any
special associations that would not be found in a sample of ordinary consumers.
The skewness and kurtosis values reported in Table 7.1.1.a. have bearing on the choice of
statistical tests (to be further explicated in section 7.2. and Chapter 8). Another issue influencing
the choice oftest techniques is the correlational pattern between dependent variables. Specifically,
when dependent variables are significantly correlated, multivariate analysis ofvariance
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(MANOV A) should be considered in stead ofunivariate analysis ofvariance (ANOV A). Table
7.1.I.c. shows correlations among the dependent variables and the manipulated variables. The
three anonymity constructs are included for the purpose of tentative evaluations of discriminant
validity.
Several interesting correlations are found in Table 7.1.1.c. Some ofthese are addressed when
discussing the tests of the hypotheses in Chapter 9. Here, we concentrate on correlations pertinent
to the discussion of appropriate statistical techniques for the analyses, that is inter-correlations
between dependent variables belonging to the same group ofvariables, such as number, latency,
favourability, and sensitivity of associations. Inter-correlations between dependent variables within
these groups (e.g., number ofhedonic associations, number offunctionsl associations, number of
symbolic associations, etc.) are relevant because we would like to identify which variables within
the groups are most affected (if any) by our manipulations.
Table 7.1.I.c. shows that within three of the four groups of dependent variables (number, latency,
favourability, and sensitivity ofassociations) several variables are significantly correlated. Three
significant correlations are found for the number of different kinds of associations. First, the
number of functional benefits reported is negatively correlated with the number of symbolic
associations reported. This might imply that some subjects are more concerned with the symbolic
aspects of the brand whereas others are more attuned to the symbolic side of it. Alternatively, some
respondents (for example those subjected to the weaker forms ofanonymity or the control
condition) may have reported functional associations with are rich in symbolic implications in stead
of the more sensitive symbolic associations they are related to (e.g., functional associations such as
high quality and unique performance could be related to -- and thus reported in stead of -- symbolic
associations such as successful and exclusive). Second, the number ofintentions is negatively
correlated with the number offunctional associations and positively correlated with the number of
attitudes reported.
The latency of hedonic, functional, and symbolic associations are all significantly and positively
inter-correlated, though no correlation is above .5. The latencies of attitudes, however, are very
strongly correlated with the latency of intentions (r = .88). Overall, for all groups of variables,
measures concerning attitudes and intentions are strongly correlated. (her kommer tabellen)
Also, the latencies of different types of associations are negatively correlated with the number of
associations reported. This is very plausible because a large number of a given type of association
necessarily leads to a greater mean latency score than a smaller number of associations (recall that
latency scores correspond to the order at which associations are reported).
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The favourability of the different kinds of associations are generally positively correlated. That is,
all types ofbenefit associations are strongly (positively) correlated with attitudes, and somewhat
weaker with each other and with intentions. The sensitivity variables are less inter-correlated than
latency variables and favourability variables. Still, significant correlations are observed between
sensitivity ofhedonic associations, and the sensitivity offunctional associations and the sensitivity
of attitudes. Sensitivity is generally negatively correlated to favourability variables, indicating that
our subjects perceived a greater probability of holding back unfavourable than favourable
associations.
As expected, the two subscales of Social anonymity, Public anonymity and Interviewer
anonymity, are positively correlated. However, none ofthese subscales are correlated with the
other type of anonymity: Self anonymity. Thus, the correlational pattern observed in Table 7.1.I.c.
and the confirmatory factor analyses ofthese constructs in Chapter 5 support our theoretical
postulation that Social anonymity and Self anonymity are distinct constructs, and that Social
anonymity can be meaningfully divided into two subscales of Public and Interviewer anonymity.
7.2. Test of assumptions
The correlational pattern between dependent variables along with the other descriptive statistics
indicate when MANOVA should be used in stead of ANOVA to test hypotheses. Also, the number
of respondents (N) for the different variables is highly relevant in a discussion of what techniques
to use and to evaluate if statistical testing is possible at all.
Our hypotheses imply that groups of dependent variables should be compared, e.g. the effect of
anonymity manipulations on the number of symbolic associations vs. the effect on the number of
functional and hedonic associations, etc. Correspondingly, we were interested in comparing effects
within the groups of dependent variables regarding latency, favourability, and sensitivity,
respectively. Inspection ofinter-correlations within these groups ofvariables suggest that
MANOVA should be used in stead of ANOVA in some instances (for further details see Chapter
8). In the following we test whether the assumptions for ANOVA and MANOVA are met by the
relevant variables.
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7.2.1. Test of ANOVA assumptions
Three main assumptions should be met in order to use ANOVA: (a) treatment populations should
be normally distributed, (b) homogeneity ofvariances across the five experimental groups, and (c)
independence between subjects belonging to the different experimental conditions (Keppel 1982).
The latter assumption is met by our experimental design in which subjects were randomly assigned
to one of the five conditions. The other two assumptions need to be addressed more carefully.
Table 7. l. l.a. shows that several variables are skewed (skewness values above l) and peaked
(kurtosis values above 2). Not surprisingly, the problems are most accute for attitude and intention
variables -- the variables with lowest sample size (29 and 42, respectively). Moreover, these
variables have very unequal numbers of cases in the experimental groups. For example, 19
intentions are found in the SAQ3P group (the group subjected to both a self-administered
questionnaire and third-person questions) and only 2 intentions in the CTRL (control) and CONF
(confidentiality assurance) groups. Similarly, for attitudes, there are 14 observations in the SAQ3P
group and merely 3 in the CONF group. When the normality assumption cannot be met, when
sample sizes are small and cell sizes very different, non-parametric tests should be applied
(Tabachnick and FidelI 1983). Self anonymity, Sensitivity of functional associations, and
Sensitivity offunctional associations are also variables that violate the normality assumption (see
Table 6.1.l.a.). However, these violations are less serious because the three variables have higher
sample sizes (N = 142 for sensitivity and favourability offunctional associations and 202 for self
anonymity) and relatively equal cell sizes. Thus, the selection of an appropriate test technique for
these variables is more influenced by the degree to which the other main assumpton is met: the
homogeneity ofvariances.
Cochran' s C and Bartlett-Box' s F statistics were used to test for homogeneity of variances across
the five experimental groups. Both tests were used because the two tests may lead to different
conclusions (Wiener, Brown, and Michel 1991). In fact, our data provide an example of such
incidents (see Table 6.2.1. below). Test statistics for the variables subjected to univariate analyses
ofvariance are depicted in Table 6.2.1. The other variables were submitted to MANOVAs due to
the pattern ofinter-correlations (tests ofMANOVA assumptions are reported in section 6.2.2.).
Notably, all attitude and intention variables are investigated by means ofunivariate test even though
the pattern of correlations in Table 6.1.1.c. indicate that these variables should be included in
MANOVAs with other dependent variables. However, MANOVA could not be performed on
attitude and intention variables because of empty cells (recall that these variables had low numbers
of observations in some cells).
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The Cochran and Bartlett-Box statistics test the null hypothesis that variances in the five
experimental groups are equal. Hence, significant findings indicate violations (rejection of the null
hypothesis). Table 7.2.1. shows that the attitude and intention variables with poor distributional
properties also violate the homogeneity assumption. This supports our choice of non-parametric
tests for these variables. Also, two other variables violate the homogeneity assumption: Latency of
intentions (only Cochran's C is significant) and Number offunctional associations. However,
Number offunctional associations is a variable with large and fairly equal cell sizes, and is thus
fairly robust to this violation (Shavelson 1981). The Latency of intention variable, on the other
hand, has unequal cell sizes, but the seriousness of the violation is questionable for this variable
since only one of the test statistics is significant. Therefore we analysed effects on this variable
both by means of ANOVA and a non-parametric test (see Chapter 7).
Table 7.2.1.
TESTS OF ASSUMPTIONS OF UNIVARIATE HOMOGENEITY
Variable Cochran's C Bartlett-Box's F
Self anonymity C(39,S) = .369 p = .00 F(4,S7904) = S.76l p= .00
Number ofhedonic assoc. C( 40,S) = .22S p = 1.00 F(4,S9000) = .27S p = .89
Number of functional assoc. C( 40,S) = .332 p = .00 F(4,S9000) = 2.764 p = .03
Number of symbolc assoc. C(40,S) = .246 p = .64 F(4,S9000) = .911 p =.46
Number of attitudes C(40,S) = .446 p = .00 F(4,S9000) = 8.382 p = .00
Number of intentions C( 40,S) = .441 p = .00 F(4,S9000) = 21.712 p= .00
Latency of attitudes C(S,S) = .810 P = .00 F(4,367) 3.789 p= .00
Latency of intentions C(7,S) = .46S p= .04 F(4,146) .884 P =.48
Favourability of attitudes C(S,S) = .2S8 P = 1.00 F(4,3S7) .127 p = .97
Favourability of intentions C(30,S) = .S12 P = .00 F(4,33289) = 33.897 p = .00
Sensitivity of symbolic assoc. C(37,S) = .233 P = 1.00 F(4,S079l) = .734 p = .73
Sensitivity of attitudes C(S,S) = .4S9 p = .11 F(4,3S7) 1.719 p = .IS
Sensitivity of intentions C(7,S) = .482 p= .03 F(4,146) .600 p = .66
Aquisitive self-presentation C( 40,S) = .271 p= .22 F(4,S9000) = 1.984 p= .09
Protective self-presentation C(40,S) = .288 P = .10 F(4,S9000) = 1.984 p= .09
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6.2.2. Tests of MANOV A assumptions
When dependent variables are correlated, MANOVA is preferred to a series of ANOVAs because
MANOVAs account for the pattern of correlations between variables and thus protect against Type
I errors (Iacobucci 1994). In this study, MANOVA was selected to test hypotheses involving the
two subscales of social anonymity (public and interviewer anonymity) and two groups ofbenefit
associations: latencies ofhedonic, functional, and symbolic associations, and the favourability of
hedonic, functional, and symbolic associations. The assumptions ofMANOVA are (a)
homogeneity ofvariance for dependent variables, (b) homogeneity ofvariance-covariance
matrices, and (c) multi-normally distributed dependent variables (Tabachnick and Fide111983).
Assumption (a) was tested by means of the Cochran's C and Bartlett-Box's F statistics, whereas
assumption (b) was tested by means of Box' s M statistic for multivariate equality of covariances.
The results are reported in Table 7.2.2.
Table 7.2.2.
TESTS OF HOMOGENEITY FOR DEPENDENT VARIABLES
AND VARIANCE-COVARIANCE MATRICES
Variables Box's MCochran's C Bartlett-Box's F
Public anonymity
Interviewer anonymity
Latency ofhedonic assoc.
Latency of funct. assoc.
Latency of symb. asoc.
Favourab. ofhedonic assoc.
Favourab. of funct, assoc.
Favourab. of symbolic assoc.
ce40,S) = .339 P = .01
ce40,S) = .286 P =.11
ce12,S) = .289 P = .59
ce12,S) = .273 P = .78
ce12,S) = .522 P = .00
ce12,S) = .299 P = .47
ce12,S) = .309 P = .38
C(12,S) = .300 P = .47
Sensitivity ofhedonic assoc. celS,S) = .348 P = .10
Sensitivity of functional assoc. celS,S) = .271 P = .70
F(4,367) = 3.560 P = .01
F(4,367) = 1.595 P = .17
M = 30.859 P = .00
F(4,3760) = .498 P = .74
F(4,3760) = .533 P = .71
F(4,3760) = 1.823 P = .12
M = 27.941 P =.46
F(4,3760) = .372 P = .83
F(4,3760) = .940 P =.44
F(4,3760) = .737 P = .57
M = 35.273 P = .17
F(4,6178) = 2.263 P = .06
F(4,6178) = .460 P = .77
M = 13.729 P = .39
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One of the variables in Table 7.2.2. violates the homogeneity assumption: Public anonymity.
However, since the sample size is large for this variable (N = 205), cell sizes relatively equal, and
there are no outliers, this violation is not serious enough to prevent the use ofMANOVA. The Box
M statistic is, however, also significant for the multivariate test including public anonymity and
interviewer anonymity as dependent variables. Thus, we tested the hypotheses for these variables
by means ofboth multivariate and univariate analyses ofvariance.
Violations ofassumption (c), that dependent variables should be multi-normally distributed, can be
tentatively tested by examining univariate tests. Univariate normality does not guarantee
multivariate normality, but does increase the probability ofmultivariate normal distributions. Table
7.I.I.a. shows that one of the variables is not normally distributed: Latency of functional
associations (Kurtosis = 3.12, Skewness = 1.46). Still, MANOVA is fairly robust to this violation
because sample sizes are above 20 in each experimental group and no outliers are observed for this
variable (Tabachnick and FidellI983).
7.3. Test of confounds: task ambiguity and task involvement
Task ambiguity and task involvement represent rival explanations for potential effects of our
manipulations. For a given effect observed in one of the experimental groups, say the SAQ group
(the one subjected to self-administered questionnaires), one might speculate whether the effect is
actually caused by the type of anonymity induced, or whether this manipulation simply affected the
level of ambiguity or involvement in a special way. Since the task ambiguity and task involvement
variables are not significantly correlated (r =.01, p =.88), we tested for group differences by
means of two separate ANOVAs. Tests of distributional properties and homogeneity of variances
for the variables detected no serious violations to these assumptions. The results of ANOV As are
reported in Tables 7.3.1. and 7.3.2.
The results presented in Tables 7.3.1. and 7.3.2. show no differences between the five
experimental groups for task involvement or task ambiguity. Thus, we can eliminate these two
variables as rival explanations for any observed effects of our manipulation.
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Table 7.3.1.
RESULTS OF ANOVA FOR DIFFERENCES IN TASK AMBIGUITY
Sum of Mean Sig. of
Source of variation squares df squåre F F
Main effects 32.46 4 8.11 .59 .67
Experimental Group 32.46 4 8.11 .59 .67
Explained 32.46 4 8.11 .59 .67
Residual 2742.15 200 13.71
Total 2774.60 204 13.60
Table 7.3.2.
RESULTS OF ANOVA FOR DIFFERENCES IN TASK INVOLVEMENT
Sum of Mean Sig. of
Source of variation squares df square F F
Main effects 152.35 4 38.09 1.07 .37
Experimental Group 152.35 4 38.09 1.07 .37
Explained 152.35 4 38.09 1.07 .37
Residual 7064.30 199 35.50
Total 7216.65 203 35.55
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CHAPTER 8
TESTS OF HYPOTHESES
In this chapter, tests of the hypotheses developed in Chapter 5 are reported. The sections are
organized in the same order as the hypotheses were presented in Chapter 5. In section 8.1., we
report the results ofmanipulations of social- and self anonymity. In section 8.2., posited
differences in sensitivity between the various types ofbrand association are tested. Further, in
section 8.3., tests ofhypotheses about anonymity-effects on response latencies are reported.
Sections 8.4.and 8.5. reports on tests ofhypothesized effects of our manipulation on the
sensitivity of associations reported (8.4.), and on the favourability of associations (8.5). Section
8.6. reports on tests ofposited effects on the predictive ability ofassociations. Finally, interactions
between self-monitoring subscales and our manipulation ofanonymity are analysed in section 8.7.
Findings are summarised at the beginning ofChapter 9 (section 9.1.).
All hypotheses on the effects of the anonymity manipulation focus on effects ofselfanonymity
compared to a control condition. To test these hypotheses, it is sufficient to compare CTRL (the
control group) and the 3P (third-person questioning) and SAQ3P groups (self-administered
questionnaire and third-person questioning). However, as the overall purpose ofthis study is to
explore effects of different types of anonymity and different types of anonymity-inducing
techniques in a new context, we consistently include analyses for all five experimental groups.
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8.1. Manipulation of self- and social anonymity (HIa-c)
The techniques used to elicit brand associations in this study were expected to evoke different types
ofanonymity. Three specific hypotheses were developed in Chapter 5:
HIa Respondents subjected to third-person questioning will experience higher levels ofself
anonymity than respondents in the control group.
HI b Respondents subjected to self-administered questionnaires will experience higher levels of
interviewer anonymity than respondents in the control group.
HI b Respondents subjected to confidentiality assurances will experience higher levels of
public anonymity than respondents in the control group.
HIa addresses group differences in selfanonymity. Tables 7.L La. and 7.2.1. in Chapter 7
showed that the self anonymity variable did not meet the ANOVA assumptions of normal
distribution and homogeneity ofvariances. Though ANOVAs usually are robust to non-normality
and to violations against the homogeneity ofvariance assumption (Tabachnick and FidellI983),
we chose to use both ANOVA and the Kruskal-Wallis non-parametric analysis to test HIa. The
Kruskal-Wallis one-way analysis ofvariance is considered as a very useful technique for
comparison of three or more groups when scores cannot be assumed to come from a population
distributed in a certain way (Siegel and Castellan 1988). The test is based on ranks of scores and
tests the probability that average ranks for each group come from the same population (see Siegel
and Castellan 1988, p.207). The results of the Kruskall-Wallis one-way analysis ofvariance for
group differences in selfanonymity is reported in Table 8.1.a. and the results of the ANOVA in
Table 8.1.b.
Table 8.1.a
KRUSKAL-WALLIS ONE-WAY ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR GROUP
DIFFERENCES IN SELF ANONYMITY
Experimental groups: mean ranks" Corrected for ties
Variable CTRL CONF SAQ 3P SAQ3P Chi-square df Sign.
Self anonymity 84.53 76.98 89.49 132.89 126.20 30.92 4 .00
(14.90) (12.54) (16.30) (24.32) (25.57)
NOTE: CTRL = control group, CONF = assurances of confidentiality, SAQ = self-administered questionnaire,
3P = third-person questioning, SAQ3P = self-administered questionnaire and third-person questioning.
"The scores in parenthesis are mean scores.
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The Kruskal-Wallis test indicates that the level of self anonymity experienced in the five groups
differed significantly. Furthermore, the mean ranks for the two groups subjected to third-person
questioning (3P and SAQ3P) are considerably higher than for the other groups. This finding lends
support to HIa. The results of the ANOVA (see Table 8.1.b.) are consistent with the Kruskal-
Wallis test: the main effect is significant and Scheffe comparisons ofmean scores show that scores
for the 3P and SAQ3P groups are significantly higher than for the control group.
Table 8.I.b.
ANOVA FOR GROUP DIFFERENCES
IN SELF ANONYMITY
Experimental groups (mean scores)
Scheffe
Variable F-ratio Sign. CTRL CONF SAQ 3P SAQ3P comparisons Sign.
Self
anonymity 7.47 .00 14.90 12.54 16.30 24.32 25.57 3P>CTRL .00
SAQ3P>CTRL .00
NOTE: CTRL = control group, CONF = assurances of confidentiality, SAQ = self-administered questionnaire,
3P = third-person questioning, SAQ3P = self-administered questionnaire and third-person questioning.
Since the two subscales of social anonymity, public- and interviewer anonymity were correlated
(.57), MANOVA would be a natural choice for testing group differences concerning these
variables. However, the assumptions ofhomogeneous covariances and homogeneity ofvariances
ofpublic anonymity across groups were violated (see Table 7.2.2.). Because these violations were
not very serious, we performed both a MANOVA including both variables simultaneously, and a
univariate test for public anonymityby means of the Kruskal-Wallis non-parametric test. The
results of the MANOVA is reported in Table 8.I.c. and the Kruskal-Wallis test in Table 8.1.d.
The pattern offindings from the MANOVA strongly support hypotheses Hlb and Hlc. Public
anonymity scores are significantly higher in the CONF group than in the control group, and
interviewer anonymity scores are higher in the SAQ and SAQ3P groups than in the control group.
Effect sizes are large for Interviewer anonymity (Eta-square= .15) and moderately large for public
anonymity (Eta-square= .09) (Cohen 1977). Notably, public anonymity scores for the SAQ and
SAQ3P groups are also higher than for the control group. This is consistent with our previous
analyses of public anonymity and interviewer anonymity showing that these constructs are related
and tap into the more general construct ofSocial anonymity (see section on measurement in
Chapter 6). The results of the Kruskal-Wallis test for group differences in public anonymity
support the results of the MANOVA. The Chi-square value is significant and the pattern ofmean
ranks parallels the Scheffe comparisons in the MANOVA model.
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Table 8.I.c.
MULrrvARIATE AND UNIVARIATE ANALYSES OF GROUP
DIFFERENCES IN PUBLIC- AND INTERVIEWER ANONYMITY
Experimental groups (mean scores)
Scheffe
Variable F-ratio Sign. CTRL CONF SAQ 3P SAQ3P comparisons Sign.
Multivariate
test (Wilk's) 5.19 .00
Univariate tests
Public
anonymity 5.11 .00 9.80 11.81 12.17 10.48 12.14 CONF>CTRL .00
SAQ>CTRL .00
SAQ3P<CTRL .00
Interviewer
anonymity 8.36 .00 10.85 12.05 15.88 11.50 15.14 SAQ>CTRL .00
SAQ3P>CTRL .00
NOTE: CTRL = control group, CONF = assurances of confidentiality, SAQ = self-administered questionnaire,
3P = third-person questioning, SAQ3P = self-administered questionnaire and third-person questioning.
Table 8.I.d.
KRUSKAL-W ALLIS ONE-WAY ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR GROUP
DIFFERENCES IN PUBLIC ANONYMITY
Experimental groups: mean ranks (mean scores) Corrected for ties
Variable CTRL CONF SAQ 3P SAQ3P Chi-square df Sign.
Public anonymity 82.38 108.53 116.01 87.99 120.78 14.20 4 .01
NOTE: CTRL = control group, CONF = assurances of confidentiality, SAQ = self-administered questionnaire,
3P = third-person questioning, SAQ3P = self-administered questionnaire and third-person questioning.
Overall, Hla-c are strongly supported by our data: we have demonstrated that the techniques used
to elicit brand associations induced principally different kinds of anonymity in a manner consistent
with our predictions.
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8.2. Premises for anonymity-effects: Perceived sensitivity of brand
associations (H2a-b)
Two hypotheses were developed regarding the relative perceived sensitivity of different types of
brand associations:
H2a Symbolic brand associations will be perceived as more sensitive to distortion than
functional and hedonic associations.
H2b Intentions will be perceived as more sensitive to distortion than attitudes.
Descriptive analyses in Chapter 7 showed no serious violations to the assumptions for ANOV A for
any of the variables of perceived sensitivity of distortion. Only Sensitivity of functional
associations was not normally distributed. However, since the sample size is not very small for
this variable and cell-sizes are not very different across experimental groups, ANOVA is robust to
this violation (Tabachnick and Fidell 1983). In comparing the level of sensitivity of the different
types ofbrand associations, we could not include all categories in a single ANOVA due to empty
cells (recall that there were very few subjects that reported attitudes and intentions in some groups).
Thus, in accordance with the hypotheses, we performed one ANOVA for the benefit associations
(with Scheffe comparison ofgroup means), and a t-test for comparison ofSensitivity ofattitudes
vs. Sensitivity ofIntentions. The results are reported in Table 8.2.
Table 8.2.
ANOV A AND T-TEST FOR DIFFERENCES IN SENSITIVITY
BETWEEN CATEGORIES OF BRAND ASSOCIA nONS
Types ofassociations (mean scores)
Variable F-ratio Sign. Funct. Hedonic Symbolic Attitude Intention
Scheffe
comparisons Sign.
Sensitivity 19.33 .000 2.65 2.81 4.12 Symb.>Funct. P =.01
Symb.>Hedonic p =.03
Sensitivity
I::rn!iQ
2.02 .070 2.59 3.43
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The ANOV A resulted in a significant main effect and a pattern of contrasts consistent with our
hypotheses: the subjects reported significantly higher levels of sensitivity for symbolic associations
than for hedonic and functional associations. Though marginally significant, the level of sensitivity
of intentions was higher than for attitudes.
The higher level of sensitivity of symbolic associations indicates that the low ranks typically
assigned to social recognition in studies of cultural values (Rokeach 1979, p. 133) may transfer to
ratings of the probability ofreporting symbolic brand associations in elicitation interviews.
Moreover, to our knowledge, this study is the first to document that intentions are seen by
respondents as more sensitive to distortion in elicitation interviews than attitudes.
So far we have demonstrated that our manipulation of anonymity worked as hypothesised and that
the relative levels of sensitivity of different kinds ofbrand associations were consistent with our
theoretical contentions. What follows are tests ofhypotheses regarding specific effects of
anonymity-inducing techniques.
8.3. Anonymity-effects on response latencies (H3)
In this thesis we have advanced the conjecture that anonymity may affect the order at which
associations are reported. The underlying contention is that associations which are inconsistent
with respondents actual or desired self-images will tend to be reported later than actually activated
under conditions oflow or no anonymity. However, we believe that this kind of distortion can be
overcome by inducing the right kind of anonymity Specifically, the following hypothesis was
suggested:
H3 Sensisitive associations will be reported earlier under conditions of self anonymity than
under non-anonymity conditions.
In section 8.2., symbolic associations and intentions were found to be the most sensitive types of
brand associations. Group differences for Latency of symbolic associations was tested by means
of a MANOV A including Latency ofhedonic associations, and Latency of functional associations
because these three variables were found to be positively inter-correlated (see Table 7.l.l.c.) and
belonged to the same group of variables. For example, if group differences were found for Latency
of symbolic associations by a univariate test, this effect will be partly influenced by the other two
correlated variables. Hence, Latency ofhedonic associations and Latency offunctional associations
were included in the analysis in order to account for the inter-correlations and thus guard against
TESTS OF HYPOTHESES J07
Type I error. In Chapter 7, we detected that Latency offunctional associations was not nornally
distributed, and that the variance ofLatency ofsymbolic associations was not homogeneous across
groups. However, due to reasonable sample sizes and fairly equal cell sizes for these variables,
violations were not serious enough to prevent the use ofMANOVA. The results of the MANOVA
are presented in Table 8.3.a.
Table 8.3.a.
MULTIVARIA TE TEST FOR GROUP DIFFERENCES
IN RESPONSE LATENCIES OF BENEFIT ASSOCIATIONS
Experimental groups (mean scores)
Variable F-ratio Sign. CTRL CONF SAQ 3P SAQ3P
Multivariate
test (Wilk's) 1.51 .13
Latencies of:
Functional ass. 4.79 3.66 4.42 3.72 4.69 (no comparisons made)
Symb. assoc. 6.29 5.46 6.00 4.88 8.23
Hedonic assoc. 4.00 4.02 6.00 3.80 4.48
NOTE: CTRL = control group, CONF = assurances of confidentiality, SAQ = self-administered questionnaire,
3P = third-person questioning, SAQ3P = self-administered questionnaire and third-person questioning.
Mean scores are average order values, i.e. a large numbers indicate that associations were reported late
(low degree oflatency).
No significant main effect was observed for the multivariate test of differences in mean latencies of
symbolic, hedonic, and functional brand associations across the five groups. Inother words, the
data does not support our contention that self anonymity influence the order at which symbolic
associations are reported. Still, we believe that rejection ofthis theoretical proposition is premature
at this point. Firstly, this is the first study empirically investigating this issue. Second, the means
observed in Table 7.3.a. seem to indicate differences between groups though differences are not
large enough to obtain a significant effect in this study. Moreover, the statistical power is not very
close to one (power =.71 when a= .05 for Wilk' s criterion), implying that significant effects
might have been observed with a larger sample.
Though Latency ofintentions was correlated with several other variables (see Table 7.1.1.c.), this
variable had to be tested by univariate tests due to small cell sizes (resulting in empty cells when
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other variables were included in multivariate analysis). Caution is therefore needed in the
interpretation of findings. Also, the variance of Latency of intentions is not homogenous across
conditions, but this variable is fairly normally distributed (see Chapter 7). Because cell sizes are
very unequal, violations pose a serious threat to the validity of conclusions drawn from a common
ANOV A. Therefore, we used a non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis analysis in order to test for group
differences in Latency of intentions.
Table 8.3.b.
KRUSKAL- WALLIS TEST OF GROUP DIFFERENCES IN
LATENCY OF INTENTIONS
Experimental groups: mean ranks* Corrected for ties
Variable CTRL CONF SAQ 3P SAQ3P Chi-square df Sign.
Latency of intentions 26.25 35.50 38.50 19.94 16.66 13.57 4 .01
(6.50) (8.03) (10.50) (4.03) (3.50)
NOTE: CTRL = control group, CONF = assurances of confidentiality, SAQ = self-administered questionnaire,
3P = third-person questioning, SAQ3P = self-administered questionnaire and third-person questioning.
*Mean scores reported in parenthesis are average order values, i.e. a large number indicates that associations
were reported early (high degree oflatency).
The findings observed in Table 8.3.b. lend support to H3b: intentions are reported earlier for the
two groups subjected to self-anonymity (see the clearly lower average ranks for these groups) than
for the control group (and the other groups).
8.4. Anonymity-effects on the sensitivity of associations reported
(H4a-b)
Hypotheses 4a posits that our manipulation of anonymity will effect the number of certain sensitive
associations reported.The basic assumption behind the hypotheses is that respondents will tend to
hold back undesirable associations - consciously or unconsciously - in order to display a
favourable self-image toward themselves and the interviewers. Self anonymity is expected to
mitigate this kind of distortion:
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H4a A greater number of sensitive types of associations will be reported under conditions of self
anonymity than under non-anonymity conditions.
To test H4a we focus specifically on the two types of associations shown to be most sensitive;
symbolic associations and intentions. Number of symbolic associations was only weakly
correlated with one other relevant variable: Number offunctional associations (r= -.14, p< .05, see
Table 7.1.1.c.). Also, Number ofsymbolic associations did not violate any of the assumptions for
running ANOVAs (see Tables 7.1.1.a. and 7.2.1.). Also, univariate tests for Number ofhedonic
associations and Number offunctional associations were performed to provide more detail. The
latter variable violated the assumption ofhomogeneous variances across groups (Table 7.2.1.), but
due to fairly equal cell sizes for this variable (less than 2:1), ANOVA could still be used. Results of
ANOVAs for Number of symbolic associations, Number ofhedonic associations, and Number of
functional associations are reported in Table 8.4.a.
Table 8.4.a.
UNIV ARIA TE TESTS FOR GROUP DIFFERENCES IN NUMBER OF
HEDONIC, FUNCTIONAL AND SYMBOLIC BRAND ASSOCIATIONS
Experimental groups (mean scores)
Scheffe
Variable F-ratio Sign. CTRL CONF SAQ 3P SAQ3P comparisons Sign.
Univariate tests: (no comparisons made)
N ofhedonic .72 .58 1.13 .91 .74 .76 .57
N of symbolic 1.39 .24 3.05 2.98 3.49 3.36 2.89
N of functional 1.40 .24 1.35 1.37 l.S3 .88 1.19
NOTE: CTRL = control group, CONF = assurances of confidentiality, SAQ = self-administered questionnaire,
3P = third-person questioning, SAQ3P = self-administered questionnaire and third-person questioning.
The results of ANOVAs for the three types ofbenefit associations all suggest that our manipulation
did not significantly affect the number ofhedonic, functional, or symbolic associations reported by
our subjects. Again, however, we maintain that rejection of the hypothesis that anonymity affects
the number of symbolic associations reported in elicitation interviews is premature. In particular,
the low level of power for our test (power =.43 for (l = .05), indicates that significant effects
could have been observed for a larger sample. It is also interesting to note that group differences
for Number ofhedonic associations and Number offunctional associations seem to be larger than
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for Number of symbolic associations -- though no differences are large enough to be significant in
this study.
Chapter 7 showed that Number of intentions and Number of attitudes violated both the assumption
ofnormality (see Table 7. l. l.c.) and the assumption ofhomogenous variance (see Table 7.2.1.)
for ordinary parametric univariate analysis ofvariance. Because attitudes and intentions have very
unequal cell sizes, violations were considered as serious (Tabachnick and Fidell1983) and the
Kruskal-Wallis analysis was selected in stead of ANOVA to test for group differences for Number
of intentions (H4b) and Number of attitudes. Results are reported in Table 8.4.b.
Table 8.4.b.
KRUSKAL-W ALLIS TEST OF GROUP DIFFERENCES IN
NUMBER OF INTENTIONS AND ATTITUDES
Experimental groups: mean ranks" Corrected for ties
Variable CTRL CONF SAQ 3P SAQ3P Chi-square df Sign.
N of intentions 87.00 86.65 91.30 125.86 126.95 40.93 4 .00
(.05) (.05) (.09) (.48) (.51)
N of attitudes 96.36 95.48 98.14 107.55 119.41 12.47 4 .01
(.10) (.07) (.12) (.19) (.38)
NOTE: CTRL = control group, CONF = assurances of confidentiality, SAQ = self-administered questionnaire,
3P = third-person questioning, SAQ3P = self-administered questionnaire and third-person questioning.
*Mean scores are reported in parenthesis.
The results of the Kruskal-Wallis tests show that significantly different numbers ofintentions are
reported across experimental conditions. Specifically, substantially higher average ranks are
observed for the two groups subjected to self anonymity (3P and SAQ3P). Correspondingly, a
significant effect is also observed for Number of attitudes, and again the highest ranks are found in
the 3P and SAQ3P groups. In sum, H4a is supported for intentions, the second most sensitive
type of associations, but not for the most sensitive kind, symbolic associations.
Inaddition to withholding sensitive associations, respondents mayengage in constructive reporting
ofless sensitive associations in stead ofreporting sensitive associations and may thus lower the
level of sensitivity of associations reported. Hence, we expected that:
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H4b A higher level of sensitivity of associations will be observed under conditions of self
anonymity than under non-anonymity conditions.
Sensitivity offunctional and hedonic associations are moderately correlated (r= .25, p<.05) (see
Table 7.l.l.c.). Though moderate violations to the assumption of normality were detected for
these variables (see Tables 7.1. l.a.), a MANOVA was used to test for group differences in
Sensitivty ofhedonic associations and Sensitivity offunctional associations because MANOVA is
robust to moderate violations to the normality assumption when cell sizes are not very different and
there are no outliers. Results of the MANOVA are reported in Table 8.4.c.
Table 8.4.c.
MULTIVARIATE TEST FOR GROUP DIFFERENCES IN PERCEIVED
SENSITIVITY OF DISTORTION OF HEDONIC AND FUNCTIONAL ASSOCIATIONS
Experimental groups (mean scores)
Variable F-ratio Sign. CTRL CONF SAQ 3P SAQ3P
Multivariate
test (Wiik 's) 1.26 .27 (no comparisons made)
Perceived sensitivity of'
Hedonic assoc. 3.39 2.17 2.74 3.29 2.81
Functional ass. 2.84 2.26 2.86 2.42 2.77
NOTE: CTRL = control group, CONF = assurances of confidentiality, SAQ = self-administered questionnaire,
3P = third-person questioning, SAQ3P = self-administered questionnaire and third-person questioning.
The MANOVA results showed no significant effect for group differences in Sensitivity ofhedonic
associations or Sensitivity of functional associations.
Group differences in Sensitivity of symbolic associations, Sensitivity of attitudes, and Sensitivity
of intentions were first subjected to separate ANOVAs, see Table 8.4.d. Again, no significant
main effects are observed for any of the variables, lending no support for H4b. Since the
Cochran' s C statistic indicated that the variances of Sensitivity of intentions was not homogeneous
across groups (C7•S= .482, p=.03), we also submitted this variable to a Kruskal-Wallis test (no
serious violations were observed for Sensitivity of symbolic associations and Sensitivity of
attitudes). The results ofthis test confirmed the results of the ANOVA: no significant main effect
for group differences was observed (Chi-square.j,« 6.00, p = .20).
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Table 8.4.d.
UNIVARIATE TESTS FOR GROUP DIFFERENCES IN PERCEIVED
SENSITIVITY OF SYMBOLIC ASSOCIATIONS, ATTITUDES AND INTENTIONS
Experimental groups (mean scores)
Scheffe
Variable F-ratio Sign. CTRL CONF SAQ 3P SAQ3P comparisons Sign.
Univariate tests,
Sensitivity of: (no comparisons made)
Symbolic assoc. 1.22 .30 3.92 4.16 4.33 4.09 4.15
Attitudes .58 .78 3.50 1.67 3.75 1.57 2.86
Intentions .91 .47 3.00 2.00 2.00 3.65 3.78
NOTE: CTRL = control group, CONF = assurances of confidentiality, SAQ = self-administered questionnaire,
3P = third-person questioning, SAQ3P = self-administered questionnaire and third-person questioning.
In sum, no support is found in our data for the conjecture that self anonymity will elicit brand
associations which are perceived as more sensitive to distortion than brand association elicited
under conditions of no anonymity (H4b). Several of the tests performed here were, however,
hampered by low statistical power. For example, the power for the MANOVAfor Sensitivity of
functional and hedonic associations was only .56 (ex=.05). Notably, the effect size was
moderately high: = .07 (Cohen 1977). The statistical power for the tests of the other variables were
even lower: .30 for Sensitivity of Symbolic associations, .15 for Sensitivity of attitudes, and .25
for Sensitivity ofintentions. Moreover, the effects sizes were considerable for Sensitivity of
attitudes (Eta-square= .14) and for Sensitivity ofintentions (Eta-square= .12). On this account,
further research on the relationship between anonymity-inducing techniques and the perceived
sensitivity of associations seems warranted.
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8.5. Anonymity-effects on the level of favourability of associations
reported (DS)
One hypothesis was developed in Chapter 4 for the effect of our manipulation on the level of
favourability of symbolic associations reported:
H5 The level of favourability of symbolic associations will be higherunder conditions of
self anonymity than under non-anonymity conditions.
When testing this hypothesis for Favourability ofsymbolic associations, we included Favourability
ofhedonic associations and Favourability offunctional associations and submitted the three
variables to a MANOVA because these variables were shown to be significantly correlated in
Chapter 7 (see Table 7.1.I.c.). No violations to the assumptions ofMANOVA were found for any
ofthese variables (see Tables 7.l.l.a. and 7.2.2). Results of the MANOVA are reported in Table
8.5.a.
Table 8.5.
MULTIVARIATE TEST FOR GROUP DIFFERENCES
IN THE FAVOURABILITY OF BENEFIT ASSOCIATIONS
Experimental groups (mean scores)
Variable F-ratio Sign. CTRL CONF SAQ 3P SAQ3P
Multivariate
test (Wiik 'sy 1.29 .23 (no comparisons made)
Favourability of:
Hedonic assoc.
Functional ass.
Symb. assoc.
5.86 5.95
5.97 6.93
4.43 4.44
6.60 5.35 6.62
6.56 6.85 6.80
4.66 4.78 4.95
NOTE: CTRL = control group, CONF = assurances of confidentiality, SAQ = self-administered questionnaire,
3P = third-person questioning, SAQ3P = self-administered questionnaire and third-person questioning.
The multivariate main effect for group differences in favourability for benefit associations was not
significant. Though the pattern of mean scores for Favourability of symbolic associations is
consistent with H5, we conclude that H5 is not supported by our data. The statistical power of the
test was .63 (0.= .05). Thus, there is room for more powerful tests which could result in
significant fmdings. Interestingly, the same pattern ofmean scores are observed for all three
benefit associations: the favourability ofbenefit associations tend to be higher for the groups in
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which some kind ofanonymity was induced than in the control group (though differences are not
significant in this study).
No hypotheses were developed for Favourability of attitudes and Favourability of intentions.
However, due to the exploratory nature ofthis study we still performed analyses of group
differences for these variables. Favourability of attitudes had relatively sound distributional
properties (no serious violations, see Table 6.1.1.a. and Table 6.2.1.) and was therefore subjected
to an ANOV A. However, the results ofthis analysis must be interpreted with caution since
Favourability of attitudes and Favourability of intentions were correlated with the favourability of
benefit associations (MANOVA could not be performed due to empty cells). The results of the
ANOVA for group differences in Favourability of attitudes showed a non-significant main effect
(F4,27 = .48, P = .75).
Favourability ofintentions violated both the normality and the homogeneity assumption of
ANOV A (see Table 7.1.l.a. and Table 7.2.1), and because cell sizes were unequal for this
variable, it was tested by means of the Kruskal-Wallis non-parametric test. The Chi-square for this
test was significant, indicating that the favourability of intentions significantly differed across
groups (Chi-square.j., = 33.96, P = .00). This effect was due to considerably lower mean ranks
in the two groups subjected to third-person questioning (Mean ranks for the five groups were:
CTRL=88.71, CONF=88.55, SAQ=95.32, 3P=56.31, SAQ3P=61.11). As previously noted, this
finding should be considered as preliminary because Favourability ofintentions was correlated
with the favourability ofhedonic and symbolic associations (MANOV A could not be performed
due to empty cells).
8.6. Anonymity-effects on the predictive ability of reported
associations (H6a-c)
Predictive ability is defined in this thesis as the correspondence (correlation) between the ratings of
associations to Mercedes and rated attitudes and intentions toward the same brand.
The basic contention here was that the different anonymity-inducing techniques (i.e., the different
experimental groups) would vary in their ability to elicit associations relevant to subjects' attitudes
and intentions. Specifically, the following three hypotheses were presented:
H6a Associations elicited under conditions of self anonymity will be more predictive of
attitudes than associations elicited under non-anonymity conditions.
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H6b Associations elicited under conditions of self anonymity will be more predictive of
intentions than associations elicited under non-anonymity conditions.
H6c The difference in predictive ability between associations elicited under self anonymity
conditions and associations elicited under non-anonymity conditions will be larger for the
most latent associations thanfor all associations reported.
Hypothesis 6a was tested by correlating the strength ratings of associations in each group with the
self-report measures of attitudes and intentions. Group differences were tested by means of
Fisher s Z-test for comparison of correlations (Battacharyya and Johnson 1977). Results are
reported in Table 8.6.a.
Table 8.6.a
CORRELATIONS BETWEEN EVALUATIONS OF ASSOCIATIONS AND SELF-
REPORTED ATTITUDES AND INTENTIONS
Experimental groups (correlations)
Fisher's Z
Variable CTRL CONF SAQ 3P SAQ3P comparisons
Attitude .323** .472** .540*** .591 *** .318* 3P>CTRL**
3P>SAQ3P*
Purchase .287* .161 .005 .408*** .066
intention
NOTE: CTRL = control group, CONF = assurances of confidentiality, SAQ = self-administered questionnaire,
3P = third-person questioning, SAQ3P = self-administered questionnaire and third-person questioning.
*** = <.01
** = <.05
* = <.10
The results in Table 8.6.a. partly support H6a. For attitudes, the predictive ability of the 3P group
(r = .591) is significantly better than for the control group (r = .323). However, the correlation for
the SAQ3P group (r = .318) is about equal to the correlation for the control group. Interestingly,
correlations in the SAQ and CONF groups are higher than in the control group -- though the
differences are not large enough to be statistically significant in this study. For intentions,
correlations are only significant for the 3P group (r = .408) and the control group (r = .287). The
difference between the two is in the hypothesised direction, but is not statistically significant.
Hence, H6b was not supported.
In sum, the pattern of findings in Table 8.6.a. seem to support our conjecture that anonymity-
inducing techniques may improve the validity of associations reported in an elicitation interview.
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Specifically, self anonymity was shown to elicit associations which were more predictive of
people' s self-reported attitudes than ordinary free (the control condition).
To test H6c, the five most latent associations were correlated with self-reported attitudes and
intentions and groups compared by means of the Fisher Z-test. The results of this analysis are
reported in Table 8.6.b. Also, the five most latent associations were regressed against the attitude
and intention measures and R-squares reported to provide further detail. Regression results are
reported in Table 8.6.c.
Table 8.6.b
CORRELATIONS BETWEEN EVALUATIONS OF FIVE MOST SALIENT
ASSOCIATIONS AND SELF-REPORTED ATTITUDES AND INTENTIONS
Experimental groups (correlations)
Fisher's Z
Variable CTRL CONF SAQ 3P SAQ3P comparisons
Attitude .092 .509** .387** .604*** .344** 3P>SAQ3P**
3P>SAQ*
Purchase .193 .162 -.095 .349** .Q38
intentions
NOTE: CTRL = control group, CONF = assurances of confidentiality, SAQ = self-administered questionnaire,
3P = third-person questioning, SAQ3P = self-administered questionnaire and third-person questioning.
*** = <.01
** = <.05
* =<.10
Table 8.6.c
REGRESSION RESULTS: THE FIVE MOST SALIENT ASSOCIATIONS
REGRESSED AGAINST SELF-REPORTED ATTITUDES AND INTENTIONS
Experimental groups (explained variance)
Variable CTRL CONF SAQ 3P SAQ3P
Attitude .02 .39"*" .20' .45""" .14
Purchase
intentions
.14 .06 .06 .25 • .05
NOTE: CTRL = control group, CONF = assurances of confidentiality, SAQ = self-administered questionnaire,
3P = third-person questioning, SAQ3P = self-administered questionnaire and third-person questioning.
*** = <.01
"* = <.05
"= <.10
• = <.15
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The results of the correlational analyses in Table 8.7.b. and the results of the regressions in Table
8.7.c. show the same pattern offindings. Importantly, correlations with self-reported attitudes and
R-square values from the regressions are significant for the 3P group but not significant for the
control group. The correlation between associations and attitudes is also significant for the SAQ3P
group, but the R-square value is not significant for this group.
For intentions, 3P is the only group with a significant correlation. The regression results reported
in Table 8.6.c show that none of the groups obtained significant R-square values, though the 3P
group was quite close (p = .115) and had a higher R-square value than the other groups.
In sum, H6c is supported by our data. The differences between the control group and the 3P group
in abilities of elicited associations to predict self-reported attitudes and intentions are larger for the
most latent associations than for whole sets of associations. This finding is consistent with our
conjecture that respondents reporting associations under conditions of no anonymity may postpone
reporting of some relevant (but socially undesirable) associations whereas respondents subjected to
self-anonymity are not as concerned with this. Discussion of explantions of these findings are
presented in Chapter 9.
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8.7. Tests ofinteractions (H7a-b)
High self-monitors were expected to be more sensitive to manipulations of anonymity because they
hold more sensitive associations and because they are more prone to actively manage impressions
during interviews. Hence we hypothesised that:
Hla Any observed effects of anonymity manipulations on Number-, Latencies-,
Favourability-, or Sensitivity of associations will be more accentuated for high self-
monitors than for low self-monitors.
Regarding the predictive ability of associations reported under different experimental conditions,
we expected that self-monitoring would be a negative moderator for the control group. In this
group respondents are more motivated and more free to distort and, consequently, the greater
tendency ofhigh self-monitors to manage their responses come into play. This managing of
responses lowers the predictive ability of associations reported. In the groups subjected to third-
person questioning, however, little distortion should occur during elicitation interviews, and self-
monitoring should therefore not be a significant moderator of the predicitive ability of associations
reported. The following hypothesis was suggested:
Hlb Self-monitoring will be a negative moderator for the predicitive ability of associations
elicited under conditions of non-anonymity, but not for associations elicited under
conditions of self anonymity.
8.7.1. Tests of interactions with Self-monitoring for Number of associations,
Latencies of associations, Favourability of associations, and Sensitivity of
associations (H7a)
Results of analyses of interactions for Number of associations, Latencies of associations,
Favourability of associations, and Sensitivity of associations are reported in Table 8.7.1. Only
significant interactions or interactions which are close to significant are reported. Based on the
results of the confirmatory factor analysis of the Norwegian version of the Lennox and Wolfe
(1986) self-monitoring scale (see measurement section ofChapter 6), and consistent with the
theoretical foundation of the scale, we devided the scale in two subscales termed Acquisitive self-
presentation and Protective self-presentation and analysed interactions separately, Notably, all
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interactions reported here were included in the analyses ofmain effects in previous sections; no
special analyses that included only interaction terms were performed.
Table 8.7.l.
SIGNIFICANT INTERACTIONS WITH SELF-MONITORING
FOR NUMBER OF ASSOCIATIONS, LATENCIES OF ASSOCIATIONS,
AND SENSITIVITY OF ASSOCIATIONS
Method x Acquisitive self-presentation Method x Protective self-presentation
Scheffe Scheffe
F Sig F comparison F Sig F comparison
4.03 .00 CONF>CTRL** 1.94 .10 CONF<CTRL**
3P>CTRL*** 3P<CTRL**
SAQ3P>CTRL ***
Dependent
variables
N of symbolic
associations
Latencies of
Hedonic associations 2.39 .06 CONF>CTRL ***
Latencies of
Functional assoc. 3.75 .01 CONF>CTRL ***
SAQ3P>CTRL**
Sensitivity of
Hedonic associations 2.17 .08 SAQ3P>CTRL **
Sensitivty of
Symbolic associations 3.05 .02 3P>CTRL"*
SAQ3P>CTRL ***
NOTE: CTRL = control group, CONF = assurances of confidentiality, SAQ = self-administered questionnaire,
3P = third-person questioning, SAQ3P = self-administered questionnaire and third-person questioning.
Interactions stem from analyses of main effects reported in previous sections
*** = <.01
** = <.05
* =<.10
Several interesting findings emerge from Table 8.7.1. In support ofH7a, five out ofsix significant
interactions are positive. Thus, high self-monitors seem to be more prone to report certain types of
associations - and report some associations earlier under conditions of anonymity than low self-
monitors. Specifically, different findings are observed for the two subscales of Self-monitoring.
There is a positive interaction between Acquisitive self-presentation and the anonymity
manipulation for Latency ofhedonic associations and Latency offunctional associations, whereas
no such interactions are observed for Protective self-presentation. Vice versa, there is a positive
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interaction between the manipulation and Protective self-presentation for Sensitivity ofhedonic
associations and Sensitivity of symbolic associations, but no significant interaction is observed for
Acquisitive self-presentation. Moreover, significant interactions are observed for Number of
symbolic associations for both subscales ofSelf-monitoring, but the nature of the two interactions
are different: individuals high in Acquisitive self-presentation report more symbolic associations
when anonymity is provided (positive interaction), whereas individuals high in Protective self-
presentation report less symbolic associations under conditions of anonymity (negative
interaction). These findings point to the usefulness of a two-dimensional approach in examinations
of the relationship between effects of anonymity and self-monitoring in elicitation interviews.
8.7.2. Self-monitoring as a moderator of predictive ability (H7b)
Moderated Regression Analysis (MRA; Zedeck 1971; Sharma, Durand, Gur-Arie 1981) was used
to test H8b. Separate analyses were performed for the control group (see Table 8.7.2.a.) and the
group subjected to third-person questioning (Table 8.7.2.b.). Decisions regarding moderator-
effects were framed on the taxonomy described by Sharma et al. (1981). Their decision rules are
summarized as: (a) ifthe cross-product (in our case the cross-product of strength of associations
and self-monitoring) is significant and the main effect is not significant, Self-monitoring is
classified as a pure moderator, (b) if the cross-product coefficient is significant and the the main
effect coefficient is also significant, Self-monitoring is a quasi-moderator (that is, Self-monitoring
is both a moderator and a predictor), and (c) ifthe cross-product is not significant and the main
effect for Self-monitoring is significant, Self-monitoring acts as apredictor.
When a cross-product involving one or two independent variables are included in a regression,
multicollienarity is often present. This is a problem to our analyses because we want to examine
independent effects of each predictor coefficient. Moreover, the consequences of collinearity are
more servere in situations with moderate or low levels of explained variance and with small sample
sizes (Mason and Perreault 1991). On that account, we centered all variables involved (Marquardt
1980) and checked for the presence of multicollienarity byestimating variance inflation factors
(VIF). VIP-values for all variables were between l and 2, well below the cut-offvalue of 10
suggested by Neter, Wasserman, and Kutner (1989, pA09). Thus, multicollinearity is not a threat
to the substantive conclusions drawn from this analysis. Examinations of other assumptions for
regression analysis, such as normal distribution of residuals, constant variance of Y(for different
levels of Xs), and presence of outliers, revealed only moderate violations. Results of MRA for the
control group is reported in Table 8.7.2.a. and for the third-person questioning group (3P) in
Table 8.7.2.b.
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Table 8.7 .2.a.
MODERATED REGRESSION ANALYSIS (MRA) WITH STANDARDIZED
COEFFICIENTS FOR THE CONTROL GROUP (N=40)
Independent variables
Dependent Adjusted Strength Strength x Strength x
variable R-square ofassoc. ASP ASP PSP PSP
Models with all associations included
Attitude
1. .081** .323**
2. .074 .296* .133
3. .164** .294* .043 -.336**
4. .088* .279* .182
5. .109* .165 .218 -.234
Intention
1. .058** .287*
2. .035 .277 .044
3. .010 .276 .060 .048
4. .061 .246 .170
5. .066 .339* .141 .192
Models with f1.vemost latent a!£,5.ociatiQnsincluded.
Attitude
l. -.018 .092
2. .008 .096 .224
3. .105* .172 .103 -.370**
4. .013 .044 .241
5. .091* -.053 .271* -.325*
Intention
1. .012 .193
2. -.002 .195 .111
3. -.030 .193 .114 .010
4. .025 .154 .199
5. .006 .180 .191 .088
NOTE: ASP = Acquisitive Self-presentation, PSP = Protective Self-presentation.
*** = p<.OI
** = p<.05
* = p<.I0
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Table 8.7.2.b.
MODERATED REGRESSION ANALYSIS (MRA) WITH STANDARDIZED
COEFFICIENTS FOR THE GROUP SUBJECTED TO
SELF ANONYMITY (N=42)
Dependent
variable
Independent variables
Adjusted
R-square
Strength
ofassoc.
Strength x
ASP PSP
Strength x
PSPASP
Models with all associations included
Attitude
l.
2.
3.
4.
5.
Intention
.334*** .591 ***
.404*** .523*** .266**
.388*** .527*** .267** .008
.387*** .549*** .176**
.374*** .566*** .282** .058
l.
2.
3.
4.
5.
.145*** .408***
.139** .367** .131
.123** .418** .141 .099
.133** .392** .096
.145** .454* .166 .205
Models with five most latent associations included
Attitude
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
Intention
.349*** .604***
.418*** .535*** .267**
.402*** .535*** .267** -.000
.398*** .560*** .255**
.383*** .567*** .265** .Q28
l.
2.
3.
4.
5.
.100** .349**
.099* .302* .155
.076 .323* .160 .043
.088* .331* .103
.085* .372* .157 .157
NOTE: ASP = Acquisitive Self-presentation, PSP = Protective Self-presentation.
*** = p<.OI
** = p<.05
* = p<.IO
The results in Tables 8.7.2.a and b partly support H8b. First, for the control group, no significant
interactions are observed for the ability of associations to predict purchase intentions (Table
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8.7 .2.a.). However, several supportive findings are observed for prediction of attitudes. When all
associations are included in the analyses, Acquisitive self-presentation (ASP) is found to be a
negative and pure moderator of the effect ofassociations on brand attitudes (the standardized cross-
product coefficient is -.336). ASP is a pure moderator because the cross-product coefficient is
significant (modeI3) whereas the main effect of ASP is not (modeI2).
When only the five most salient associations are included, ASP is still a negative and pure
moderator (the standardized cross-product coefficient is significant: -.370, see model 3, and the
main effect of ASP is not significant, see model 2). Also, Protective self-presentation (PSP) was
found to be a pure negative moderator of the effect ofstrength ofassociations on attitudes (model
5; standardized cross-product coefficient: -.325). Overall, MRAs for attitudes in the control group
support H7b.
Results ofMRAs for the third-person questioning group (3P) are reported in Table 8.7.2.b. Again
the pattern of findings is consistent with our expectations (H7b). Cross-product coefficients are not
significant for any of the four analyses. Hence, in this group Self-monitoring is not a moderator of
the predictive ability of associations reported. However, both ASP and PSP are found to be
positive independent predictors of attitudes (but not of intentions). This finding is observed when
all associations are included as well as when analyses are based on only the five most latent
associations.
The results reported here are largely consistent with our argument that Self-monitoring acts as a
negative moderator of the predictive ability of elicited associations when no anonymity is provided.
When self anonymity is induced by means of third-person questioning, the relationship of reported
associations with brand attitudes is not affected by self-monitoring tendencies. In stead, Self-
monitoring acts as a positive independent predictor ofbrand attitudes in this study -- probably
because the brand in question evokes salient symbolic benefit associations such as success, status,
and rich people (see Table 7.1.1.b.).
In the following chapter, we summarize the findings and dicuss potential explanations for the
effects and non-effects observed in this study.
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CHAPTER 9
DISCUSSION
This chapter opens with a summary of the findings (section 9.1). Explanations for the results are
subsequently discussed in section 9.2. The contribution of the study in terms oftheoretical
advances and managerial implications is discussed next (9.3). In the final section, we address
study limitations and directions for future research (9.4).
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9.1. Summary of findings
The objectives ofthis study were articulated in two major research questions in the introductory
chapter. The first addressed the concept of anonymity:
RQ l How should anonymity be defined in the context of elicitation of brand associations?
In particular we were interested in a definition that would be useful for the purpose of eliciting
brand associations from consumers' memories. We attempted an answer to this question first by
reviewing and synthesising different theories that could explain why people might want to distort
or actively manage responses in an interview. Specifically, three different psychological
mechanisms were identified.
Situational impression management (SIM) was defined as motivation to display a favourable image
to some other person or group of persons. Private self-management (PSM) was the private or
internally-directed version of SIM and referred to the need to develop or manitain self-esteem and a
favourable identity. Finally, situational self-deception (SSD) was defined as pre-conscious
censoring of self-threatening memory content. Furthermore, the reviews of the nature of brand
associations and the task of eliciting brand associations provided further understanding pertinent to
the development of a useful definition of anonymity.
Based on these reviews, anonymity was defined in Chapter 4. Because the effect of anonymity
manipulations are decided by the psychological reactions ofrespondent and not manipulations as
such, the respondent was chosen as denotation for the concept. Two different types of anonymity
was developed. Social anonymity was defined as the perceived extent to which some other person
or group of persons can reveal the identity of the respondent. This is the classic notion of
anonymity (e.g., Sudman and Bradburn 1983; Aquilino 1990; 1994). Social anonymity was
further devided into two sub-concepts: public anonymity and interviewer anonymity. The latter
pertains to the perceived degree ofanonymity toward the interviewer(s), whereas public anonymity
refers to the leveloffelt anonymity toward other persons than the interviewers (peers, friends, the
general public, etc.). Confirmatory factor analysis supported this conceptual model: Interviewer
anonymity and public anonymity were found to be related, though separate constructs.
The other type of anonymity was developed from theories of self-awareness (Duval and Wicklund
1972) and projection (Holmes 1968; 1978) and was termed self anonymity. This is an internally-
directed construct which denotes the state of not being focused on the self -- but instead on some
similar in-group person during an interview (colleagues, fellow students, etc). This is also a
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graded (not dichotomous) construct in the sense that respondents are not either constantly self-
focused or other-focused during an interview -- which typically lasts for several minutes. Instead,
respondents willlikely switch their attention between others and self. The level of self-anonymity
is represented by the degree of other-focus compared to the degree of self-focus. This type of
anonymity complements the classic and socially-directed notion of anonymity since it has a
potential of alleviating not only externally-directed motivations for distortion (SIM), but also the
more intra-psychic motivations (PSM and SSD).
In the empirical study, it was shown that some anonymity-inducing techniques primarily evoke
social anonymity, whereas others induced self-anonymity (results of the tests are reported in the
upper part of Table 9.1). Specifically, self-administered questionnaires induced the highest levels
of social anonymity and third-person questioning the highest levels of self anonymity.
Furthermore, regarding the distinction between public- and interviewer anonymity, confidentiality
assurances were shown to provide high levels of public anonymity only, whereas self-
administered questionnaires were high on both types ofsocial anonymity. Insum, the empirical
findings support the idea of different types of anonymity and the proposition that different
techniques are adequate for inducing specific kinds of anonymity.
The second research question addressed the effects of anonymity-inducing techniques (and thus
different types of anonymity) on outcomes of an elicitation interview:
RQ2: Will manipulations of anonymity have an impact on elicitation outcomes?
How will the results be affected?
To attempt some preliminary answers to these questions we conducted a randomized between-
subject experiment with five experimental conditions corresponding to four different anonymity-
inducing methods and a control group (no anonymity induced). Hypotheses were tested on a
sample of 205 undergraduate students. From the discussion of motivations of distortions we
expected that self anonymity would be much more effective in alleviating distortions than social
anonymity because self anonymity affects all three kinds of motivations for distortions (SIM,
PSM, and SSD), whereas social anonymity primarily influences only one: situational impression
management (SIM). Therefore, we expected significant different oucomes for the groups subjected
to self anonymity compared to the control group for a number of variables. Results of the tests of
hypotheses are summarized in Table 9.1.
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Table 9.1
SUMMARY OF TESTS OF HYPOTHESES
Variables Hmotheses Finding
Manipulation of anonymity
Level of self anonymity HIa 3P, SAQ3P>CTRL Supported
Level of interviewer anonymity Hlb SAQ, SAQ3P>CTRL Supported
Level of public anonymity Hlc CONF>CTRL Supported
Perceived sensitivity to distortion
Perceived sensitivity to distortion H2a Symbolic>Functional, Hedonic Supported
Perceived sensitivity to distortion H2b Intentions> Attitudes Supported
Anonymity-effects on response latencies
Latencies of sensitive brand assoc. ID Self anonymity>CTRL Supported for
purchase intentions
Anonymity- effects on the amounts of
associations reported
Number of sensitive associations H4 Self anonymity>CTRL Supported for attitudes
and purchase intentions
Anonymity-effects on the favourability of
associations reported
Level of favourability of H5 Self anonymity>CTRL Not supported
symbolic associations
Anonymity-effects on the level of
perceived sensitivity of associations
Level of sensitivity ofbrand H6 Self anonymity>CTRL Not supported
associations
Anonymity-effects on the predictive ability
of associations reported
Prediction ofbrand attitudes H7a Self anonymity>CTRL Supported
Prediction of intentions H7b Self anonymity>CTRL Supported
Relative degree of anonymity-
effect for the five most latent- H7c Five most latent>All associations Supported
vs. all associations
Interactions between self-monitoring
and the anonymity manipulation
Latencies-, number-, favoura- H8a High self-monitors>Low self- Partly supported
bility-, and sensitivity of monitors
associations
Self-monitoring as a moderator H8b Negative moderator for CTRL, Supported for
of predictive ability no moderating effect for 3P prediction of attitudes
NOTE: CTRL = control group
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9.2. Discussion of explanations
In this section, we discuss possible explanations for our findings. In line with previous research
on anonymity, we focused on motivational mechanisms in developing a theoretical rationale for
hypotheses to be tested (Chapters 2, 4, and 5). Based on our findings, however, we suggest that
cognitive processes should also be considered.
9.2.1. Motivational explanations
In brief, we expected that third-person questioning (3P) would make a difference (compared to the
control group) for a number of elicitation outcome variables. This argument was derived from a
review ofpotential antecedent psychological mechanisms to distortions (see Chapter 2). In the
review, we concluded that motivations for distortions may be intra-psychic (not aimed at other
persons) and/or externally directed toward other people (as in the traditional view of social
desirability). Compared to traditional techniques to induce anonymity, such as self-administered
questionnaires (SAQ), which only guard against socially-directed distortions, 3P was expected to
provide a different type of anonymity (termed self anonymity, see Chapter 4) affecting all three
kinds ofmotivations for distortion. Indeed, the findings reported in Table 9.1. indicate that 3P
made a difference. A larger number of intentions, higher latency-scores for intentions, and better
predictions were obtained with this method. The question here is: why? For 3P to provide valid
information, respondents must project their own associations onto other people -- in our case other
business students. Two major types of projection are found in the literature (Holmes 1968; 1978;
1981; Lewis et al. 1994; Sherwood 1979; 1981).
Classical projection. According to Holmes (1981); "in classical projection people project onto
others characteristics that are identical to those they possess but are not conscious of processing"
(p. 460). Usually, it is believed that what is being projected is some negative characteristic or
desire subjected to repression (Campbell, Miller, Lubetsky, and O'ConneIl1964). In other words,
the negative characteristic is denied and therefore subconscious. Projection serves a defensive
function by putting a psychological distance between themselves and the characteristic and thus
being spared the discomfort of admitting possession of the undesriable trait or emotion. In our
context, this would mean that students projected onto other students associations they were not
consciously aware of holding themselves. Notably, the notion of classical projection share
resemblance with the concept ofself-deception -- one of the intra-psychic motivational mechanisms
for distortion discussed in this study (see Chapter 2). More precisely, self-deception does not
necessarily imply projection, but the prerequisite of classical projection -- that needs, attitudes, or
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beliefs are denied and repressed -- and is compatible with the definition of self-deception as a pre-
conscious front-end processor preventing individuals from awareness ofunconscious threatening
self-knowledge (Greenwald 1988). On that account, the question ofwhether classical projection
occured in our study implies another question ofwhether self-deception played a role (Dilman
1972). Sackeim (1988) presented a set of criteria for an empirical demonstration of self-deception:
l. The individual has two mental contents, which if expressed as propositions are
contradictory (p and not-p)
2. These beliefs are held simultaneously
3. The individual is not aware of holding one of the mental contents (p or not-p)
4. The act that determines which beliefis and which beliefis not subject to awareness
is a motivated act.
One of Sackheims examples involve Bill and Joe. Joe does unconsciously hate Bill, whereas
consciously, he denies it. The reason why Joes hatred is unconscious is reasonably assumed to be
motivated since it is not commonly accepteble to hate people. Also, criteria 1,2, and 3 are met
since Joe at the same time hates Bill (P) and holds the beliefthat he does not (not-p). This notion of
self-deception is reminiscent of Dilrnans viewpoint that self-deception and repression are equated
and that the key feature ofboth is the avoidance ofrecognizing one's own feelings, desires, and
motives (Dilman 1972, p.316). Now, could such mechanisms occur in relationships between
consumers and brands? Are our findings compatible with the four criteria of Sackeim?
Our study was not designed to test alternative explanations. Still, some of our findings indicate that
the processes of classical projection and self-deception were operating. When comparing the
results of the control group (CTRL condition) and the group subjected to third-person questioning
(3P), we find that a larger number of intentions were found when respondents were allowed to
project their responses onto other students (3P condition). Importantly, intentions were perceived
by respondents to be more sensitive to distortion than other associations (see Table 8.2). As
previously noted, the sensitivity of intentions to buy a Mercedes are probably due to the salient
symbolic associations for this brand (see Table 8.2). Hence, stating a positive intention might be
seen as an indicator of need for social approval -- and using products to obtain social acceptance is
generally regarded as undesirable (Fisher 1993; Rokeach and Ball-Rokeach 1989). As shown in
Table 7.I.I.b, however, several positive symbolic associations highly relevant to our business
students were reported, such as personal success and wealthy people. Thus, there is reason to
believe that some respondents in our study would like to have a Mercedes. Still, because of the
potentially negative consequences of admitting a desire for this brand to oneself and others, this
positive motive was kept unconscious -- and even though it was activated during the elicitation
interview, in the CTRL group the "front-end processor" described by Greenwald (1988) prevented
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that respondents became aware of it. However, in the 3P group, this censoring mechanism was not
evoked and consequently a larger number of intentions were reported. Also, the 3P group obtained
better predictions of attitudes and intentions than the CTRL group. This finding implies that more
relevant associations -- including a larger number of intentions -- were reported under the 3P
condition. These findings and lines of reasoning support a motivational explanation consistent with
the criteria of Sackheim (1988). However, better predictions and higher numbers of intentions for
the 3P group cannot verify whether intentions were subconsciously censored in the CTRL group.
If respondents were conscious of their desires for a Mercedes, other motivational mechanisms and
another type ofprojection should be considered.
Attributive projection. Attributive projection denotes the projection of characteristics (or in our
case: associations) in order to justify or relieve the tension of one' s own acknowledged possession
of the same characteristic (Holmes 1968; 1978; 1981). Thus, respondents engaged in attributive
projection ifthe elicitation task made them aware oftheir intentions to buy a Mercedes, but they
consciously chose to withold this information (members of the CTRL group). This explanation is
consistent with the motivational mechanism of situational impression management (SIM) and
private self-management (PSM, see Chapter 2): students in the CTRL group did not mentioned
their intentions to buy a Mercedes due to the potentially negative effects of disclosing this
information on their self-esteem and identity development (Leary and Kowalski 1990). However,
in the 3P group, respondents were allowed to project their intentions onto fellow students and
thereby justify their own desire for the brand.
The findings regarding the moderating role of self-monitoring (8.8.2.a and b) strongly support the
explanation of attributive projection. The results of the moderated regression analyses showed that
in the control group self-monitoring was a negative moderator of the predicitive ability ofreported
associations (though only for prediction ofbrand attitudes). In other words, lower predictions
were observed for high self-monitors than for low self-monitors in this group. Self-monitoring
was, however, not a moderator of the predictive ability of associations in the 3P group. Because
high self-monitors are more inclined than low self-monitors to strategically adjust their behavior to
the shifting requirements of different social situations (Snyder 1974; Lennox and Wolfe 1986), the
negative interaction with predictive ability in the CTRL condition -- and the absence of such an
effect in the 3P condition -- suggests that respondents consciously distorted their response in the
CTRL condition, but not in the 3P condition. Importantly, when looking at the moderating effects
of each sub-construct of self-monitoring, we find two significant effects for aquisitive self-
presentation and one for protective self-presentation. The fmding of a significant interaction for
aquisitive self-presentation provides further support for the mechanism of attributive projection.
This is because aquisitive self-presentation is more parallel to the nature of impression management
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than self-deception; self-deception is, as previously noted, considered as a defensive subconscious
mechanism (Sackheim 1978; 1988). Overall, we conclude that the observed effects for the 3P
group observed in this study are more in line with the process of attributive projection than with
classical projection.
9.2.2. Cognitive explanations
Though the pattern offindings in this study can be reasonably explained by motivational theories,
there are important non-findings that merit further consideration. First, the sensitivty of
associations did not vary across experimental conditions (H6a and b). This could be due to low
power of the tests for this variable our this study (see section 8.6) (notably, non-fmdings could
also be due to low validity of the measure of sensitivity, see section 9.4). However, while awaiting
further empirical results of more powerful tests, it seems warranted to challenge the motivational
perspective on anonymity effects: when no effects of anonymity-inducing techniques are observed
on the sensitivity of associations reported, but the predictive ability of associations elicited under
different conditions is significantly affected; could this be explained by other non-motivational
mechanisms?
The heart of the matter here is the higher level of prediction observed in the third-person
questioning condition (3P) compared to the control group (CTRL). Indeed, support can be found
for a cognitive explanation ofthis effect. Lewis et al. (1994) argued that responses to projective
questions might reflect informed judgement based on actual experience with the group of persons
targeted in the projective question rather than projected beliefs. In our case, this would mean that
our subjects activated knowledge about the associations and opinions offellow students rather than
projecting their own associations. Higher predictive ability of associations observed in the 3P
group would then be observed ifthe opinions oftheir fellow students were more influential on
their attitudes and intentions than their personal associations. This scenario would be most likely
for students who were not very familiar with Mercedes and therefore held few a priori beliefs and
only weak attitudes toward the brand. When subjected to the third-person questioning technique,
such students may have activated the knowledge that most oftheir fellow students believe that
Mercedes is a very good car. This positive attitude may in tum have resulted in a positive halo-
effect in which positive associations consistent with the attitude were activated from memory. Due
to the lack of a strong personal attitude or intention, these respondents may have simply activated
the knowledge of the positive attitudes oftheir fellow students when responding to the attitude and
intention measures. Hence, self anonymity, induced by third-person questioning, would elicit
more predictive associations than other conditions for respondents who were unfamiliar with
Mercedes. Unfortunately, familiarity with Mercedes was not measured in this study.
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9.2.3. Reconciliation
Which is the correct explanation for our fmdings; the cognitive or the motivational explanation? We
believe that both types ofmechanisms are relevant. The cognitive explanation does not account for
all the findings. To the contrary, the moderating role of self-monitoring strongly support the
existence of motivational factors. On the other hand, the lack of an effect of anonymity on the level
of sensitivity points to a consideration of non-motivational effects. Though the majority of findings
seems to favour a motivational explanation, we deem it tenable at this point to keep both types of
processes as potential explanations for observed effects ofthird-person questioning. In particular,
we suggest that both mechanisms might occur for different subjects subjected -- and, possibly,
also simultaneously within subjects. For example, students who were not at all familiar with
Mercedes might have responded in a manner consistent with the cognitive explanation whereas
more familiar students projected their associations as prescribed by the theory of attributive
projection. Alternatively, some students may have taken the opportunity ofthird-person
questioning to project sensitive associations, and subsequently, cued by the reference to fellow
students, activated knowledge about the opinions offellow students. In fact, this combination of
motivated projection and cognitive activation ofinforrnation about targets ofprojection seems very
plausible for elicitation ofbrand associations because the sensitivity of associations for most
brands probably vary to a large extent. For very sensitive brands, however, motivational
mechanisms will probably dominate, whereas cognitive processes would be more central for
brands with less sensitive associations.
9.3. Contribution
In this section we address the contribution of the present investigation. What has been learned from
the findings made in this study? We first tum to the theoretical implications, and afterward to the
managerial implications of our findings.
9.3.1. Contribution to theoretical research
To the best of our knowledge, this study is the first to systematically develop the concept and
measurement of anonymity for an interview setting. Moreover, our conceptualization of anonymity
is grounded in relevant psychological theories and accounts for different types of motivation for
response distorton. Specifically, two different types of anonymity -- social anonymity and self
anonymity -- were defined in order to account for both intra-psychic and socially directed
motivations for distortion (see Chapter 4). This two-dimensional view ofanonymity synthesizes
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the traditional, socially directed notion of anonymity (e.g., Sudman and Bradburn 1983) with
psychological research on projection (Holmes 1968; 1978; Sherwood 1981). Furthermore, social
anonymity and self anonymity were both successfully measured and manipulated in this study:
self-administered questionnaires were shown to induce the highest levels of social anonymity, and
third-person questioning the highest levels of self-anonymity.
By means of experimental examination, expectations about the superior effect of self-anonymity in
alleviating motivations for distortions were supported. More intentions were reported by subjects
in the third-person questioning group, and intentions were reported earlier by this group.
Associations elicited with third-person questioning were also more predictive ofbrand attitudes and
intentions than associations elicited in a control group. Additionally, third-person questioning
evoke associations that were more predictive ofintentions than self-administered questionnaires.
Thus, we have demonstrated that manipluation of anonymity does matter in a qualitative elicitation
ofbrand associations. Notably, these effects were observed for a common and moderately
sensitive brand (Mercedes) and with a common unstructured elicitation task (free elicitation) which
is believed to provide reliable and valid information (Cramer 1968).
In this study we have also demonstrated the usefulness of including self-monitoring as a moderator
variable. In fact, the negative interaction between self-monitoring and non-anonymity and the lack
of such a significant interaction for self anonymity is a major indicator of distortion in this study.
Moreover, the different effects for acquisitive and protective self-presentation support a two-
dimensional view of self-monitoring.
Finally, our measure of self anonymity could prove helpful in studies examining other phenomena
than distortion and effects on elicitation outcomes. For example, researchers doing empirical
studies of self-awareness, in particular those concerned with the private versus public self
distinction (Fenigstein et al. 1975; Tedeschi 1986), might find our measure of self-anonymity
useful. Also, within research on false consensus effects (e.g., Ross, Greene and House 1977),
means ofmeasuring self-reference have been called for (Marks and Miller 1987, p.87). Our
operationalization of self-anonymity could perhaps be adapted to this purpose.
9.3.2. Managerial implications
For brand managers responsible for design or purchase of elicitation ofbrand associations, our
findings offer several implications. However, since the type of findings observed in this study are
previously not reported in the literature, and our findings are based on associations for one brand
only, guidelines derived from the empirical results should be regarded as preliminary.
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Extant literature on measurement ofbrand associations present a number oftechniques which could
be used to elicit brand associations from consumers memories (e.g., Keller 1993; 1997; Malhotra
1995). One of the most common techniques for this purpose is the free elicitation technique used in
our study (Keller 1997). The pervasiveness ofthis method is probably due to its strong position in
psychological research (e.g., Cramer 1968; Osgood 1952). For example, Szalay and Deese (1978)
stated that:
Because one-word associations are not encumbered by the constraints of organized
language (e.g. self-censoring, rationalization, selectivity), they have been proposed as
extremely strong and uncluttered representations of thoughts.
However, our findings question the validity of the free elicitation technique. Compared to
conditions in which some kind of anonymity was induced, one-word associations elicited in the
control group were less predictive ofbrand attitudes and intentions. In short, our findings suggest
that respondents distorted their responses under this condition in terms ofwithholdning
associations and reporting associations later than they were actually activated. Still, one-word
associations could be a better technique than many others. Our findings merely indicate that even
for this unstructured technique, consumers might distort their responses.
One practical implication of the fmdings is that anonymous conditions should be induced in
elicitation interviews, even when free elicitation is being used. Specifically, our results indicate that
for some brands, free elicitation tasks framed in the third person may evoke associations which are
more predictive ofbrand attitudes and intentions. Our suggestion ofusing several anonymity-
inducing techniques is consonant with the general recommendation oftriangulation -- use of
different complementary techniques -- in qualitative market research (Sampson 1986). Notably, we
suggest that anonymity-inducing techniques are varied between and not within respondents. The
superior performance ofthird-person questioning was not observed in the group subjected to both
self-administered questionnaires and third-person questioning. Similar results were reported by
Fisher (1993). This finding indicates that the use of other anonymity-inducing methods together
with third-person questioning might weaken the positive effects ofthis technique.
DISCUSSION 135
9.4. Limitations and directions for future research
Severallimitations of the study should be noted and considered in future research on this topic.
First, associations for only one brand were elicited in this study. Other results might have been
observed for different brands. Thus, the external validity of our findings is limited. Future
research should use different kinds ofbrands in order to examine effects of anonymity for brands
with differentially sensitive associations.
The main purpose of the empirical study was to examine potential effects of anonymity-inducing
techniques in elicitation interviews -- not to investigate alternative explanations of such effects.
Though we have argued that our findings are most consistent with a motivational explanation and
particularly the mechanism of attributive projection, our findings are open to multiple
interpretations. Future research comparing alternative explanations of anonymity-effects may
include one brand with demonstrably few sensitive associations and one other brand with very
sensitive associations. One would expect that cognitive effects of anonymity manipulations would
dominate for the insensitive brand and motivational effects for the sensitive brand. Relatedly, the
use of more sensitive brands than Mercedes, would possibly enable researchers to discover effects
which were not found in this study due to lack of statistical power. Inorder to establish the
presence of projection among respondents, measures of self-esteem should also be included in
future studies of self anonymity. As projection is seen as a defensive mechanism, self-esteem
could be used to indicate who do, and who do not project (BrameI1962; Lewis et al. 1994).
Several new measures were presented in this study. Operationalizations ofself- and social
anonymity need to be validated on other samples and with other brands. Also, further development
of measures of sensitivity is needed. In this study, sensitivity was mesured in terms of self-
reported ratings of the probability that each association would be withheld and not reported (the
question was asked in the third person as recommended by Sudman and Bradburn 1983).1t is
uncertain whether responses to such questions truly reflect respondents' own tendency to withhold
associations, especially if respondents are partly unconscious oftheir distortions. Alternative
measures ofpredictive ability should also be considered in future research. In particular,
investigations of the ability ofanonymity-inducing techniques to elicit associations which are
predictive of future brand evaluations or choices would be useful.
Finally, effects of anonymity on elicitation outcomes for other techniques than free elicitation
should be investigated in future resrearch. Since our study supports the contention that consumers
may distort their responses even during free association tasks, it is very likely that other more
structured techniques can be subjected to the same kind of distortion. In fact, we believe that
motivational distortion should be considered in all kinds ofinterviews because, irrespective of the
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specific techniques applied, people are asked to express themselves in some way or another. Thus,
interviewers necessarily create a situation in which basic needs for avoidance ofthreatening self-
knowledge, for self-esteem enhancement, and for identity development come into play.
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Appendix 1: Questionnaire for elicitation interview variables
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Spørsmål om oppgaven
Vær vennlig å svar raskt, men nøyaktig på alle spørsmål. Følg førsteinntrykket.
l . I hvilken grad hadde du personene nedenfor i tankene da du skrev ned tanker om merket?
Sett ring rundt ett tall på hver linje.
I svært I svært
LITEN grad STOR grad
En slags "typisk siviløkonomstudent" 2 3 4 5 6 7
En eller flere studenter jeg kjenner 2 3 4 5 6 7
Deg selv 2 3 4 5 6 7
2. I hvilken grad er du enig eller uenig i disse utsagnene om oppgaven du var med på?
HeIt llENffi HeIt EN.l!!:
Jeg følte meg trygg på at ingen uved- 2 3 4 5 6 7
kommende ville få greie på hva jeg skrev
Jeg følte meg helt trygg på at mine svar 2 3 4 5 6 7
ville bli konfidensielt behandlet
Jeg hadde full tillit til at svarene jeg gav 2 3 4 5 6 7
ville bli behandlet på en slik måte at ingen
uvedkommende ville finne ut hva jeg skrev
3. I hvilken grad er du enig eller uenig i disse utsagnene om oppgaven du var med på?
HeIt UENIG Helt E.N!.G
Jeg følte at den måtenjeg svarte på 2 3 4 5 6 7
sikret at ingen andre enn jeg selv ville
få greie på hva jeg hadde skrevet om
dette merket
Jeg var trygg på at ingen. selv ikke 2 3 4 5 6 7
intervjueren, ville vite at det var jeg
som skrev ned disse tankene
Jeg følte meg sikker på at ingen 2 3 4 5 6 7
ville kunne knytte mitt navn til
de tankene jeg skrev ned
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4o Nedenfor presenteres flere utsagn om oppgaven du var med påoVær vennlig å sett ett kryss på
hver linje etter hvilken beskrivelse som passer best.
Det hadde ingen betydning
for meg hva jeg svarte
· . . . . . . .o_o_o_o_o_o_o_o Det hadde stor betydning
for meg hva jeg svarte
Det var ikke relevant for
meg hva jeg svarte
Det var ikke viktig for meg
hvajeg svarte
· . . . . . . .o_o_o_o_o_o_o_o
Det var relevant for meg
hva jeg svarte
Det var viktig for meg
hva jeg svarte
Det var interessant for
meg hva jeg svarte
Jeg var engasjert i hva jeg
skulle svare
· . . . . . . .o_o_o_o_o_o_o_o
Det var uinteressant for
meg hva jeg svarte
Jeg var ikke engasjert i
hva jeg skulle svare
· . . . . . . .o_o_o_o_o_o_o_o
· . . . . . . .o_o_o_o_o_o_o_o
5 ° Sett en ring rundt ett tall på hver linje etter hvor enig/uenig du er i påstandene nedenfor om
oppgaven du var med på,
Helt UENIG Helt ENIG
Instuksjonen som ble gitt, gjorde det 2 3 4 5 6 7
uklart hva jeg egentlig skulle gjøre
Jeg var svært usikker på hva intervjueren 2 3 4 5 6 7
mente da han forklarte hva jeg skulle gjøre
Jeg hadde det helt klart for meg hva jeg skulle 2 3 4 5 6 7
gjøre under denne oppgaven
6oHar du møtt intervjueren før? JA NEI
'l.Hva tror du var formålet med denne assosiasjons-oppgaven?
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8. Andre opplysninger
A. Din alder: år
B. Kjønn:
152
Kvinne D Mann D
TAKK FOR HJELPEN!
Appendix 2: Questionnaire for stage two
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A. Vurderinger av bilmerker
Hvor enig eller uenig er du i påstandene nedenfor om de fire bilmerkene?
Benytt følgende skala:
Veldig
uenig Uenig
Hverken
eller Enig
Veldig
enig
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Fyll ut alle rutene i tabellen nedenfor med tall fra 1-9 i henhold til skalaen.
BILMERKER
PÅSTANDER BMW AUDI MERCEDES VOLVO
Dette bilmerket liker jeg
Dette er et meget bra bilmerke
Dette bilmerket har høy kvalitet
Jeg har et meget godt inntrykk
av dette bilmerket
Jeg kommer til å vurderere dette
merket neste gang jeg skal kjøpe bil
Jeg kommer nok til å vurdere å kjøpe dette
merket en gang i fremtiden
Jeg kommer sannsynligvis til å velge dette
merket neste gang jeg skal kjøpe bil
Dersom det ble snakk om dette merket, ville
jeg uttale meg positivt om det
Dersom noen jeg kjenner skulle kjøpe bil og
spurte om hva jeg mente, ville jeg anbefale
dette merket
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B. Nedenfor finner du en rekke tanker som kan være knyttet til bilmerker. I hvilken
grad passer disse tankene til de fire bilmerkene?
Benytt følgende skala:
Passer Passer Hverken Passer
svært dårlig ikke eller Passer svært godt
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
BILMERKER
TANKER OM BILMERKER BMW AUDI MERCEDES VOLVO
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
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C. I hvilken grad oppfatter du tankene nedenfor som positive eller negative?
Svært Hverken Svært
TANKER negativt Negativt eller Positivt positivt
1. 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
2. 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
3. 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
4. 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
5. 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
6. 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
7. 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
8. 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
9. 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
10. 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
11. 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
12. 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
13. 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
14. 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
15. 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
16. 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
17. 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
18. 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
19. 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
20. 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
21. 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
22. 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
23. 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
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D. Tenk deg at en person ble spurt om å fortelle hvilke tanker han/hun hadde om
bilmerket Mercedes og at tankene nedenfor dukket opp i hans/hennes
hukommelse. Hvor sanns~nlig tror du det vil være at han eller hun nevner disse
tankene eller velger å holder dem tilbake?
Han/hun vil heit sikkert Han/hun vil helt sikkert
LA VÆRE å nevne NEVNE denne tanken_
denne tanken
1. 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
2. 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
3. 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
4. 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
5. 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
6. 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
7. 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
8. 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
9. 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
10. 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Il. 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
12. 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
13. 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
14. 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
15. 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
16. 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
17. 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
18. 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
19. 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
20. 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
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E. Nedenfor ber vi deg beskrive din kunnskap/erfaring med biler.
1. Vurder din kunnskap om personbiler i forhold til den gjennomsnittlige bilkunde:
En av de
minst
kunnskapsrike
2 3 4 5 6
En av de
7 mest
kunnskapsrike
2. Sett en ring rundt det tallet som beskriver din fortrolighet med personbiler:
Overhodet
ikke fortrolig 1 2 3 4 5 6
Ekstremt
7 fortrolig
3. a. Hvor mange ganger har du kjøpt bil?
b. Omtrent hvor mange km kjører du pr. år?
Antall ganger: _
Antall km: _
C. Omtrent hvor mange ulike bilmerker har du kjørt? Antall merker: _
(inklusive biler du har lånt/prøvekjørt)
e. Hvor mange forskjellige bilmerker har du eid? Antall merker:
F. Ditt forhold til biler. I hvilken grad er du enig i påstandene?
Helt Helt
UENIG ENIG
1. Hvilken bil jeg velger er veldig viktig for meg 2 3 4 5
2. Jeg er svært interessert i biler 2 3 4 5
3. Jeg bryr meg ikke om biler i det hele tatt 2 3 4 5
4. Jeg liker (event. ville like) å kjøpe bil 2 3 4 5
5. Å kjøpe bil er som å gi meg selv en gave 2 3 4 5
6. Jeg har stor glede av biler 2 3 4 5
7. Du kan si mye om en person ut fra bilen hanlhun kjøper 2 3 4 5
8. Den bilen folk kjøper sier noe om hvem de er 2 3 4 5
9. Den bilen jeg kjøper gjenspeiler min personlighet 2 3 4 5
10. Det er ikke så farlig å velge feil bil 2 3 4 5
Il. Jeg ville synes det var veldig ergerlig dersom jeg 2 3 4 5
fant ut at jeg hadde valgt en dårlig bil
12. Det er veldig irriterende å velge feil bil 2 3 4 5
13. Jeg er usikker på hvilken bil jeg vil velge neste 2 3 4 5
gang jeg skal kjøpe bil
14. Når en kjøper bil kan en aldri være heit sikker på om 2 3 4 5
en gjør det rette valget
15. Det er vanskelig å velge bil 2 3 4 5
16. Det er lett å velge feil bil 2 3 4 5
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G. Nedenfor finner du en del personlighets-beskrivelser. I hvilken grad er
beskrivelsene nedenfor riktige for din personlighet?
Gene Gene
Helt -relt Delvis Delvis -relt Helt
feil feil feil riktig riktig riktig
I' 1. Jeg har evnen til å endre adfred i sosiale O 2 3 4 5
situasjoner dersom jeg føler behov for det
2. Jeg har evnen til å kontrollere hvordan jeg O 2 3 4 5
opptrer i møte med andre mennesker,
avhengig av det inntrykket jeg ønsker å gi
~ 3. Jeg kan lett endre adferd dersom jeg føler O 2 3 4 5
at jeg gjør et dårlig inntrykk
i 4. Jeg har problemer med å endre adferd for å O 2 3 4 5
tilpasse meg ulike mennesker og situasjoner
5. Jeg har erfart at jeg kan tilpasse egen O 2 3 4 5
adferd til hvilken som helst situasjon
6. Jeg har problemer med å sette opp en god O 2 3 4 5
fasade, selv når det er til min fordel
i' 7. Når jeg ser hva situasjonen krever, er det O 2 3 4 5
enkelt for meg å tilpasse adferden
JI< 8. Jeg er ofte i stand til å «lese» folks virkelige O 2 3 4 5
følelser i øynene deres.
9. Når jeg samtaler med noen, legger jeg O 2 3 4 5
merke til selv de minste endringer i ansikts-
uttrykket til den jeg samtaler med
e- 10. Min intuisjon er svært god når det gjelder O 2 3 4 5
å forstå andres følelser og motiver
11. Jeg vil som regel legge merke til om noen O 2 3 4 5
synes en vits er smakløs, selv om de ler
overbevisende av den
)( 12. Dersom jeg har sagt noe upassende, viljeg O 2 3 4 5
som regel kunne «lese» det i øynene til de som
hører på
13. Dersom noen lyver for meg, vil jeg som O 2 3 4 5
oftest se det på personen umiddelbart
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